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General Introduction
Development economics stresses the role of agriculture in the developing world, given the
importance of the sector in the economies of developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa,
the poorest region in the world, relies on agriculture for 15% of its GDP, and about 52%
of its jobs, although this importance has been decreasing over time. 1 The sector provided
more than 60% of jobs and contributed to 20% of the GDP in the early 1990s. This shift
in labor composition has been absorbed mainly by the tertiary sector, which has increased
from about 45% to above 50% during the same period. This picture of the current state
and the transitions in the economy of Sub-Sahara Africa is quite heterogeneous across
countries, and motivates the importance of adopting different sets of policies to address
economic questions in general, and labor market issues in particular.
The economy of Senegal, a West African country, has a structure and an evolution similar
to the common trend across the continent. Agriculture contributes to 30% of current jobs,
down from nearly 50% in the early 1990s, while the share of services in total employment
has been increasing, from a little below 40% in the 1990s to 55% at the end of the 2010s.
Additionally, informality is a prominent feature of the economy, with an estimated 90%
of non-agricultural jobs being informal. South Africa is an example of a country with a
different evolution, one that is in some ways typical of other Southern African countries
1All the statistics in this section come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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but in other ways includes labor market features that are linked to the country’s unique
history. Agriculture has always represented a lower share of the economy due to the
effects and legacy of land ownership rules present during the apartheid period. Only 5%
of individuals are currently employed in the agricultural sector, a proportion that was
11% in the early 1990s. The economy is dominated by the service sector, which currently
contributes to 72% of jobs. Two main features of its labor market distinguish South Africa
from other countries. The first is South Africa’s large unemployment rate, estimated at
28% in 2018, one of the largest in the world; as a comparison, the average unemployment
is 6.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa in the same year. 2 The second feature is the low share of
the informal sector in South Africa, which accounts for about a third of non-agricultural
jobs in the country.
In this dissertation, I study strategies that individuals and governments can take to increase
job opportunities or to get better returns from existing activities, given the particularities
of these two countries mentioned above. In South Africa, where jobs come mostly from
the formal non-agricultural sector, I investigate whether a policy intervention, wage sub-
sidies, and an informal institution, ethnic capital, can help individuals improve their labor
market outcomes, in a context with important labor market imperfections. In Senegal,
where agriculture still has a significant share in employment, I investigate whether an
intervention through farmer cooperatives can help improve the welfare of members.
Young workers are particularly affected by the imperfections in South Africa’s labor mar-
ket. In 2018, 52% of job seekers aged between 15 and 24 were unemployed, making
2Unemployment is higher in the Southern African region, but still much lower than South Africa’s.
Across South Africa’s neighboring countries, Namibia has unemployment rate currently at 20%, whereas
this rate is 18% in Botswana.
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South Africa the country with the highest youth unemployment rate in the world. 3To ad-
dress this particular issue, the government implemented the Employment Tax Incentive, a
wage subsidy that reduces taxes paid by employers if they hire young workers. The policy
offers a unique opportunity to contribute to our knowledge base on the effectiveness of
wage subsidies implemented at scale, as most evidence from developing countries come
from small-scale experiments, and because the subsidy represented a large share of the
wages of covered workers. The first chapter of this dissertation assesses the effect of the
policy and shows that the policy was not effective in improving labor market outcomes
for young workers, despite the higher-than-expected take-up of the policy. The chapter
discusses the potential reasons for the failure of this policy, in particular the fact that the
policy did not consider the structural reasons for unemployment.
The second chapter looks at labor market outcomes for internal migrants in South Africa.
Like international migrants, internal migrants move to new places in search of better op-
portunities, relying on their contacts to decide where to move to and to find opportunities
once they arrive there. This aspect, however, has not been studied in the literature as much
as international migration, despite the importance of the question. Internal migration is
an important phenomenon in developing countries, and in particular, a major contributor
to the increasing urbanization. Additionally, social networks and their use are prevalent
in the context of developing countries. The second chapter proxies for social networks
with ethnic groups. I follow Borjas (1992) by defining ethnic capital as the resources
that an internal migrant might benefit from based on his ethnic group, and look at how
the average characteristics of the ethnic group explain occupation choices and chances of
3The 15-24 age range is chosen to reflect the official ILO youth unemployment rate.
3
employment.
The third chapter of this dissertation is concerned with the agricultural sector in Sene-
gal, and it investigates one way in which small farmers may get better access to markets:
collective commercialization through their cooperatives. Researchers and policymakers
have long considered cooperatives as a way by which farmers can get access to better
markets by aggregating their output. Those cooperatives exist but try and mostly fail to
aggregate their output to sell. The third chapter frames this question as a lack of coordi-
nation and investigates an intervention that can help address this failure. Using the case
of peanut farmer cooperatives in Senegal and a series of lab-in-the-field and randomized
controlled experiments, we test the effectiveness of “cheap talk” to enhance coordination
and collective commercialization within these cooperatives. The chapter also highlights
the interplay between “cheap talk” and group size in addressing coordination failure, a
result that has not been explored previously in the literature.
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Chapter 1: Failed Promises of a Wage Subsidy: Youth and South Africa’s
Employment Tax Incentive
1.1 Introduction
Youth unemployment is a global challenge. Around the world, young workers face un-
employment rates two to four times those of the overall population. They struggle to
transition into the labor market, even after investing in education to increase their chances
of integration.1 Addressing this challenge is a particularly important policy question for
developing countries, given their relatively young populations and how the issue’s signifi-
cance can be important for economic growth.2 High youth unemployment rates mean that
a large share of the active population is not contributing to the growth of the economy
or accumulating the experience that would in turn increase these workers’ productivity.
Human capital accumulated through schooling could also be depleted through long spells
of unemployment. Finally, unemployment can produce negative externalities such as vi-
olence, crime, and social unrest, due to the frustration of those who are not able to get a
1Filmer and Fox (2014) note that transition into the labor market is a multifaceted issue, with some
young individuals experiencing periods of economic activity while in school, many others transitioning via
their parents’ or relatives’ business and farms, and some making it into the formal sector after experiencing
long spells of unemployment.
2In 2014, the median individual was 18 years old in Africa, 7 years younger than in South Asia, the
second-youngest region. The population in Africa is projected to stay young, with a projected median age
of 25 in 2050. (Filmer and Fox, 2014).
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job, conditions that further deter investment by businesses.3 To address the issue, policy-
makers have considered interventions such as active labor market policies.4 Economists
have regained interest in the effectiveness of these policies due to their widespread use to
mitigate the 2008 global recession; however, not enough is known about how these in-
terventions affect employment, especially wage subsidies in developing countries (Card
et al., 2015; Kluve et al., 2017; McKenzie, 2017).5
South Africa has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world. In the first quarter
of 2018, 52% of South Africans aged 15 to 24 years were unemployed.6 The youth
unemployment rate is in part a consequence of the overall high unemployment rate in the
country; in the first quarter of 2018, South Africa’s overall unemployment rate was 27%.7
South Africa’s labor market in that regard remains an outlier, both among countries with
the same level of development (especially Latin American countries) and among Sub-
Saharan African countries.8 Over the two decades following the end of apartheid in 1994,
unemployment has risen continuously, except for a short period of strong growth in the
2000s that ended with the 2008 global recession. The situation is particularly severe
for Black South Africans (30% of them are unemployed versus 11% of White South
3See Cramer (2010) for a discussion of the literature on youth unemployment and violence, with a
focus on developing countries. Blattman and Ralston (2015) also discuss employment and social stability,
emphasizing the role of employment programs.
4See the literature review for a discussion of active labor market policies.
5In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, a report by the International Labor Organization and
the World Bank revealed that almost all countries took some counter-cyclical measures, includ-
ing 23 countries that had some wage subsidies, primarily in terms of reducing social contributions
by employers. See http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/
documents/publication/wcms_186324.pdf
6The situation is particularly problematic given the size of South Africa’s population. Based on World
Bank statistics, South Africa has a population twice as large as any other country with a youth unemploy-
ment rate above 40 percent.
7Data are from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey Statistical release for the 2018Q1: http://www.
statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2018.pdf
8By comparison, Nigeria, the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, just preceding South Africa, had
an unemployment rate of 19% in the third quarter of 2017.
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Africans), which suggests that inequality in the labor market is a major contributor to
income inequality in the country.9
South Africa has implemented the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) to address its youth
unemployment issue. It is a wage subsidy, initially proposed by Levinsohn (2007), which
offers tax reductions to firms that hire young workers. The presence of a high youth
unemployment, and a high retention in the formal sector were the rationale for this policy,
as this could arguably serve as stepping stone into the labor market for young workers.
10 The government adopted the proposal and signed it into law in December 2013. The
wage subsidy was phased in as a pilot program until 2016 and later extended due to
higher than expected take-up by firms (National Treasury, 2016), although the extension
was supposed to be conditional on effectiveness. To date, a few papers have attempted
to analyze the ETI’s impact on young workers’ labor market outcomes (Ebrahim et al.,
2017; Moeletsi, 2017; Ranchhod and Finn, 2016), but they have yet to produce conclusive
evidence of the ETI’s causal impact. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which the
Employment Tax Incentive affected labor market outcomes of young workers.
By analyzing the ETI, I contribute to the literature on the impact of wage subsidies on
youth employment in developing countries and provide one of only a handful evaluations
of policies implemented at a national level. Similar policies have been evaluated in the
literature, including the “Stage d’Initiation à la Vie Professionelle” (Initiation into the
World of Work - SIVP) in Tunisia (Broecke, 2013), the post-2008 Employment Subsidy
9Income distribution in the country remains largely unequal, with one of the highest Gini coefficients in
the world, and inequality, if anything, has worsened over time. See Sulla and Zikhali (2018) for a detailed
report on inequality in South Africa.
10See section 1.3.1 for a further discussion of South Africa’s labor market institutional features, and how
a wage subsidy is a potential policy to address the high youth unemployment.
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Program in Turkey (Balkan et al., 2016), the Youth Employment Subsidy in Chile (Bravo
and Rau, 2013), and the First Employment Law in Colombia (Ariza and Cedano, 2017).
The ETI is different from these policies mainly because it offers larger subsidies as a share
of the wages paid; its value is as high as half the wages paid, whereas other subsidies
studied amount to between 10 and 20 percent of wages. Furthermore, the ETI covers a
broader share of workers, compared to the policy in Tunisia that targeted recent graduates
or the policy in Chile that targeted poor young workers. It also covers a wider range of
the income distribution, including earnings well above the median and the current national
minimum wage. Finally, unlike Turkey’s program that was first designed to counter the
effects of a recession, South Africa implemented the ETI independently of the business
cycle. There have been some evaluations of wage subsidies on youth employment in
developing countries using small-scale randomized control trials (Galasso et al. (2004) in
Argentina, Groh et al. (2016) in Jordan), including a pilot evaluation in the case of South
Africa (Levinsohn et al., 2014).11 There is a debate on how scaling up policies changes
their effectiveness; as such additional analysis of at-scale policy would contribute to our
knowledge on the subject when it comes to wage subsidies.
By studying the effect of the ETI, I also contribute to the literature on youth unemploy-
ment in South Africa. The alarming youth unemployment rate not only makes any poten-
tial policy of interest in itself, but analyzing the ETI can also help policymakers rethink
that policy or inform future decisions. The importance of the structural features underly-
ing South Africa’s high unemployment rate casts doubt on the effectiveness of any policy
11An additional evaluation by de Mel et al. (2019) examines subsidies for small firms to hire additional
workers, but without restriction on age for the workers to hire. The firms hired workers that were 31.5 years
old on average.
8
that does not adequately address those features. Economists often mention four main fea-
tures: minimum wage laws, skill mismatches between labor supply and labor demand,
firing regulations, and unions (Banerjee et al., 2008).12 Minimum wage laws in South
Africa potentially deter employers from hiring, especially hiring young workers, as their
productivity is likely below the statutory minimum.13 The goal of a wage subsidy is to
make these minimum wages less binding, by reducing the actual cost of labor. However,
high firing costs are another feature in South Africa that could make firms reluctant to hire
new young workers, even when a subsidy is offered, especially a temporary one. Firms
perceive firing costs as very high, due to the legislation that imposes high hurdles on firing
a worker and due to the unpredictable implementation of this legislation by labor courts
(Bhorat et al., 2014). In fact, the initial policy proposal suggested a “no-questions-asked”
dismissal period associated with the implementation of the ETI, but this suggestion never
made it into the actual policy.
Finally, I contribute to the literature on wage subsidies in South Africa by providing reli-
able causal estimates of the impact of the ETI on young workers’ labor market outcomes.
In order for a firm to be able to claim the subsidy for of a given worker, the worker had to
be recently hired (after October 2013) and aged 18 to 29 at the time of the claim. These
criteria suggest using a difference-in-difference strategy to estimate the effects of the pol-
icy on the employment outcomes of young workers. I study individuals born between
1979 and 1988, who would have been between 26 and 35 in the first year of implementa-
tion of the policy. In this sample, the cohorts 1984-1988 are eligible for the subsidy, and
12See the section on South Africa’s labor market for a more detailed discussion.
13This is a recurring point in evaluations of wage subsidies: firms report that they do not hire workers
because of the restrictions on wages. See Galasso et al. (2004) and Groh et al. (2016).
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I use the cohorts 1979-1983 as a control group. This is a departure from Ranchhod and
Finn (2016), who uses the sample of all working age individuals for their estimation, but
an approach that Moeletsi (2017) previously used. I improve on Moeletsi (2017) by con-
trolling for experience, a key dimension along which eligible and ineligible cohorts differ.
Intuitively, labor outcomes of young workers catch up with those of their older peers over
time, as they accrue more experience; also, the relative importance of experience early
in the life cycle has been documented in South Africa (Banerjee et al., 2008; Levinsohn,
2007). However, experience is not measured in the dataset available on workers’ labor
market outcomes. I address this by constructing a proxy for experience at an aggregate
level. Finally, I use workers’ information to analyze the ETI, instead of firms’ data, as
the design of the policy provides a criterion that allows estimation of causal effects on
workers instead of firms. Ebrahim et al. (2017) studied the effect of the ETI using firms’
administrative data. There are reasons to be cautious about the endogenous nature of
firms’ decision to claim the subsidy, even when a conditional difference-in-difference is
used. For instance, firms that take up the subsidy likely anticipate that they will grow.
The results by Ebrahim et al. (2017) are to be interpreted with caution because of this
endogenous decision.
My results show that overall, the ETI did not lead to a significant increase in employment
for young individuals.14 Given the precision of my estimates, I can rule out improve-
ment in overall employment in the order of 1 percentage point.15 I find that men seem
to have been more affected, as the estimates are consistent with larger effects than those
14Although these results are similar to Ranchhod and Finn (2016), it is worth stressing that I do find this
result on a sample that is optimal for identifying the causal effects of the policy.
15These results rule out the effects found by Moeletsi (2017), suggesting the importance of controlling
for experience when estimating the effect of the policy.
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for women. Indeed, if anything, my results imply that the policy led to decreased em-
ployment for women, but for reasons that I discuss later, this should be interpreted with
caution. I find no differential effects with respect to race or education, two other im-
portant dimensions that affect outcomes on South Africa’s labor market (Banerjee et al.,
2008; Kingdon and Knight, 2004). The evidence in this paper finally suggests that there is
no heterogeneous effect with respect to industrial sectors or local labor market conditions.
Taken together, these results imply that reducing labor costs may not be sufficient to
induce firms to hire young workers. I argue that other constraints must be addressed in
addition to reducing labor costs in order to improve employment rates for young workers.
One such constraint is firing regulations in the country. 16 When firms make hiring
decisions in a dynamic setting, with a wage subsidy that lasts at most two years, they
take into account the probability that they might hire a worker for whom the costs of
firing might exceed the value of the wage subsidy, together with the forgone profit. If
those costs exceed the benefit from the wage subsidy, then firms would be unwilling to
hire young workers. This reasoning is in accordance with the literature as McKenzie
(2017) noted that wage subsidies tend to be more successful in settings where firms are
not required to register workers, suggesting that labor regulations are an important barrier
to the success of wage subsidies.17
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss the literature about
16In the present analysis, I have not been able to exhibit which of these constraints are responsible for the
absence of positive effects of the policy. The choice to present how firing regulations may have affected the
effectiveness of the policy is purely arbitrary. In section 1.3.1, I discuss how the different constraints could
potentially undermine the effectiveness of a wage subsidy.
17A related paper is Hardy and McCasland (2017) who studies the effects of a placement service for
apprentices in Ghana. Among firms who expressed interest in hiring apprentices with no entry fees unlike
what is regularly done, firms assigned no apprentice did not subsequently hire any worker. The paper cites
frictions in screening apprentices’ ability or skills as a barrier for these firms young apprentices.
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wage subsidies, with a focus on empirical evidence in developing countries. Second, I
present the main features of South Africa’s labor market. Third, I explain the policy, and I
present the data and my empirical strategy. Fourth, I present and discuss the results from
my estimation. Finally, I conclude by discussing the lessons learned from evaluating this
policy.
1.2 Wage subsidies in the literature
Wage subsidies are one type of active labor market policies, a category of policies that
intervene in the labor market to correct imperfections, in order to improve employment
prospects of some or all workers.18 They are in contrast to passive labor market policies
that provide income replacement to individuals that have lost or do not have a job.19 20
1.2.1 Wage subsidies conceptually
Theoretical discussions of wage subsidies date back to Kaldor (1936). As mentioned in
Katz (1996), the “basic idea behind (employer-side) wage subsidies is to reduce the costs
to firms of employing the targeted group of workers thereby stimulating demand for these
workers and raising their employment rates and earnings.” This shifts out the demand for
the labor of the targeted group, and the effects on employment depend on labor demand
and labor supply elasticities. However, that assumes that markets determine equilibrium
18See Betcherman et al. (2004) and Card et al. (2015) for general meta-analyses, Kluve et al. (2017) for
a survey of policies targeted at youth, and McKenzie (2017) for a survey of studies in developing countries.
19These include, for instance, welfare benefits and unemployment insurance.
20Besides wage subsidy programs, other active labor market policies are: (1) employment services that
focus on producing better matches between jobs and job seekers, (2) training programs in specific skills
that increase potential workers’ employment prospects, (3) public work programs, by which the govern-
ment directly provides short term jobs, and (4) micro-enterprise or self-employment development, which is
assistance (either financial or technical) to help individuals to develop their own businesses.
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wages. If wages are determined otherwise, it is not profitable for firms to hire workers
whose marginal productivity is under the prevailing wage (e.g., minimum wage), but wage
subsidies can induce firms to hire such workers by offsetting or reducing the perceived
productivity gap (Wolff and Stephan, 2013).
Theoretical discussions highlight implementation issues and have long recognized the
trade-off between general and targeted subsidies. A well-designed wage subsidy will
minimize the “windfall” that arises when firms merely receive money for workers that
they would have hired anyway. This consideration favors targeted subsidies over gen-
eral ones. For this reason, Layard and Nickell (1980) suggested subsidizing “marginal
employment” (subsidies conditional on increasing employment at the firm level), but rec-
ognized the difficulty of accurately identifying marginal employment. Katz (1996) made
the case for subsidies administrated as tax credits, in order to ease the burden of admin-
istration. However, targeted subsidies may come at the expense of distortions in labor
allocation or stigmatization of targeted workers. Targeted workers may be hired at the
expense of other similar workers (substitution effects) or other workers that are fired (dis-
placement effects).
Besides the incentive created for firms to hire targeted workers, wage subsidies can also be
justified by their long run effects, as accumulated experience raises workers’ productivity.
Advocates of wage subsidies view this as a justification despite concerns of substitution
among eligible and ineligible workers (Bell et al., 1999). This also hints at the fact that
wage subsidies can be more successful if they are combined with other activities that
enhance productivity, such as on-the-job training (Katz, 1996).
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1.2.2 Wage subsidies in developing countries
McKenzie (2017) reviewed experimental evidence on the effectiveness of active labor
market policies in developing countries. It follows from the discussion of experimental
evaluations of wage subsidies (de Mel et al., 2019; Galasso et al., 2004; Groh et al., 2016;
Levinsohn et al., 2014) that they have a limited overall impact on employment. However,
they can be useful as a temporary policy tool for the creation of short-term jobs. One
useful insight that potentially applies to the case of South Africa is that covering only
registered firms, or requiring eligible firms to register their workers, seems to lower the
effect. Groh et al. (2016) found a 38 percentage point increase in employment when firms
are not required to register workers hired through the wage subsidy, whereas Galasso et al.
(2004) found a 1.7 percentage point increase in employment when registration is required
and firms face a penalty if they fire the worker after the end of the subsidy period. This
suggests that wage subsidies are unlikely to be effective if firms have conditions on hir-
ing, and points especially to the fact that Levinsohn’s (2007) initial proposal suggested a
“no-questions-asked” dismissal period that did not make it to the actual policy implemen-
tation. The effect in Groh et al. (2016) is however not long-lived. 21
Evidence from nationally implemented policies comes in part from measures taken by
countries to counter the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. In Turkey, these pro-
grams were aimed at firms hiring new workers who were previously unemployed (Balkan
et al., 2016) whereas in Mexico, the policy aimed to prevent firms from firing workers
21One aspect that is missing in the literature is the effect of wage subsidies coupled with other interven-
tions, such as training for the workers. Groh et al. (2016) offered soft skills training in their context, but
this did not lead to differential effects.
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(Bruhn, 2016). In both studies, the policies increase employment, showing that wage
subsidies can be effective countercyclical measures. In particular, Balkan et al. (2016)
show stronger effect in regions with higher unemployment rates, and evidence from Bruhn
(2016) shows that firms could use the subsidies to hire enough workers to return to their
pre-crisis levels of employment.
Nationally implemented wage subsidies have different targeting. The policies in Chile
(Bravo and Rau, 2013) and Columbia (Ariza and Cedano, 2017) targeted young low wage
earners. The wage subsidy in Tunisia (Broecke, 2013) targeted recent college graduates.
Unlike these studies, my paper looks at a policy that has a broader eligibility criterion, as
all workers aged 18-29 were eligible. The post-2008 Employment Subsidy Program in
Turkey analyzed in Balkan et al. (2016) had even broader coverage, as firms could claim
subsidies for all women above 18 and for men aged 18-29. Wage subsidies sometimes
have targeting based only on firms. The policy in Turkey analyzed in Betcherman et al.
(2010) targeted the poorest provinces in the country while the one in Mexico (Bruhn,
2016) was available only for firms producing durable goods (e.g., firms in manufacturing
and construction industries).
Among the previous studies, two have investigated whether their positive employment
effects were driven by substitution or displacement effects, i.e. firms hiring workers, but
not creating new jobs overall in the economy. Betcherman et al. (2010) conduct an indirect
test examining economic activity by using energy consumption, whereas Bruhn (2016)
compared hiring patterns by eligible and ineligible industries. Bruhn (2016) found no
effects of substitution; although one should bear in mind that these results are estimated
in the aftermath of a recession, implying a large of pool of unemployed individuals to
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hire from. I discuss later the potential implications of displacement or substitution effects
given my results.
1.3 Context
1.3.1 South Africa’s labor market and youth unemployment
Economists point to four features as the main reasons for the high unemployment rate in
South Africa (Banerjee et al., 2008): minimum wage laws, skill mismatch, labor regula-
tions regarding firing, and unions.
South Africa adopted a national minimum wage in 2018, and it has been in effect since
January 2019. The level was set at ZAR 3500 a month, which was close to the median
monthly earnings at the time.22 Before 2019, minimum wages were defined at the sec-
toral level and negotiated between firms and workers’ unions at the district council level.
Studies of revisions to sectoral minimum wages found mixed results of these changes.23
Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) found that the creation of a minimum wage for domestic
workers who were not previously covered by such laws did not lead to a decrease in em-
ployment, whereas Bhorat et al. (2014) found that the institution of a minimum wage for
agricultural workers led to a decrease in employment for these workers. The high unem-
ployment in South Africa rate is consistent with a binding minimum wage that is higher
than the marginal productivity of unemployed workers (Banerjee et al., 2008). Young
workers are likely less productive than more experienced and likely older ones, because
22ZAR = South African Rand. Over the period that the policy covered, the exchange rate fluctuated
between 10 to 15 rands for a dollar.
23The lack of consensus on the employment effects of minimum wage is not specific to South Africa.
See for instance Card and Krueger (1994) and Neumark et al. (2014) for evidence in the US.
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on-the-job training and experience increase productivity. As such, minimum wages may
have a bigger impact on the employment of young workers. 24
A skill mismatch between labor demand and labor supply could explain both high unem-
ployment rates and the rise in unemployment in the decade following the end of apartheid.
Labor supply has increased, primarily through the addition of unskilled workers, at the
same time that the economy became more skill biased (Banerjee et al., 2008). There
are two sides of the nexus between skills and employment outcomes. The first relates to
the level of education. There are high returns to completing secondary school, but many
youths do not finish their secondary education. The second relates to the skills that ed-
ucation indeed confers to workers. Firms complain that education qualifications convey
little information on workers’ skills. Indeed, Carranza et al. (2019) show that skill certifi-
cation increases youth employment, by removing information frictions between workers
and employers regarding skills, whereas Abel et al. (2019) show that a reference letter
from previous employers increase callbacks and employment for women, although the
latter findings likely confound information frictions about both skills and experience.
The mechanism behind the link between labor regulations and unemployment in South
Africa is not clear, especially for firing regulations. The regulations appear to be no
different from those in Latin American or European countries that have stringent labor
regulations but much lower unemployment rates. However, firms cite high separation
costs as a deterrent for hiring decisions. Benjamin et al. (2010) suggest that labor courts
interpret the law inconsistently, raising the uncertainty of the outcome when a dismissal is
24Neumark and Wascher (2004) provide cross-country evidence that minimum wages decrease youth
employment, with a larger effect when there is no specific minimum wage for workers and when labor
standards and union coverage are higher. Gorry (2013) further provides theoretical evidence that minimum
wage interacts with the ability of a young worker to gain experience, leading to larger effects.
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challenged as unfair. Bertrand and Crepon (2019) further show that providing information
on labor regulations to firms make these firms hire substantially more workers.25 Because
there is no age restriction on these regulations, they are likely to be more binding for firms
when recruiting young workers, as these workers’ productivity is likely lower on average
and has greater variability, while their potential tenure is longer.26
The presence and strength of unions in the country reinforce the role of minimum wage
and labor regulations as constraints for job creation. Labor regulations explicitly grant
each worker the right to be represented by a union member, both during internal discus-
sions regarding dismissals and during court hearings. With unions’ support, workers have
better representation in courts and are more likely to have favorable outcomes during
trials. This likely raises firms’ costs of dismissal. Prior to the institution of a national
minimum wage, unions were also responsible for collective bargaining that sets wages at
sectoral and district council levels.
Given its high unemployment rate, it is surprising that informal employment in South
Africa is low, especially compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The share of
workers in informal employment is 34 percent of the total employment in South Africa,
compared to 72 percent in Africa and 53 percent in Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries (ILO, 2018). Plausible explanations include barriers to entry in terms of credit con-
25Bertrand and Crepon (2019) report effects 6 months after their intervention. One possible explanation
of their results is that providing information about regulations to firms did not make these firms create jobs,
but made them more confident in their hiring decisions, and consequently make them hire at a quicker pace
than without the information. As such, the effects found could be driven by quicker hires instead of job
creation.
26Firms might be able to identify some of the older workers who have high ability or high productivity
because of their experience, as these workers are more likely to get and mostly keep jobs, which would
show in their experience, for example on their resume. This is not the case for young workers, as they
usually do not have the experience. With this greater uncertainty about young workers’ productivity, there
are higher risks that firms get a worker with a low ability among young workers and that this worker might
be difficult to fire later, due to the regulations.
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straints, lack of skills and a lack of entrepreneurial culture due to the legacy of apartheid
(Kingdon and Knight, 2004). These constraints also account, to some extent, for why
firms in the formal sector do not hire more. Magruder (2012) further makes the case that
regulations in the formal sector spread to the informal sector; regarding wage settings
(recall the discussions above), they could raise wage expectations overall which nega-
tively impacts employment creation by small firms, thus possibly firms in the informal
sector. Young workers are usually disproportionately represented in the informal sector
(Filmer and Fox, 2014), so an unusually small informal sector may contribute to high
youth unemployment.
The high unemployment rate in South Africa has often raised questions about how unem-
ployed individuals meet their basic needs without labor income. One hypothesis is that
unemployed workers may rely on other sources of income and consequently that part of
unemployment might be voluntary. Transfers from social programs, especially the old
age pension, are one such source that is often mentioned. It is not clear however how
the presence of pensioners in a household affects the labor supply of working age mem-
bers. Studies that claim that the old age pension reduces labor supply (e.g., Bertrand
et al., 2003) ignore the effect on migration, as the pension seems to provide a relaxation
of financial constraints on migration for rural households (Ardington et al., 2009; Posel
et al., 2006). However, Abel (2019) suggests that the results may not generalize to the
whole country. These mixed results cast doubt on the hypothesis that income from social
programs alters labor supply behavior and leads to voluntary unemployment.
These features of South Africa’s labor market call into question how likely it is that a wage
subsidy will increase young workers’ employment. Minimum wages create a wedge or
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gap between marginal productivity and wages, which is likely larger for young workers
since they are less experienced and less productive. A wage subsidy lowers the costs
of labor, in this case of young workers’ labor. If we first ignore the dynamic aspect of
their decision-making, the wage subsidy may induce firms to hire more young workers
than otherwise, provided that the subsidy compensates for the gap between marginal pro-
ductivity and the minimum wage or other wage paid. Skills mismatches contribute to
the productivity gap; the lower the skills of young workers, the higher the wage subsidy
needs to be to induce firms to hire young workers. If there are skills that young workers
can acquire by on-the-job training, the wage subsidy then acts as a compensation for the
employer’s costs of training the worker. Firms without the subsidy would not have volun-
tarily incurred these costs, especially since there is no way to guarantee that the workers
will stay at the same firm once they are trained. 27
Labor regulations highlight the importance of considering the dynamics of firms’ deci-
sions and their uncertainty regarding young workers’ productivity. 28 In South Africa,
firing regulations imply that firms are uncertain that they could fire a worker once they
have hired him or her, or that they are uncertain of the cost at which they can fire the
worker. In the case of a permanent subsidy, these regulations would have little influence
on whether firms hire young workers. When the subsidy is temporary, however, the firm
27In theory, a solution to the costs of training faced by the employer (together with the risk that the worker
leaves once he or she is trained) is that the firms pay a lower wage at the beginning of the worker’s tenure,
and then increase the wage with tenure. However, wage floors in terms of a minimum wage could make
this impossible.
28The fact that firms are more uncertain of young workers productivity that they are of older ones plays
into how minimum wages affect the effectiveness of a wage subsidy. However, if there were no regulation
preventing form firing workers, firms can experiment with a wage subsidy, assured that they can fire the
worker once he or she is hired and the firm learns about his or her productivity. The uncertainty about
young worker’s productivity is thus more relevant in relation with labor regulations.
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needs to account for the possibility that it gets stuck with a worker that would be difficult
to fire; the productivity of the worker may well be above the actual costs of labor for the
firm during the subsidy period, but not afterwards. The presence of unions would tend
to reinforce the point on labor regulations, as unions represent workers in courts during
unfair firing trials. In the end, the decision to hire workers targeted by the subsidy will
depend on whether the subsidy offsets the previously perceived productivity gap, account-
ing for potential on-the-job training, but labor regulations make firms less likely to hire
despite the subsidy, especially given the uncertainty of young workers’ productivity.
1.3.2 The Employment Tax Incentive
Levinsohn (2007) first proposed a wage subsidy to tackle youth unemployment in South
Africa.29 The wage subsidy is justified by the fact that young workers face high unem-
ployment rates, but those who experience smooth transitions to work remain employed in
the future. The original proposal argued for an individual account for young job seekers
that they could use with any prospective employer. This framing seems to present youth
unemployment as a low supply of labor issue instead of a low demand for labor. How-
ever, it is firms that need to be incentivized since they do not create jobs. In the end, the
subsidy was implemented as a reduction in tax liabilities for employers. The initial pro-
posal also included a probationary period during which a “no-questions-asked” dismissal
policy would be in place, but this provision was not adopted.
29The other policy suggested is a reform on immigration policy that would encourage an influx of ed-
ucated migrants especially from other African countries. The reason for such a policy is that skilled and
unskilled labor are complement rather than substitutes. An increase in the level of education of the popu-
lation propelled by an immigration reform is thus likely to increase employment prospects for low skilled
labor.
21
The proposal was enacted into law as the Employment Tax Incentive Act which was
signed in December 2013. The bill made it clear from the onset that the wage subsidy
was a temporary policy, active from 2014 to 2016, that would be subject to a review
and considered for a non-guaranteed extension. Specifically, policymakers expected to
spend ZAR 5 billion over 3 years to create 178,000 new jobs for youths at a cost of
approximately ZAR 28,000 per job, while subsidizing 423,000 jobs.30 The policy has
since been extended twice, in 2016 and in 2018, and is still in implementation until 2029.
The decision to extend was based primarily on firms’ higher-than-expected take-up of
the subsidies. During the first two years of implementation, more than ZAR 6.3 billion
was claimed, with an estimated 650,000 jobs claimed in the fiscal year 2014/2015 alone
(National Treasury, 2016).
The wage subsidy has eligibility criteria on both the firm and the worker side. The firm
needs to be registered for Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) for employee income tax purposes.
Firms in the public sector are not eligible. Firms can also only claim deductions if they
do not owe the South African Revenue Service any money. The bill requires that no older
worker is displaced as the consequence of the young worker being hired, upon penalty
of ZAR 30,000 and the possibility of losing the firm’s eligibility to claim the incentive in
the future. Finally, the employee’s wage needs to be in accordance with minimum wage
regulations. For their part, employees need to be between 18 and 29 years old, for the
firm to claim the subsidy on their behalf. The other important restriction regarding the
employee is that he or she may not be related to the employer.
30As a comparison, the government social protection programs amounted to ZAR 130 billion for the
fiscal year 2013/2014. These programs primarily include the old age pension and the child support grant.
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The employer can claim the wage subsidy as a reduction in taxes owed the National
Treasury.31 The subsidized amount per eligible worker hired depends on the wage he or
she is paid, as shown in Figure 1.1. The amounts shown correspond to the subsidies for
full-time workers. For part-time workers, the subsidy is proportional to the earnings that
would have been paid if the worker was working full time, at the same wage rate. The
subsidies can be claimed by an employer for the same worker for up to two years. The
value of the subsidy falls by half in the second year it is claimed by the same firm, for the
same worker.
Figure 1.1: Amount of the ETI subsidy
Notes: The vertical line denotes the median monthly earnings the year before the ETI was implemented.
1.3.3 Previous evaluations of wage subsidies in South Africa
Prior to the implementation of the Employment Tax Incentive, Levinsohn and Pugatch
(2014) used a search model estimated using the Cape Area Panel Study data to perform
31Employers are subject to monthly withholding, including income tax that they pay to the South Africa
Revenue Service. While paying the amount that they owe, firms deduct the subsidy and pay only the net
amount due for withholding for all their workers. In case their total withholding is below the total subsidy
owed, the excess is paid back to the employer as part of the reconciliation that employers must submit twice
a year.
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a prospective analysis of the impact of the policy. The study focuses on how the search
behavior of workers responds to the subsidy, but their model does not incorporate firms’
decisions, even though the statutory incidence of the subsidy is on firms. Levinsohn and
Pugatch (2014) show that a wage subsidy can increase reservation wages, although when
combined with the increase of the value of searching for a job, the net result is an increase
in youth employment. They estimated that a ZAR 1,000 subsidy would decrease youth
unemployment by 12 percentage points.
Levinsohn et al. (2014) later conducted an experiment piloting a wage subsidy voucher
for young workers. A sample of 4000 youths aged 20-24 at baseline was divided into a
wage voucher group and a control group. Follow-up surveys show that individuals who
were offered the voucher were 7 percentage points more likely to be employed one year
later (the period during which the voucher was redeemable) and 10 percentage points
more likely to be employed two years later. Attrition is important, however, and may be
driving the medium term effects. Besides this point, the authors noted that their results
may be driven by the control groups turning down more job offers, especially when they
are in households that have other employed individuals.
After the ETI was implemented, Ranchhod and Finn (2016) carried out a short term evalu-
ation using the Quarterly Labor Force Survey. Using a difference-in-difference estimation
strategy, they found no effects in the first year of policy implementation. Moeletsi (2017)
later identified a flaw in their definition of the treatment group. Ranchhod and Finn (2016)
defined the treatment group by current age (the below 30 group), rather than by age at the
time of implementation. Moeletsi corrected this by defining the treatment group in term
of fixed cohorts (born after 1985). Moeletsi’s approach is an improvement, but it fails
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to account for workers’ experience, which is likely to bias his estimates up, since young
workers will catch up with the older ones over time as they gain more experience.
Ebrahim et al. (2017) use firms’ administrative data to compare firms that claimed the
tax incentive to firms that did not, before and during the implementation of the policy.
They use a combination of matching and difference-in-difference methods. Their results
indicate that, on average, firms that claimed the incentive hired more youths than to firms
that did not. However, they found that hiring of non beneficiaries (workers aged 30 or
above) increased by about the same amount. This most likely means that they capture the
fact that firms that took up the subsidy would have hired workers even without the ETI.
Using administrative records, they compute the deadweight loss due to subsidized jobs
that would have been created anyway, given their estimates. Their results indicate that
only 8% of claims can be attributed to newly created jobs, a very small share compared
to similar policies in other countries.
1.4 Data and methodology
1.4.1 Data: the Quarterly Labor Force Survey
The Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) provides the best available information on
South African labor market outcomes at the worker level, given its frequency and its
national scope.32 Since 2008, the QLFS has collected information from a nationally rep-
resentative sample, at a quarterly frequency. It is a rotating panel in which one fourth
32Other available datasets are the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS), a panel survey conducted
every two years since 2008, and the General Household Survey, which is conducted once a year as a general
purpose survey but also collects labor market information.
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of the sample is replaced each quarter. 33 The sampling unit is the residential address,
whereas the unit of observation is the household. As such, in case of residential turnover,
the new household is surveyed in place of the older one. Each household is interviewed
in a maximum of four consecutive quarters.
In order to obtain repeated and independent cross-sections and avoid issues of correlated
measures within households over time, I restrict the sample used in my analysis to the first
time each dwelling unit in the survey is observed in the data, which I call the incoming
rotation group. The rotation groups are designed such that each group has “the same dis-
tribution pattern as that which is observed in the whole sample” (Statistics South Africa,
2008) and this ensures that the incoming rotation group constitutes a nationally repre-
sentative sample. Using the incoming rotation group avoids attrition issues, especially
if individuals or households leave the survey in ways that are related to eligibility to the
ETI.34 Papers such as Verick (2012) have used algorithms to recover the panel structure
of the dataset, specifically by tracking changes in the structure of the households inter-
viewed in the same dwelling place. As I am not interested in changes within individuals
but in comparing cohorts over time (see more on the methodology in the section below),
the repeated cross-section component is suitable for the analysis. Also, given the short
33This dataset can be compared to the US Current Population Survey, which also has a rotating panel
structure. According to the United States Census Bureau, “households from all 50 states and the District of
Columbia are in the survey for 4 consecutive months, out for 8, and then return for another 4 months
before leaving the sample permanently”. (see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-
documentation/methodology.html). For the QLFS, dwelling units are in the survey for four consecutive
quarters and then leave the sample permanently.
34In order to have a sample of independent cross-sections, studies in the US that use the CPS usually
resort to the outgoing rotation group, i.e. households that are leaving out the survey for four months or
indefinitely, but more so because these households are asked additional questions. In the case of the QLFS,
since there is no additional advantage of using the equivalent outgoing rotation group, using the incoming
rotation makes more sense. It further avoids attrition issues, to the extent that these issues are not properly
accounted for by the weight corrections performed by Statistics South Africa.
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length of time that individuals stay in the panel (four consecutive quarters at most), the
panel dimension of the dataset is not useful for my estimation strategy.
The QLFS is designed to be representative at the province level, and within the province
level, at the metropolitan/non-metropolitan area level. 35 The sample is based on a strati-
fied two-stage sampling design; in the first stage, primary sampling units (PSUs) are cho-
sen with probability proportional to their size, and in the second stage, dwelling units are
systematically drawn with equal probability from each sampled PSU. At the first stage,
the sampling is stratified by the province-metro/non-metro areas. This survey design
produces inverse probability weights that can be used to produce statistics that are rep-
resentative of population level parameters. Statistics South Africa further adjusts those
weights for non-responses, so that the information from the survey is consistent with the
information available at the time on the structure of South Africa’s population. 36 I treat
those final weights as population weights for my estimation purposes.
There have been changes over time in the methodology of the survey, especially in the
master sample from which primary sampling units are drawn. From 2008 to 2014, the
QLFS used a master sample based on the 2001 census data. A change occurred in 2015,
with the master sample rebased to the 2011 census. This poses problems for using time
variation that includes data before and after the update, as any break in the structure of
the data can be a confounding factor that prevents interpretation of the estimates as causal
effects of the policy. There is still debate about the implications of these changes in the
35Metropolitan municipalities are important municipalities that enjoy an autonomy in their administra-
tion, as opposed to other areas. There as 8 such metropolitan areas, with three of them in the province of
Gauteng. Provinces are consequently often divided into metropolitan municipalities and non-metropolitan
areas.
36See Statistics South Africa (2008) for a discussion of the computation of the weights.
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survey on measurement of employment (see Kerr and Wittenberg, 2019, for a discussion).
As such, I only use data from 2014 and earlier, which use the 2001 census’ master sample,
and cover the first year of the policy’s implementation.
I consider as employment outcomes overall employment (employment in any firm), pri-
vate employment and private formal employment. I consider workers employed in the
private sector when they work for a private firm and in private formal employment when
they report that their employer deducts income tax from their salary. The goal of the ETI
is to increase employment for young workers. The subsidy does so by targeting private
firms that are registered for tax purposes. Analysis of private formal employment gives us
the direct effects of the policy on the targeted outcome. However, the underlying goal of
the policy is to increase overall employment for youths, which may extend beyond private
formal employment. For example, youths could respond through changes between jobs,
such that overall employment does not change for young workers but private formal em-
ployment increases. Another example is that some workers may be encouraged to search
and find informal jobs, but not formal jobs, which would increase employment beyond
any effect on private formal employment. As such, I consider any private employment
and any employment as additional employment outcomes.
I additionally consider participation in the labor market as an outcome, for two reasons.
First, the subsidy may have induced young workers to look for jobs, if these workers
believed that what their decreased costs to firms may increase their chances of being
hired. Second, because of this first point, looking at both employment outcomes and
participation will give us an idea of the effects of the subsidy on unemployment.
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1.4.2 Identification strategy
Because the policy has a clear start date and clear eligibility rules for workers whose
wages can be subsidized, I use a difference-in-difference strategy to estimate the effects
of the Employment Tax Incentive on young workers’ employment outcomes.37 A firm can
claim the subsidy if it hired a worker after October 2013 and the worker was between 18
and 29 years old at the time he or she was working at the firm. Although this criterion is
labeled in terms of current age, it is more intuitive to reason in terms of cohorts. Table A.1
summarizes the cohorts who were eligible and the time when they were eligible. Using
current age as the distinguishing criterion between the treatment and control groups for
the difference-in-difference analysis could be misleading. Because eligibility stops once
the individual turns 30, using current age rules out the effects of the policy on workers
after their eligibility. The justification for a wage subsidy was to propel young workers
into the labor market; if they stay employed even after their eligibility ends, this should
be part of the effects of the policy. Treated workers could stay in employment after their
eligibility because they keep the job that they were recruited for under the policy, or
because they get other jobs, using the experience that they accumulated from subsidized
employment. Arguably, these are not major concerns as I am only interested in the first
year of implementation, but I adopt the most accurate way to define eligible and ineligible
37There is always the concern that agents can anticipate future policies and act accordingly. This can lead
to bias in the estimation of the effects of these policies. In the case of the ETI, there seems to have been a
long debate at the parliament on this policy, as early as in 2011; also, there was no clear announcement that
predated the signing of the ETI act. Given this, such anticipations are not a concern in this specific case.
However, I provide a discussion below on how the placebo test in periods before the policy addresses to
some extent the anticipation concerns.
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individuals. 38
The treated group is the group of individuals who are 29 or younger as of 2013Q4. Be-
cause the QLFS only reports the year of birth, this translates into individuals born in or
after 1984 (see Table A.1).39 The control group is composed of individuals who were
30 or above at the time of implementation, meaning that they were born in 1983 or be-
fore. For the estimation, I need to choose a sample that increases the chances of finding
the effects of the policy, with individuals in the sample not too far from the cutoff. For
this reason, unlike Ranchhod and Finn (2016) who use the whole sample of individuals
of working age, and in line with Moeletsi (2017), I use a sample of individuals 5 years
above (control group) and 5 years below (treatment group) the cutoff provided by eligi-
bility of workers for the subsidy. The main sample in my estimations is thus the group of
individuals born between 1979 and 1988.
One caveat in the use of the difference-in-difference approach in the present case is the
fact that the control group in my analysis is potentially affected by the policy. As dis-
cussed in the literature review above, when wages are subsidized for part of the popula-
tion, firms could substitute ineligible workers for eligible ones, meaning that ineligible
workers are potentially negatively affected by the policy, or negatively treated. In that
case, the difference-in-difference will provide at best, the effect of the wage subsidy on
38Studies of nationally implemented wage subsidies which targeted individuals based on age (e.g., Balkan
et al., 2016) likely estimate a lower bound of the effects of these policies. Once an individual passes the age
of eligibility, they become part of the control group in those studies’ empirical strategy and thus contribute
to the construction of the counterfactual. To the extent that there are returns to the experience accumulated
because of subsidized employment, this overestimates what would be the employment for the control group
in the absence of the subsidy, and biases the estimate of the policy down.
39Although the questionnaire of the QLFS asks for the exact date of birth, the publicly available dataset
only contains the age in years. Discussions with staff at DataFirst suggest that this may have to do with the
fact that an individual’s national identification number is composed of his or her day of the birth, information
that needs to be removed for anonymity purpose. Consequently, I can only consider in my analysis the age
at the time of the survey or the year of birth.
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eligible workers relative to ineligible ones, including both jobs created by firms for young
workers as well as jobs that they obtain at the expense of ineligible ones. The interpre-
tation of such effects would be that firms reacted to the policy, with no direct way to tell
what fraction of jobs are created, and what fraction is due to substitution. The design
of the policy and the regulations in South Africa imply, however, that such substitutions
should be limited. 40
Table A.2 presents summary statistics on employment outcomes and other characteristics
for the treatment and control groups, before and after the policy. Workers in the young
cohort saw their employment increase for all measures of employment, though these be-
fore and after statistics do not necessarily reflect causal effects of the program, for reasons
that I discuss below.
I estimate the following equation to obtain the difference-in-difference estimates using a
linear probability model: 41
E[Yicpt|Xicpt] = β0+δ0dc+δ1dc∗postt+β1expcpt+β2exp2cpt+γXicpt+provp+Y eart+Qtrt
(1.1)
Yicpt is the employment outcome of interest, for individual i in cohort c, who lives in
province p and was interviewed at quarter t. dc is a dummy for young cohorts that is 1 for
cohorts c =1984-1988 and zero for cohorts c =1979-1983. In my main specification, I
use data for t = 2011Q1, · · · , 2014Q4. postt is a dummy variable for periods during and
after 2013Q4, the first five quarters of implementation of the ETI. δ1 is the difference-
40I discuss more this issue in relation to the results in section 1.5.1.
41The absence of an error term in the equation below reflects the fact that it is a linear probability model
that I estimate.
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in-difference parameter, the parameter of interest. The equation controls for experience
with a proxy constructed at the year of birth-province level, expcpt. Province of resi-
dence (provp) is included to capture province specific time-invariant characteristics that
may be correlated with employment opportunities. Xicpt are additional control variables,
including race, gender, and education.
The QLFS does not report information on labor market experience. However, it is im-
portant to control for experience in the equation above. The treatment and the control
group differ on the experience that they have acquired in the labor market, with older in-
dividuals having greater experience, and it is known that accumulated experience affects
labor market outcomes, typically with a quadratic functional form. I construct a proxy
for experience at an aggregate level. For example, in 2012, 39.2% of individuals born
in 1984 and living in Gauteng were employed; this implies that, on average, the group
of individuals born in 1984 and living in Gauteng has accrued .39 year of labor market
experience in 2012.42 To calculate this experience proxy, I use data from all labor force
surveys conducted since the older cohort entered their working age then compute the av-
erage employment ratio for each year of birth cohort at the province level. I next sum
these average employment ratios to obtain my proxy for experience. Experience at time
t for the cohort c living in province p is then the cumulative exposure to the labor market
that this group has had until time t− 1. Figure 1.2 below presents the distribution of this
proxy for the young and the old cohorts, before the policy, with more detailed information
in Figure A.2.
42I consider the frequency of the surveys (biannually until 2007, then quarterly afterwards) in computing
the experience proxy. The example here uses the annual employment ratio for illustration purposes.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of experience proxy
All the estimates that I present are weighted by the adjusted inverse probability weights
that Statistics South Africa provides for the QLFS. Although the use of weights is com-
mon for the estimation of parameters describing variables’ distribution, there is a long
debate in economics and social science in general on whether those weights should be
used when running regressions (see e.g., Solon et al., 2015, for a discussion on the sub-
ject). The consensus seems to be that weights should not matter, especially when the
variables describing the sampling scheme, and thus the weights are included in the model
that is estimated. If they do not matter, then not using them should be preferred, as the
OLS estimator is BLUE, while the weighted least squares estimator is not. However,
in the case of difference-in-difference, the regression estimated to obtain the estimator is
often guided both by economic intuition. In the end, it is a difference in means that is esti-
mated and as such, the means should be estimated to be representative of the population.
Although the variables that I include in the model are guided by economic knowledge
of labor markets in general and South Africa’s labor market in particular, the goal is to
adjust for any characteristics that may be affecting labor market outcomes differently for
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the young and the old cohorts. All this favors the use of weights in the present case.
1.4.3 Suggestive evidence of parallel trends
The identifying assumption for the difference-in-difference strategy is that the treatment
and the control groups would have evolved in the same way if no policy intervention were
made, such that the changes in the outcomes of the control group are a valid counterfac-
tual for the treatment group, in the absence of the policy. Although this assumption cannot
be tested directly, it is possible to check if, before the policy, employment outcomes for
the young and the older cohorts evolved in similar ways. There are two ways to imple-
ment this test. The first is to estimate differences between the two groups, conditional on
observables, in periods before the policy, and test whether they are significantly different






Yicpt is the employment outcome of interest, for individual i in cohort c, who lives in
province p and was interviewed at quarter t; dc is a dummy for eligible cohorts that is 1 for
cohorts c =1984-1988 and zero for cohorts c =1979-1983. I use data for the periods t =
2011-2013Q3. In the equation above, δ0 is the difference between young and old cohorts
in 2013Q3. δq + δ0 is the difference for each of the quarters q = 2011Q1, · · · , 2013Q2.
The test of parallel trends before the policy is thus the test of joint significance of the coef-
ficients δq. Figure 1.3 presents these coefficients. Although the figure points to differences
in the coefficients δq for all the outcomes over time, with most of these coefficients being
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positive, the confidence intervals associated with the estimates do not allow to rule out
that they are jointly equal to zero. As a result, I do not reject that there were parallel
trends in outcomes between the eligible and the ineligible cohorts before the policy. The
coefficients and confidence interval suggest overall however that the test is a bit imprecise.
Figure 1.3: Testing parallel trends prior to the policy
Notes: The graphs above present the result of estimating Equation 1.2. The coefficients plotted here are the
coefficients of interaction between year-quarter dummies and the dummy for young cohorts. They represent
the difference between the old and the young cohort, relative to the difference in 2013Q3, the last quarter
before the implementation of the ETI. The bars are the 95% confidence intervals.
A similar test is whether there has been a differential change in employment outcomes
between the eligible and the ineligible cohorts, in periods just prior to the implementation
of the policy. I perform this test for the first three quarters of 2013, i.e. the three quarters
immediately before the implementation of the ETI. This is intuitively a placebo test of a
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change before the policy was implemented. If the test detects a change, then it is unlikely
that eligible and ineligible cohorts had the same trend. To implement this test, I run the
following regression, using data for t = 2011Q1, · · · , 2013Q3:
E[Yicpt|X] = βP0 +δP0 dc+δP1 dc∗placebot+βP1 expcpt+βP2 exp2cpt+γPXicpt+provp+Y eart+Qtrt
(1.3)
where placebot is a dummy that is 1 for the quarters 2013Q1 to 2013Q3 and zero for
2011 and 2012. If the parallel trend assumptions hold, then the coefficient δP1 should be
zero. The estimations in Table 1.1 show that I cannot reject that this coefficient is equal to
zero. In particular, the estimates for private employment indicate that if anything, young
workers may have been catching up to the older workers. This points to the importance
of controlling for experience and suggests that my estimates are likely an upper bound on
the true effects of the policy.
Results of equation 1.3 also provide evidence against the idea that firms or workers took
anticipatory actions in advance of the policy implementation. Such reactions would in-
clude firms firing young workers with the expectation of rehiring them and thus benefiting
from the wage subsidy, or firms postponing their hiring decisions regarding young indi-
viduals. Both actions would show up as a relative decline in employment outcomes for
young workers, leading up to the policy start date. While the policy had a provision
against displacement of older workers (see the earlier presentation of the ETI), there was
no explicit mention of re-hiring, leading to concerns that there might have been some tem-
porary separations between firms and workers. The presence of such effects would imply
a negative coefficient δP1 . The fact that this coefficient is not statistically different from
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Table 1.1: Placebo effect using 2013 first three quarters
Overall Private Private formal
employment employment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δP1 , placebo in 2013 1.174 0.193 2.283 1.323 0.519 -0.268
(1.357) (1.289) (1.433) (1.336) (1.330) (1.224)
Experience proxy 12.245 8.360 9.696 6.081 10.125 4.824
(1.197)*** (0.861)*** (1.073)*** (0.821)*** (0.985)*** (0.747)***
Experience proxy square -0.685 -0.551 -0.487 -0.422 -0.487 -0.339
(0.113)*** (0.090)*** (0.104)*** (0.082)*** (0.098)*** (0.078)***
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.14
N 39,407 39,407 39,407 39,407 39,407 39,407
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2013Q3. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, born
in 1979-1988. δP1 is the coefficient for the placebo test before the policy (see Equation 1.3). Standard errors
in brackets are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample weights from the
QLFS and estimated using a linear probability model. Controls are race (Blacks, Colored, Asians/Indians
and Whites), gender, education (no education, some primary, primary completed, some secondary, sec-
ondary completed and post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the
presence of another individual who is working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.




Table 1.2 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 1.1. The specifications in
the first two columns do not control for potential experience, while the two last columns
do. The first two specifications imply that the overall employment for young workers
increased by between 1.3 and 1.8 percentage points, relative to an employment ratio of
44 percent before the policy began. Although these results are not statistically significant,
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I cannot rule out effects as large as 3 percentage points, and this includes an increase
of 2 percentage points, the size of the effects found in Moeletsi (2017). Once I control
for potential experience, my estimates suggest that the policy led to a decrease in the
probability of employment, but not a statistically significant one, of between .2 and .7
percentage points. More importantly, I can rule out benefits as small as a 1 percentage
point gain. Notably, controlling for experience reduces the estimated impact of the ETI.
The estimates for private employment and private formal employment are similar in their
magnitude and their precision to the estimates for overall employment. Even though only
firms that were private and registered for income tax purposes were eligible to claim the
subsidy for workers that they hire, the policy could have resulted in reallocation of labor
instead of job creation, such that effects on private employment or overall employment
are different from the effects on private formal employment. Similar results for all these
outcomes imply that the policy did not lead to such reallocation.
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Table 1.2: Impact of the ETI on youth employment: main results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Overall employment
δ1 1.842 1.353 -0.206 -0.735
(0.965)* (0.891) (0.984) (0.893)
Experience proxy 12.120 8.549
(1.118)*** (0.741)***
Experience proxy square -0.716 -0.622
(0.090)*** (0.071)***
Average for young cohort prior to the policy: 43.9%
R2 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.15
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Controls N Y N Y
B: Private employment
δ1 1.157 0.752 -0.137 -0.765
(1.046) (0.968) (1.067) (0.979)
Experience proxy 9.524 5.854
(1.002)*** (0.688)***
Experience proxy square -0.507 -0.441
(0.085)*** (0.064)***
Average for young cohort prior to the policy: 35.8%
Controls N Y N Y
R2 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.13
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
C: Private formal employment
δ1 0.672 0.446 -0.485 -0.782
(1.005) (0.905) (1.005) (0.927)
Experience proxy 9.860 4.390
(0.954)*** (0.638)***
Experience proxy square -0.492 -0.347
(0.084)*** (0.060)***
Average for young cohort prior to the policy: 27.2%
R2 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.14
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Controls N Y N Y
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, born
in 1979-1988. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see Equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets
are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample from the QLFS and estimated
using a linear probability model. Controls are race (Blacks, Colored, Asians/Indians and Whites), gender,
education (no education, some primary, primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed and
post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another
individual who is working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.
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In the previous section on parallel trends before the implementation of the ETI, I noted
that if anything, young workers’ outcomes were catching up to those of workers a few
years older. If that trend continued even in the absence of the policy, young workers
may have continued catching up with older workers. Then, the effects estimated with
a difference-in-difference strategy would tend to over-estimate the effects of the policy.
This further reinforces the interpretation that the policy did not have meaningfully large
positive effects.
One concern with the preceding analysis is that I use as a control for experience a proxy
constructed at an aggregate level, the birth year-province (cp) level, while analyzing an
outcome at the individual level. Measurement errors in aggregation could lead to bias in
the implied effect of the policy. For this reason, I re-estimate Equation 1.1 at the level
at which the proxy for experience is constructed. Table 1.3 presents the results of the
aggregated level regression. There are 10 birth cohorts in my sample (5 in the eligible
group and 5 in the ineligible cohort) and 9 provinces in South Africa, which results in 90
units of observation. I use 16 quarters for my main estimations (2011-2014); this amounts
in the end to 1440 observations, as shown in Table 1.3. The estimates in Table 1.3 are
similar to the ones at the individual level (Table 1.2, columns 3 and 4), suggesting that
measurement errors due to aggregation are unlikely to explain my results.
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Table 1.3: Impact of the ETI on youth employment: aggregate level regressions
Overall Private Private formal
employment employment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ1 -0.206 -0.858 -0.137 -0.934 -0.485 -0.857
(1.061) (0.822) (1.051) (0.894) (1.212) (0.913)
Experience proxy 12.120 8.316 9.524 5.627 9.860 4.505
(1.033)*** (0.804)*** (1.053)*** (0.672)*** (1.392)*** (0.629)***
Experience proxy square -0.716 -0.609 -0.507 -0.435 -0.492 -0.355
(0.095)*** (0.068)*** (0.100)*** (0.061)*** (0.134)*** (0.058)***
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.46 0.61 0.32 0.54 0.31 0.63
N 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, born
in 1979-1988. Data are aggregated at the birth cohort-province level. δ1 is the difference-in-difference
estimator (see Equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions
are weighted using the sample weights from the QLFS and estimated using a linear probability model.
Controls include race (Blacks, Colored, Indians, Whites), gender, education (no education, some primary,
primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed, post-secondary), marital status, the presence
of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another individual who is working, all included in the
regression equation as dummy variables.
Table 1.4 presents the effects of the policy on young workers’ labor force participation. I
look at this outcome in isolation from the others as it reflects the reaction of individuals
to the prospect of a wage subsidy. Given that they are now a relatively cheaper labor,
young workers may have internalized the increased value of job searching and responded
by increasing their labor force supply.43 The estimates, however, show that there was no
increase in labor force participation for young workers as a result of the ETI. In fact, the
estimates for labor force participation are similar to the ones for employment outcomes,
suggesting that young workers did not increase their labor force supply when the ETI
became available. One possibility is that these young workers may have correctly antici-
43By looking at labor force participation, I investigate the effects of the ETI on the extensive margin of
the labor supply.
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pated that the policy would not increase their chances of employment. By combining the
results on employment and labor force participation, it follows that the ETI did not affect
unemployment for young workers. 44
Table 1.4: Effects of the ETI on labor force participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ1 0.701 0.322 -0.502 -0.952
(0.947) (0.904) (0.995) (0.926)
Experience proxy 5.601 6.330
(1.004)*** (0.772)***
Experience proxy square -0.377 -0.412
(0.084)*** (0.073)***
Controls N Y N Y
R2 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals born in 1979-1988 from the incoming
rotation group. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets
are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample weights from the QLFS and
estimated using a linear probability model. Controls are race (Blacks, Colored, Asian/Indians and Whites),
gender, education (no education, some primary, primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed,
post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another
individual who is working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.
Overall, my results suggest that the Employment Tax Incentive did not produce to the
(large, positive) effects expected from the policy. My results are similar to those in Ranch-
hod and Finn (2016), despite using a more appropriately defined sample that does not
include much older and more experienced workers than those targeted by the ETI. These
results, however, stress the importance of controlling for experience when accounting
44Unemployment is defined as employment among workers who supply their labor force, and neither
employment nor participation is affected by the policy. Looking at the the effects of the policy on em-
ployment and labor force participation separately to infer the effects on unemployment avoids analyzing a
sub-sample (active workers) that is potentially changing over time because of the policy, if the policy had
an effect. I additionally analyze the effects on unemployment, and the results in table A.3 show that indeed
youth unemployment was not affected by the policy.
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for differences between the eligible and the ineligible cohorts. Not doing so leads to an
over-estimation of the effects of the ETI.
There have been a number of concerns raised in the literature about wage subsidies that I
investigate here to explore the extent to which they may confound or qualify my findings
(Card et al., 2015; McKenzie, 2017). The first concern is displacement effects. Because
of the targeting, the wage subsidy can lead to displacement effects, whereby workers that
are not targeted by the policy are fired and replaced by targeted ones. This may be less
likely in South Africa given the design of the ETI and features of the labor market. The
ETI Act includes a penalty for firms that fire an older worker to hire one who qualifies for
the subsidy, which should deter such displacements. There are also high perceived dis-
missal costs in the country. Workers have the right to challenge unfair dismissal, and in
this specific case, older workers could challenge unfair dismissal to hire a young worker.
Previous research (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2010) suggests that the disruptions that these
challenges cause to firms is a serious concern in general, and this would have discour-
aged firms to fire older workers to recruit younger ones. A final point is the absence of
large positive effects which further casts doubt that displacement effects might have oc-
curred. If there were such displacement effects, employment outcomes of the ineligible
workers would have fallen compared to a situation where no policy was implemented.
The difference-in-difference estimator would then capture both jobs obtained by eligible
workers, and jobs that were displaced, overstating the effect on eligible workers. The fact
that I can rule out even small positive effects provides evidence against such concerns. It
thus seems in the end unlikely that there would have been such displacement effects.
A second concern is substitution effects. When wage subsidies are targeted, firms may
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hire eligible workers at the expense of other workers, which is labeled the substitution
effect. This is different from displacement effects because firms do not fire workers.
If there were substitution of old workers by young workers, the difference-in-difference
estimates would capture these effects, since it is estimated out of differences in outcomes
for young and older workers. The job creation effects would then be lower than the effect
estimated here. But the fact that the estimates are low implies that substitution is not
widespread. All young workers are eligible, and as such, substitution between young
workers would bot be induced by the ETI.
The third concern is deadweight loss: firms could take up the wage subsidy and hire
workers that they would have hired anyway, even in the absence of the wage subsidy.
This concern was in the mind of policymakers when devising the policy, as reflected in
the newly hired requirement to be able to claim the subsidy, along with the penalty for
displacement. However, none of these requirements prevent a firm that would have hired
young workers anyway from claiming the subsidy. The combination of high claims by
firms and no effects on employment suggest that the claims of the subsidy are entirely
driven by this behavior. This is consistent with estimates in Ebrahim et al. (2017) using
firms’ administrative data, which indicate that that firms that claimed the ETI increased
hiring of young workers, but also hiring of older workers. Another interpretation of their
results is that firms claimed the subsidy as they expanded and hired both young and old
workers, independently of the ETI.
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1.5.2 Robustness checks
Before discussing the robustness of my results based on the main strategy as described by
section 1.4.2, and in particular as summarized in Equation 1.1, I offer alternative estima-
tions of the effects of the policy based on the definition of eligibility. I argued in section
1.4.2 that the best way to define the eligible and the ineligible groups is by looking at
cohorts. Using current age to define those groups should however play little difference,
especially given that the effects are estimated only in the first year. 45 I present in Ta-
ble 1.5 the results of an equation similar to Equation 1.1, but with eligibility defined in
terms of age. To avoid issues of systematic differences between the eligible and the in-
eligible groups, I restrict the sample to individuals aged 29 or 31, with individuals aged
29 in the eligible group. The estimates suggest results that are globally in line with my
estimates using cohorts to define eligibility. Eligible workers did not experience signif-
icant improvement in their employment outcomes, relative to ineligible workers. The
estimated effects seem to suggest possible larger positive effects in overall employment,
but if anything negative effects for private formal employment, the main target of the pol-
icy. Overall, the estimates become less precise, as the sample size shrinks due to the age
restriction. I take this overall as evidence that the results are robust to defining eligibility
in terms of current age or cohorts.
I test the robustness of the results to some concerns that may confound these results. The
first concern is that firms can claim the subsidy for periods of different lengths depending
45This rules out possible returns to experience that would be best captured by defining eligiblity in terms
of cohorts, allowing eligible individuals to stay in the estimations as ”treated”, after they are no longer
eligible for the subsidy.
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Table 1.5: Main effects of the ETI, comparing 29 and 31 years old over time
Overall Private Private formal
employment employment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 29, after 2013Q4 1.261 -0.113 0.778 -0.224 -0.551 -1.596
(1.830) (1.647) (1.828) (1.628) (1.711) (1.512)
Age 29 (base: age 31) -3.366 -2.175 -1.964 -0.772 -1.436 -0.556
(1.209)*** (1.134)* (1.114)* (1.027) (1.021) (0.935)
R2 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.15
N 11,082 11,082 11,082 11,082 11,082 11,082
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, aged
29 or 31 at the time of survey. The results presented are the coefficients for individuals aged 29, and its
interaction with a dummy variable for the periods after the start of the policy. Standard errors in brackets
are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample from the QLFS and estimated
using a linear probability model. Controls are race (Blacks, Colored, Asians/Indians and Whites), gender,
education (no education, some primary, primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed and
post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another
individual who is working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.
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of the age of the worker. Firms can claim the subsidy for workers for at most two years,
or until these workers become 30 years old. This implies that firms can claim the subsidy
for two years only for workers that are hired at 28 or below, which translates to workers
born in 1986 or afterwards. I use individuals born between 1986 and 1988 as my eligible
group, and compare them to individuals born between 1981-1983.46 From the perspective
of the value of the subsidy for firms (i.e. ignoring productivity concerns), it is more
valuable for firms to hire workers for whom they can claim the subsidy for a longer
period, unless these workers are less productive. This would imply larger effects for these
workers. Overall, the the effects on employment for younger workers that are eligible
for two years (Table A.4, column 2) are still not significant. Even when considering the
point estimates and the largest effects that they imply, there is no clear pattern regarding
differential effects on these younger workers. The effects estimated on private formal
employment and private employment are consistent with larger effects on these young
workers, whereas the opposite is true for overall employment. Overall, these results are
not consistent with larger effects on workers for whom firms could claim the subsidy
longer.
Second, I address the concern that there might be differential returns to education for
the eligible and the ineligible cohorts. The system of education has changed over time
in South Africa, along changes in the political landscape with the end of the apartheid
regime, although the changes in education sometimes predated the political end of apartheid.47
46The latter group is chosen both to have a 3 year cohorts band for ineligible workers, just as for the
workers that are in the eligible group. The cohorts in the middle, those born 1984 or 1985 are workers that
are eligible for less than two years.
47One characteristic of the system of education under the apartheid system was racial segregation of
schools. School desegregation started as earlier as 1990 in the province of Gauteng, years before the end of
apartheid regime.
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The sample in my analysis spans several cohorts that potentially were differentially af-
fected by these changes. These individuals were as young as 6 and as old 15 in 1994, the
year marking the end of the apartheid regime. To the extent that there have been changes
in the quality of education, and thus changes in the returns to education, this may con-
found the estimates of the effects of the policy, as these are differential changes for young
and old cohorts just as the change induced by the ETI. I address this concern by allow-
ing the employment returns to education to differ by time (Table A.4, column 3) or by
cohorts (eligible, and ineligible; Table A.4, column 4) in Equation 1.1. The results from
these specifications are similar to the main results, which implies that different returns to
education is not a concern for my estimates of the effects of the ETI.
I then address a concern related to the effects of experience on employment outcomes.
My main specification assumes the same experience profile for eligible and ineligible
workers. It may be the case that worker eligible for the subsidy, who are on average
younger, are on a different experience profile. I address this concern by allowing the
experience proxy to enter Equation 1.1 differently for eligible and ineligible individuals.
The results over the three employment outcomes (see table A.4, column 5) are similar
to the main results, suggesting that my results are not sensitive to differential experience
profiles.
I finally test the sensitivity of my results to the functional form of my experience proxy.
The quadratic relationship between employment outcomes and the experience proxy in
Equation 1.1 is primarily motivated by its common use in such equations. However, given
the fact that I do not observe experience itself, it could be argued that a different functional
form may be more suitable. Table A.5 presents the results of estimations when I consider
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several alternative specifications. These specifications include a linear function, a cubic
function, and the use of deciles of the experience proxy to account for a potentially non-
parametric relationship. The results using the cubic relationship and the non-parametric
relationship indicate results that are overall similar to my main specifications (quadratic
functional form). However, the results are compatible with higher effects when using a
linear relationship. This indicates that not including the quadratic term of the experience
proxy acts as omitting a relevant variable that biases my results upwards. The downside
of this analysis is that my results are sensitive to the functional expression of my proxy
for experience. 48
In the end, across all the results, experience seems to matter a lot for my results (see
presentation of the main results in Table 1.2). As I argued in the methodology section, I
adopt this empirical strategy to account for time-varying differences in experiences that
may confound the changes introduced by the wage subsidy policy, especially given that
eligible and ineligible workers are at different phases of the employment profiles. The
importance that experience plays could have been expected given the importance of expe-
rience for labor outcomes and the quadratic functional form. Nonetheless, there remains
the issue that control variables should not matter in a difference-in-differences setting, as
the strategy removes any pre-existing differences between differences. Control variables
48I address an additional concern related to the precision of the results. My main estimations throughout
this article cluster standard-errors at strata level, to take into account the design of the QLFS. Other consid-
erations also govern the choice of the level of clustering are the fact that outcomes maybe correlated within
units, such as local labor markets, or the units of treatment assignment. These additional concerns would
favor clustering at the cohort level, given that whole cohorts are treated; the cohort X time level, given
that the treatment occurred at specific dates; the province X cohort level or the province level to take into
consideration the correlation of outcomes within labor markets. The province X cohort level would also
address to fact that the experience proxy is measured at that level. To assess the influence of such concerns
on the results, I consider alternative clustering at the province X cohort level, and at the cohorts level. In the
later case, given the number of cohorts (10), I use a wild bootstrap to perform the tests. Results presented
in Table A.11 show that there is no meaningful changes in the results due to these alternative clustering.
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should matter only if they are necessary to establish suggestive evidence that the parallel
trend assumptions hold only conditional to these control variables. It is the case that con-
trol variables do diminish the implied placed effects reported in 1.3, especially for private
employment. The results overall are, however, not significant, with or without the inclu-
sion of experience. It is also true that the effects estimated, besides in one specification
for overall employment. But again, in conjunction with the results on participation, it
would be hard to argue how the policy led to an increase in overall employment, without
a meaningful change in private formal employment. I take this collectively at the least as
the lack of robust evidence that the policy improved employment outcomes for eligible
young workers, even as the inclusion of the experience proxy seems to affect the results a
lot.
Regarding other control variables, they can be divided into two categories: those that are
time-invariant, such as race, gender, and those that are time-varying, such as education,
the structure of the family, and marital status. Control variables that do not change over
time would not matter for the estimates of the results but would lead to more precise
estimates. Among control variables that are time-varying, education is one that could
potentially be problematic. Indeed, young individuals (who are eligible for the policy) can
choose to stay longer in school since education is another important variable explaining
employment outcomes in South Africa. Investing more in education could be seen as a
response to the greater prospect of employment caused by a wage subsidy. So, to the
extent that the policy affects employment through education, its inclusion in the equation
will cause a reduction of the estimated effect of the ETI. However, it is unlikely that the
indirect effect through education would be observed in the immediate future. The reasons
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are that I focus only on the first year of implementation of the ETI, and that eligible
individual in my main sample are at least 26 years old, with less room to increase their
education. Also, the effects on participation would suggest that such concerns are not
present in this setting. The structure of the household and marital status are also variables
that could respond. It is less clear how immediate, such responses could be to the policy.
An additional concern is related to the pre-trend tests that I conducted in section 1.4.3.
The results that I obtained, including the placebo test in 2013 seem imprecise. I obtain
large coefficients, but for which I cannot reject the hypothesis that they are different from
zero. Also, these coefficients seems to be if anything, larger than some of the estimates
of the effects of the policy. Although this would suggest that the results may be in the
end not precise, this is not consistent with the much smaller standard errors that I obtain
for the estimations of the effects of the policy.49. The comparison of the precision of
the placebo test and the actual estimates could actually be misleading, as the placebo
tests are by construction less powered compared to the actual estimates, given that the
actual estimates use a larger sample, on the time dimension. Also, the comparison of
the placebo effects to the actual estimates would preclude the fact that the estimates are
obtained conditional on the acceptance of the hypothesis of parallel trends. In the end, the
conclusion are to be considered within the limits of the precision of my pre-policy trend,
which is evidenced by the large coefficients for the placebo tests, although the signs of
the placebo tests suggest that if anything, my results are an overestimation of the effects
of the policy.
49That said, some of the estimates are compatible with important increases in employment, although this
is not the consistent conclusion across the estimations.
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1.5.3 Heterogeneity of the effects
It is possible that a null effect on the average young worker masks a combination of
positive and negative effects on different subgroups of youth. Therefore, I explore the
heterogeneity of the effects of the policy along dimensions that are regularly considered
in studies of South Africa labor market (Banerjee et al., 2008): gender (Table A.6), race
(Table A.7), and education (Table A.8). Women, Blacks (referred to simply as Africans)
and individuals with low education have worse employment outcomes. Of the three,
arguably only the difference in employment outcomes by level of education is potentially
related to differences in the workers’ productivity. 50
Across those three dimensions, the most puzzling result is along the gender dimension.
Table A.6 presents the results of Equation 1.1, estimated separately for men and women.
The overall effect is a combination of negative effects on women’s employment and pos-
itive effects on men’s employment. The results suggest that private formal employment
decreased by 3 percentage points for women; the most optimistic effect implied by these
estimates is a reduction by .9 percentage points of the probability of being employed in
a private formal firm, because of the policy. These results seem to be a combination of
decreased employment for young female workers and increased employment for older
female workers (see Figure A.3). However, for most outcomes, the increase for older
50The theoretical predictions on the heterogeneous effects are not clear; i.e. for education for instance,
whether individuals with low education or those with high education might gain more from a wage subsidy.
To the extent that the difference in employment by education reflects only differences in productivity, the
wage subsidy could induce firms to hire now those who otherwise were not profitable for these firms, i.e.
individuals with low education. This would imply a higher effect on individuals with low level of education.
Similarly, firms could hire more workers with high level of education as the wage subsidy potentially help
them expand their business, especially since some of these workers with high education were previously
unemployed.
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women seems to have started before the policy. Moreover, the trends in the outcomes
seem rather erratic to support evidence of parallel trends, even though tests similar to the
ones presented in the identification strategy section do not rule out that the two cohorts
of women had similar trends before the policy. Given these concerns, the result that the
wage subsidy decreased employment for young women should be read with caution.
The trends in outcomes look more similar for young and older male workers (see Figure
A.4); the estimates for the effects of the policy, though positive, are not statistically signif-
icant. Given the precision of the estimates, positive effects as small as 3 percentage points
can be ruled out as the increase of overall employment for young men; but similarly, these
estimates cannot rule out decreases in overall employment of 2 percentage points.
Overall, the analyses by the worker’s level of education and race do not reveal any hetero-
geneity. Table A.8 presents estimates of Equation 1.1 separately for individuals without
and with a matric, the exit exam at the end of secondary school. These results are really
similar and imply no differential effects with respect to the level of education. Table A.7
presents the results by race, separately for White and Black South Africans, the two major
race groups in South Africa. The point estimates for Whites are larger. In particular, the
estimates imply an increase by 1.6 percentage points of the probability of private formal
employment for eligible Whites, because of the policy. These results are however impre-
cise and do not rule out null effects, nor effects equal to those estimated for Black South
Africans. In conclusion, there is no heterogeneity of the effects with respect to race.
I then perform the analysis of the heterogeneity by main industry. As the data that I
use for the analysis is a household survey, there is little information that would allow
heterogeneity analysis with respect to firms characteristics. Respondents however give the
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industry in which they are employed, and the information is coded to have the 1-digit main
industry, per the Standard Industrial Classification of industries. I investigate whether
employment has changed in some industries in ways that would suggest an impact of the
policies for firms in those industries. I use the main industries as possible outcomes, and
estimate for each of the industries, equations similar to 1.1. Table A.9 shows the results of
the estimation. Employment across all the industry has not differently changed for eligible
workers compared to ineligible ones. This implies no differential effects of the policy by
industry. One limitation of the heterogeneous analysis by industry as performed here is
that the different industries as outcomes, are considered as independent outcomes. These
outcomes are however related, as a worker is employed in one only of these industries.
The evidence on the heterogeneity by industry as presented here is thus suggestive.
One additional analysis that I perform is to test whether results are heterogeneous with re-
spect to local markets conditions. Firms that are in more dynamic labor markets may have
better opportunities to hire young workers because of the policy. I use the unemployment
rate of workers above 35 to capture the strength of the labor market, which I interact with
the main variable of interest. The model estimated is thus a triple difference. The main
variable of interest in this case is the triple interaction term. Results presented in Table
A.10 shows that the triple interaction is not statistically significant, which implies that
there was no heterogeneous effects with respect to local labor market conditions.
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1.5.4 Discussion: Unsuccessful scale-up?
An important implication of the present analysis is the fact that the ETI does not replicate
the effects of the small pilot of a wage subsidy studied by Levinsohn et al. (2014). The
results in Levinsohn et al. (2014) suggest an increase in employment by 7 percentage
points, an effect that is ruled out by most of the estimates that I found in my analysis. It
is an open question as to what factors may have caused the difference in effects, as there
are substantial differences in the scale and the details of the pilot wage subsidy and the
ETI. The pilot was a voucher for workers to search for a job and lasted only 6 months.
However, most of these comparisons would favor the ETI as the more impactful (e.g., high
take-up in the ETI, vs. few claims of vouchers by the firms). The pilot was implemented
as a voucher to increase search by workers, rather than hiring by firms, suggesting that
the pilot targeted labor supply, while the ETI was meant to address labor demand. One
specific finding in the pilot study is that that the effects seem to be driven by a reduction
in the number of offers turned down. 51 This is a hint that job creation may have not
been the driver of the results of the pilot, explaining why a wage subsidy might work at
a small scale but not when implemented at scale. Such comparison of course is qualified
by the inherent differences in the pilot wage subsidy vouchers and the ETI implemented
at scale. Considering that these are both wage subsidies, this would suggest that there
51Levinsohn et al. (2014) noted that the reduction in the number of offers turned down is especially true
in households with other employed members, who in general are the least likely to be in wage employment
and when they do, have higher wages on average. This echoes the idea that the structure of households
affect labor market outcomes in South Africa. The paper also frames this result as the consequence of a
higher perceived probability of success for jobs for which they receive information through their family.
This contradicts however the idea that turning jobs in the control group was indeed a choice to get higher
paying jobs. The results do not provide clear evidence on earnings effects, and more importantly do not
offer insight on job offers to get as to what the earnings for the jobs turned down are.
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are some scale-up challenges, besides the difference in the design of the two policies. I
provide below a discussion of considerations that may have prevented the replication of
the effects of a wage subsidy once implemented at scale.
Banerjee et al. (2017) offer a framework to think through why a pilot RCT does not
replicate when the intervention is scaled up. There are potentially six types of reasons
that could explain the failure for an intervention to scale up: market equilibrium effects,
spillover effects, political reasons, context-dependence, implementation challenges, and
pilot site-selection bias.
Market equilibrium concerns are conceptually important for wage subsidies, e.g., with
the possibility of changes in the composition of employment without no changes at the
aggregate level, i.e., without any job creation. However, these concerns do not seem
to be the explanation in the case of the ETI. There have not been fundamental changes
in labor market conditions following the implementation of the policy, as the level of
unemployment in the country has, if anything, remained the same as in previous years.
Equilibrium effects that would be consistent with the results found in this paper would
have been a wage decrease for ineligible workers, such that the ETI does not offer a
relative advantage for young workers. Reports from the Labour Market dynamics in South
Africa for 2014 indicated that wages have remained unchanged overall compared to their
level in 2013, implementation challenges, which would suggest that market equilibrium
effects are unlikely. 52
Spillover effects in the context of a wage subsidy could be of two forms: substitution
52See the report here: https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/
catalog/536/download/7390.
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effects (negative spillovers) or complementarity between young and older workers labor
(positive spillovers). I have previously discussed that substitution may be unlikely in
the South African context and given the regulations around the ETI. This implies that
negative spillover effects are unlikely. Positive spillovers are one explanation that would
be compatible with no relative effects, i.e., no improvement of young workers compared
to older ones, but improvement for both eligible and ineligible workers. This could be
justified by a complementarity between the labor of young workers and that of older
workers. Overall in 2014, labor market outcomes have not improved, and in fact, growth
overall has stalled in that year, implying that there was not a sudden rise in employment
for the eligible workers. The question remains, though, as to what would have been the
situation, were 2014 a period of strong growth, such that the ETI could have acted as a
buffer. In fact, business cycles could well be an explanation as to why the wage subsidy
did not matter, given the low growth in 2014. I cannot, however, provide conclusive
evidence as to the relationship between business cycles and the effectiveness of wage
subsidy in South Africa. My exploration using provincial differences in unemployment
rates did not lead conclusive results (see Table A.10 and related discussion above). In all,
it seems that spillover effects might be unlikely, but that the lack of results in 2014 could
well be related to the business cycle in that year.
For political reactions, there could be, on the one hand, reactions on the workers side
to the policy or a reaction by firms. A reaction from firms would, however, have been
inconsistent with the higher-than-expected take-up of the subsidy that the government
reported. It is not clear how a political response on the workers side could explain the
result. It is the case that unions initially opposed the idea of a wage subsidy, and thus
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could have mobilized workers against this policy. It is not clear, however, how workers
would follow such an indication to oppose the policy. Jobless workers are not covered by
unions and thus may have no relation with the unions. Additionally, these workers would
have likely taken an offer that a firm made to them.
Context dependence refers to the idea that a policy could be successful in a particular
place but not somewhere else. Small-scale RCTs of wage subsidies have consistently
found positive effects (see discussion in the literature review). This suggests that the
positive effects in the wage subsidy pilot study in South Africa are an unusual feature that
would fail to replicate elsewhere. This also relates to the next point, pilot site-selection
bias. There is no indication that the pilot was implemented in areas that would favor the
effectiveness of a wage subsidy, in ways that would not replicate when it scaled up to the
whole country.
The last point in the framework by Banerjee et al. (2017) is implementation challenges,
a point that would not be consistent with the higher take-up that the policy mentioned.
If scaling up the wage subsidy was a challenge, then we would have expected that fewer
firms take up the subsidy compared to the pilot. It is the contrary that the implementation
of the ETI indicates.
From this illustrative discussion, it seems that one potential explanation as to why the ETI
is not effective and does not replicate the findings from the small scale wage subsidy is that
2014 was a year of slow growth. It is not possible, however, to ascertain that implementing
the wage subsidy in a different year would lead to different results. Overall though, this




In this paper, I evaluate the impacts of the Employment Tax Incentive, a wage subsidy
implemented by South Africa’s government. The policy was designed to give incentives
to firms for hiring young workers by lowering their labor costs. The wage subsidy was
valuable to firms as it could amount to half the wage paid to a young worker. It was
originally intended to last only two years, but it has been extended twice, and is currently
scheduled to last until 2029. The basis of this renewal has been the higher than expected
take-up of the subsidy by firms.
Using the ETI’s age-eligibility restrictions and start time, I evaluate its impact on young
workers by comparing individuals below and above the birth cohort cutoff for eligibility,
before and after the start of implementation. My results show that young workers’ em-
ployment did not increase as a consequence of the subsidy; I rule out effects as small as a
1 percentage point increase in overall employment.
Conceptually, the wage subsidy would have narrowed the productivity gap of young work-
ers (due in part by the lack or mismatch of young worker’s skills), and compensated em-
ployers for any initial training that these workers would have required. However, firms
would have hired young workers only if the amount of the subsidy was large enough to
offset this productivity gap as well as the training costs for employers. Firing regulations
combined with the temporary nature of the subsidy (the subsidy could be claimed for up
to two years for the same worker) would have further reduced the chances that firms in-
deed hired these young workers. Because the wage subsidy did not lead to improvements
in employment of young workers, these other constraints (skills and labor regulations)
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should be considered for further policy actions, possibly in conjunction with the wage
subsidy. Indeed, there have been some promising experiments on certifying skills (Car-
ranza et al., 2019) and improving firms’ information on labor regulations (Bertrand and
Crepon, 2019). Even though these experimental studies find improvements in labor mar-
ket outcomes, my analysis suggests that we should exercise caution when generalizing
the findings of these experiments. Indeed, the present analysis suggest how the results of
the wage subsidy implemented at national scale are different from those of the pilot study
by Levinsohn et al. (2014).
One of the limitations of this study is the difficulty of drawing concrete policy recom-
mendations. At the very least, my research implies that a wage subsidy, as currently
implemented through the ETI, may not help improve labor outcomes for young workers.
However, this paper does not provide clear guidance for how to improve the policy, or
definitive evidence of why it was not effective. The discussion in section 1.3.1 provides
a review of the factors in the structure of South Africa’s labor market could potentially
shape the effectiveness of a wage subsidy. My analysis has shown no heterogeneous ef-
fects by race or education, parts of the features discussed, or by industry, which would
have given an indication of ways to improve the policy. However, it could be worth rec-
ognizing and exploring changes to the policy along these dimensions, e.g., subsidies to
specific industries, to investigate pathways to a successful wage subsidy. Other policies
that directly address the features presented in section 1.3.1, such as promoting access to
quality education, could be considered as well.
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Chapter 2: Internal Migrants’ Ethnic Capital and Labor Market Outcomes
in South Africa
The role of social networks in economic decisions has been recognized and has received
a lot of attention from economists (see e.g., Granovetter, 2005; Jackson, 2011, for an
overview). Individuals consider others’ choices and benefit from others’ resources when
they decide what is in their own best interest. The role of social networks has been
extensively studied in two areas: migration and labor markets. As the decision to mi-
grate requires that the prospective migrant examines the potential gains in the destination
against the costs of moving, social networks are potentially helpful in lowering costs by
providing information to newcomers and in facilitating their integration at the destina-
tion. As for labor markets, there is ample evidence that individuals often find their jobs
via friends, family, or other contacts (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004). 1 Both the-
oretical and empirical evidence shows that social networks affect migration decision and
labor market outcomes, with a particular focus on the integration of international migrants
in the labor market in their destination. Internal migrants do not seem to have received
the same attention, although they potentially face the same problems at their destination
that international migrants face in their host countries.
1See section 2.1 on the literature review for more on the empirical evidence.
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The question of the role of social capital for internal migrants’ labor market performance
is particularly relevant for developing countries. Internal migration is an important phe-
nomenon in developing countries, as this migration is generally from rural to urban areas,
and accounts for a sizable part of the growth of urban populations (Lall et al., 2006). Also,
social networks have particular importance in developing countries due to imperfect and
sometimes missing markets (Munshi, 2003).2 In rural areas in developing countries, in-
dividuals typically rely on their friends and family members for loans, which are either
cheaper compared to the high-interest rate loans offered by existing institutions, or the
only choice in places where such institutions do not exist.3 Individuals also use their so-
cial networks to insure themselves against risk, as suggested by the relative smoothness
of consumption even though income is really volatile.4
South Africa is a good setting to look at the importance of networks for labor market
outcomes. Burns et al. (2010) highlight the importance of networks in the labor market
for the whole population in South Africa. The relevance of networks for employment
opportunities in South Africa can be appreciated by looking at both job seekers and firms
in the country. As suggested by the high share of discouraged workers, those who are un-
employed are unlikely to look actively for jobs, which could also be related to the already
high unemployment rate.5 Data from the National Income Dynamic Survey (NIDS) re-
2As mentioned in Chauang and Shecther (2015), “social networks are arguably both more necessary and
more frequently used by individuals in developing countries.” The paper provides an overview of the im-
portance of social networks in developing countries, with an emphasis on financial aspects and information
sharing. Munshi (2014) provides a similar review on the role of social networks in developing countries.
3The World Bank reports that within Sub-Saharan Africa, about 2/3 of individuals who borrowed any
money in 2017 borrowed from family or friends (World Bank, 2018).
4This holds both at the village aggregate level (Townsend, 1994) as well as within villages when specific
networks (loans and gifts) are considered (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Udry,
1994).
5The unemployment rate was 26.5% in the fourth quarter of 2016 (South Africa Statistics: http://
www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9561). For comparison, this rate was 13.9% in Nigeria in the third quarter
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veals that 48% of employed individuals found their current job from a relative or a friend.
Evidence from Standing et al. (1996) reveals that a large share of firms (41%) rely on their
existing employees to recruit new workers. These statistics highlight the likely contribu-
tion of networks for labor market outcomes in South Africa. Indeed, Burns et al. (2010)
find that, overall, the chances of employment of an individual are enhanced by 3 to 12%
by his network.
In this article, I study the role of the ethnic capital on the labor market performance of
internal migrants in South Africa. Social networks refer to actual contacts that individuals
have and to which they turn or might turn to request information or services. As individ-
uals are more likely to interact with individuals that have the same origin, ethnicity, or
race as them, the ethnic group may be a proxy for potential contacts that and individual
has. Borjas (1992) studies the extent to which individuals benefit from the ethnic group
of their parents for their education and labor market choices, defining these resources
available from the ethnic group as the ethnic capital. Similarly, I define the ethnic capital
of internal migrants as resources that they might get from individuals of the same ethnic
group, and I study the extent to which they benefit from this capital on the labor market. 6
This article contributes to the literature in two dimensions. First, I focus on internal
migrants, unlike most studies that focus on international migrants. Internal migrants move
of 2016 (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics: http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/report/481). The
high share of discouraged workers is a sign that individuals who are willing to work resort to passive
methods of job search instead of actively being on the market.
6Madhavan and Landau (2011) notes that, because population in African cities are comprised mainly of
people that migrated at different period times there and usually not long ago, there is a fluidity in the concept
of new arrivals of migrants and established populations. This calls into questions whether the concept of
social and ethnic capital, as described in the literature on international migration (e.g., Munshi, 2003) can
be applied in for internal migration for African cities. This implies as well however that it is an empirical
question as to whether ethnic identity is a factor that affects labor market outcomes, potentially through
formation of ethnic capital. In the end, the results discussed in this chapter should be considered with a
critical perspective on the notion of ethnic capital.
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to locations where finding a job is uncertain, and where they may lack the information
necessary to get the best opportunities on the labor market. As such, they may use their
social contacts to compensate for this lack of information. Given the prevalence of the
use of social networks in South Africa for labor markets, as suggested by Burns et al.
(2010), it is an interesting question to see how internal migrants’ labor market outcomes
are related to their social networks’ characteristics.
In addition to looking at internal migrants, I study occupation choice, not just the proba-
bility of employment. Little attention has been paid in the empirical economic literature
to the importance of social networks for occupational choice. Two articles that consider
occupational choice are Patel and Vella (2013) and Guerra and Mohnen (2016). Patel
and Vella (2013) look at the probability that an incoming migrant to the USA chooses
the occupation that is the most popular among migrants from the same country. Guerra
and Mohnen (2016) use asymmetries in peers’ influences to identify the effect that so-
cial interactions play on the occupational choice in 19th century London. In this article,
I assess how occupation choices by internal migrants are related to the characteristics of
individuals of the same origin and the same ethnic group who have established themselves
previously in the migrant’s current place of residence.
The structure of the article is as follows. I first give a brief overview of the literature on
social networks and labor markets. I then present the methodology used in this article.
After presenting the data and a description of the sample of internal migrants that I use, I
discuss the results of the estimations.
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2.1 Literature
Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) provide an excellent overview of the role of social
networks in the labor market, both from sociological and economic perspectives. Mont-
gomery (1991) and Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) provide theoretical frameworks
to understand the role of networks in job search and their implications for the members
of the network. Montgomery (1991) starts from the perspective of employers who do not
observe the ability of potential workers. They might assume, however, that the ability
of current workers reflects that of the members of their networks, or that those workers
have better information about the skills of their peers. In either case, it is beneficial for
employers to rely on the network of their current workers to hire future employees. This
implies that an individual who has a larger or relatively more employed network is more
likely to find a job. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) start from workers’ perspective
by considering a network that individuals rely on for information about job opportuni-
ties, taking the network as given. The model generates a positive correlation between the
employment status of one’s network and his own employment probability. The dynamics
of the model highlights however a negative short term effect of a large network, as un-
employed individuals compete for job openings that are passed onto them by individuals
employed in the network.
Social networks are used for job search in part because of the lack of other sources of
information (Chauang and Shecther, 2015). As such, individuals who don’t have access
to information about job openings are more likely to use their social networks to get a
job. Migrants form one such category of individuals, especially just after their arrival in
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their destination. They may lack information about job availability at their destination
and rely on their social network for such information. The study of the role of social net-
works for migrants has also been in part motivated by the observation that international
migrants choose to settle in a few destinations within the host country.7 This concen-
tration follows an ethnic pattern as migrants from the same country are over-represented
in specific places. The literature on information networks presented above would imply
that the presence of social contacts could lead to positive benefits. However, the lack of
contacts with the native population could prevent the acquisition of the country-specific
human capital and hurt their labor market success. Even though such perspective could
lead migrants not to choose to live in enclaves, a theory of ethnic goods suggests that
migrants would still make this choice if ethnic goods are available in those enclaves at
a lower cost, because of economies of scale (Chiswick and Miller, 2005). The effect of
living in an ethnic enclave on labor market outcomes is thus an empirical question.
Although the high percentage of individuals finding jobs through their network is sug-
gestive that networks might have an effect on labor market outcomes, the endogenous
formation of networks plagues the estimation of the effect of social networks or social
contacts. People choose their networks and this choice is related both to their unobserv-
able personal characteristics as well as those of the group they choose to belong to. Edin
et al. (2003) provide a theoretical model of the choice of (the ethnic concentration of) the
place where migrants live. The model illustrates how selection into a network can lead to
7Borjas (1999) reports that in the US, almost three-quarters of immigrants resided in only six states
in 1998. Edin et al. (2003) states that “the share of the foreign-born population living in the three largest
metropolitan areas outstripped the share of the native population by 18 percentage points in 1997” in the
case of Sweeden. In the case of Denmark (Damm, 2009), 71% of nonrefugee immigrants live in the capital
area, where 26% of the overall population lives.
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bias in estimations. If high-skilled individuals choose large networks, the effect estimated
using OLS would lead to an overestimation of the effect of the network, as high-skilled
individuals would be more likely to find a job anyway.
Besides the endogenous choice issue, most data available to researchers, especially for
labor market outcomes, do not include actual contacts between individuals. As such,
researchers have to decide both on how to infer network connections and how to deal
with endogenous sorting into networks. Studies generally use one of two proxies to infer
who individuals are likely to have as contacts. The first one is geographic proximity. The
second is the ethnicity or the language spoken. In the case of international migrants, the
country of origin is used to denote ethnicity. The identification assumptions to account for
the endogenous sorting problem are related to these choices for social network proxies. In
particular, studies using geographic proximity usually choose units of residence such that
other confounding factors can be ruled out, whereas studies relying on the ethnic enclaves
try to account for sorting by using quasi-experiments.
Bayer et al. (2008) is a leading example of the use of geographic proximity for the study
of the effect of social networks on labor market outcomes. The study assumes that in-
teractions between individuals are very local, and shows that two individuals who live in
the same census block are more likely to work at the same place than neighbors living
slightly further apart. Andersson et al. (2014) applied the same methodology but focus on
international migrants, and find that migrants are more likely to work with a neighbor if
they live in an immigrant neighborhood.
Studies on migrant networks’ effects often rely on refugee dispersal programs for quasi-
experiments. Edin et al. (2003) use the Swedish refugee program which places refugees
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across the country, in a quasi-random way, conditional on information available to the
refugee office at the time of placement. This leads the refugees to be exposed to a network
that is exogenous to their own characteristics. Damm (2009) uses a similar approach with
the Danish refugee dispersal program: the stock of refugees placed since the beginning of
the program induces exogenous variations in the size of the enclave in which refugees are
first placed. The approach in Beaman (2011) is similar to Damm (2009), but she uses the
annual flow of refugees placed by one agency in the US to obtain exogenous variation in
the network size. Unlike those studies, Munshi (2003) uses variation in historic rainfall
in the community of origin to instrument for the size of the network of Mexican migrants
in the US.
Edin et al. (2003) and Damm (2009) find negative sorting in enclaves, meaning that low
skilled individuals are the ones that choose most often to live in large immigrant enclaves.
However, after correcting for this selection, living in a larger enclave is associated with
higher earnings. In the Swedish case, the gains from living in an enclave are present
only for low skilled workers, while high skilled workers also benefit from enclaves in
Denmark. Munshi (2003) finds that an exogenously larger share of the network in the
destination increases employment in general, and in particular employment in better paid
nonagricultural jobs. The effects estimated are heterogenous, with respect to gender,
education, time since arrival and age, networks benefiting more to those for whom it
would have been difficult to find a job otherwise. Beaman (2011) differs from the other
studies in that it takes into account the dynamics of the networks following the theoretical
work by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004). The model suggests a negative effect of a
larger network in the short run, as newly arrived migrants who are unemployed compete
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for job openings. Beaman (2011) finds that the number of migrants arrived in recent years
decreases the chances of employment for newcomers, whereas the number of established
migrants increases these chances.
The literature has mostly focused on the probability of getting a job and earnings as the
main outcomes of interest. Less importance has been given to occupation choice, which
seems to have been more studied in the sociology literature, as mentioned in Ioannides and
Datcher Loury (2004).8 Hofmeyr (2010) studies the question in South Africa by defining
occupational enclaves in the manufacturing sector as occupations where a specific ethnic
group is over-represented and finds network effects in the chances of working in an ethnic
enclave. However, this approach doesn’t allow to detect which occupations exhibit higher
network effects, and it requires that one chooses a threshold for the specialization index,
above which one occupation is considered an enclave for a particular network group.
The study also only covers the manufacturing sector. Two papers related to my current
approach are Patel and Vella (2013) and Guerra and Mohnen (2016). Each looks at the
probability of getting jobs in specific occupations and demonstrate that networks play a
role in such probabilities.
Studies on social networks and labor market outcomes related to developing countries
have focused on the reasons why firms might find it beneficial to use referrals to fill
their vacancies. Three reasons are usually mentioned (Fafchamps and Moradi, 2015):
screening of potential candidates, saving on search costs and monitoring (or solving the
8The general question here is whether there is heterogeneity in the jobs that individuals get and how
social networks is related to those different type of jobs. The industry can be used to study the different
type of jobs. Considering the industry has the appealing feature that a worker hears about opening in his
firm or other similar firms and pass the information to members of his network. However, looking just at
the industry doesn’t allow the comparison of the position that the individuals have in their respective jobs.
I can do this looking at the occupation choice.
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moral hazard problem). In experimental games, Beaman and Magruder (2012) find that
participants with high ability could refer other high ability candidates but choose to do so
only when their bonus for the referral is tied to the performance of the person referred,
suggesting that there is a screening model in play. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) do
not find evidence for the screening hypothesis, as in the case of the Gold Coast Army,
the individuals referred were not less likely to desert compared to those recruited by
other means. Heath (2018) finds support for the moral hazard model in the case of the
garment industry in Bangladesh. When a referral is made, firms tie increase in wages of
the referrers to the performance of the worker referred, inducing the latter to provide more
effort, even though the workers referred are not on average of better quality than workers
not recruited through referrals.
2.2 Methodology
The set-up is a country that has J local municipalities, denoted j = 1, · · · , J . There are
in total J = 230 such municipalities in South Africa. Considering the different languages
and provinces of South Africa, I define k = 1, · · · , K groups among which each South
African belongs to uniquely one. A group k is the set of all individuals who were born
in a specific province and who share a primary language. There are 11 language groups
and 9 provinces in the country, leading to K = 99 such groups, which I refer to as ethnic
group in this article. An ethnic group is defined by birth and language and spreads across
many municipalities, through migration. The assumption is that a migrant benefits from
the information or resources of individuals from his ethnic group who live in his current
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municipality of residence. 9
Since I am interested in labor market outcomes, the individuals that I consider are working-
age migrants (15-64 years old) who are in the labor market (workers and individuals look-
ing for jobs) and discouraged workers. The definition excludes individuals still in school
and those that are neither looking for a job nor willing to work.
Employment and ethnic capital
Consider an internal migrant i living in a local municipality j and who belongs to an
ethnic group k. His employment probability depends on his characteristics and the char-
acteristics of his current local municipality of residence. Personal characteristics include
the level of education, age, and sex. Characteristics of the place of residence capture the
local labor market’s conditions. I denote by yijk the binary variable that takes the value
1 if the migrant i is working and zero if not. This decision can be modeled in a latent
variable formulation as follows:
yijk = 1 if y
∗
ijk = Xiβ +Wjγ + uijk ≥ 0 ; 0 otherwise (2.1)
To the extent that a migrant benefits from his ethnic group in finding a job, the model
should account for the characteristics of the group. There are potentially two ways to
incorporate this feature in the labor market participation equation above. On the one
hand, the average employment rate (which is the average of the binary dependent variable
9One possibility would have been to consider the last province of residence in building a proxy for social
capital. However, the previous residence, potentially different from their place of birth, is the result of the
individual’s choice, which is thus endogenous. It is certainly more prone to individual’s choice than the
place where they were born. For these reasons, I chose the place of birth instead.
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in equation 2.1) of the social group (in this case of individuals of the same ethnic group
living in the same municipality as the migrant) could be incorporated as an explanatory
variable in the model. This approach seems, however, not internally coherent, due to
the different nature of the latent variable and the binary variable. On the other hand, the
model could include the leave-out-mean of the latent variable on the right-hand side of
the equation. This leads to the following formulation:





y∗i′jk + uijk (2.2)
Njk represents the size of the ethnic group k living in the local municipality j. Equation
2.2 has the features of a spatial model, where the dependence across individuals happens
within an ethnic group and a specific municipality. I propose here to estimate reduced
form parameters of the model in equation 2.2. Specifically, summing the latent variable
in equation 2.1 over all individuals, natural independent variables in equation 2.2 are the
leave-out-means of the characteristics of the ethnic group in the destination municipality.
The model should also account for error terms at the group level, as they show up while
averaging the latent variable. However, including an error term or fixed effects at ethnic
group X municipality level would prevent the identification of parameters at the group
level due to multicollinearity. I instead introduce fixed effects that are additive in the
ethnic group component and the municipality component. The model to be estimated
reads:
yijk = 1if y
∗
ijk = Xiβ +Wjγ1 + X̄jkδ + µj + λk + uijk ≥ 0 ; 0 otherwise (2.3)
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µj is the unobserved local municipality effect, and λk is the unobserved ethnic group ef-
fect. The parameter of interest, in the end, is δ. It reflects the extent to which a migrant’s
behavior in the labor market is related to the average characteristics of others in his ethnic
group that live in his local municipality. Evidence of the importance of the group is pro-
vided by the statistical significance of this parameter. X̄jk represents ethnic capital. The
introduction of the fixed effects at the ethnic group level and the residence level implies
that the parameter δ is identified by the variation within the ethnic group and within the
local municipality. The fact that those two fixed effects enter in an additive way allows for
the remaining variation that is used for identification. An important feature, especially re-
lated to the introduction of local municipality fixed effects is that, the identification of the
parameter of interest controls for the endogenous choice of destination by the migrants,
which may have biased the results.
There remain, however, some challenges to identification. Migrants’ choices are poten-
tially related not only to the local municipality’s characteristics (local labor market con-
ditions) in absolute, but also related to the extent to which members of their ethnic group
perform in this particular labor market. The local municipality fixed effect accounts for
the global (or common to all groups) conditions of the local market. This problem could
have been solved using fixed effects at the ethnic group - municipality level (e.g., ωjk),
but these fixed effects would be perfectly collinear with ethnic capital, X̄jk. My study
assumes this away through the additive error term (ethnic group and municipality com-
ponents). Assuming that unobservable characteristics at the ethnic group - municipality
level are additive in the two components (i.e. ωjk = µj + λk) would allow identification
of the ethnic capital parameters. Identification would also be achieved if the additive term
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captures most of the variation of the specific component that explains the choice of a mu-
nicipality by members of a particular ethnic group. To partially address the concern that
I do not control for unobserved effects at the ethnic group - municipality level, I take into
account the potential correlation of unobservables at the said level. I do this by clustering
all standard errors at the ethnic group - municipality level.
I conceptually assume that individuals are in one of the three following groups: recent in-
ternal migrants, established internal migrants and non-migrants. 10 The analysis estimates
the model in equations above for recent migrants. When I use the distinction between in-
ternal migrants and non-migrants, I refer to the experience of recent migrants relative to
all others. My measure of ethnic capital X̄jk is the average characteristics of established
migrants aged between 25 and 64 years old in a given municipality. It is plausible that
migrants would benefit from information from long-established individuals as opposed to
more recent arrivals. This is also motivated by the fact that, in the previous literature, the
effects of information networks are found in the long term, but not in the short term. In
the end, my evidence for the importance of the ethnic group in the employment proba-
bility is the extent to which recent migrants’ employment outcomes are explained by the
characteristics of long-established individuals of the same ethnic group.
Occupation and ethnic capital
One contribution of this article is the emphasis on the occupation choice of migrants (see
sections 2.3 and 2.4 for more details on the occupation variable), not just the probability
of employment. I extend the analysis presented above to the explanation of the occupation
10Refer to the data section for more explanation on the implementation of this distinction.
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choice and its relationship with the ethnic group’s characteristics. The goal here is to see
how the likelihood that an internal migrant chooses a particular occupation varies with
the characteristics of individuals of his ethnic group who live in his current municipality.
Suppose that there are q = 1, · · ·Q+ 1 occupations that an individual can choose. Define
the variables Y qijk = 1 if a migrant chooses the occupation q and 0 otherwise. Similar to
the framework presented above, one could model the choice of a particular occupation q
as follows:








ijk ≥ 0 (2.4)
My main interest is in the relationship between migrant occupation choice and the char-
acteristics of his ethnic group. In the formulation above, δq represents the reduced form
parameters of the ethnic group’s effect on the occupation choice. A significant δq would
be my evidence that migrants’ occupation choices are influenced by ethnic capital in their
municipality of residence.
In order to compute the marginal effects from equation 2.4, I use a SUR model where each
equation represents a linear probability model obtained from equation 2.4. Specifically, I
consider the following model:




q + nqj +m
q
k, q = 1, · · ·Q (2.5)
This system of equation is estimated with a SUR model. The advantage of a SUR model
over equivalent linear probability models is that it takes into consideration the correlation
among the error terms that are obtained in each equation. Compared to marginal effects
that are obtained using a multinomial logit model, the present approach doesn’t require
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the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives to be satisfied. The estimation
of the marginal effects using SUR models has been suggested by Zellner and Lee (1965)
and Heckman and Macurdy (1985).
My analysis is agnostic as to whether the results are driven by labor demand or labor
supply. Ethnic capital, as defined throughout this chapter, can move both the supply and
the demand for labor, in an analogy to exogenous variables or instruments that would be
able to move only one of the two. Consistent with the idea that ethnic capital may provide
information to migrants on opportunities, ethnic capital can move labor market outcomes
by increasing the supply of labor. Consistent with the idea that firms may use perfor-
mance by workers as a proxy for the performance of prospective employees (as initially
expressed in Montgomery (1991) analysis), firms could use the ethnic group of a migrant
as a proxy for his or her ability. Still, similarly, this could induce firms to use workers
to recruit more employees by explicitly asking them to make referrals. In the end, what
would be problematic would be that the results are driven entirely by labor demand, but
not through a request for referrals. If firms discriminate by using average characteristics
of the ethnic group, this will make ethnic capital significant in the equation estimated
using the methodology above. However, unless the way this discrimination operates is
through firms using their workers for referrals, the mechanism would not be ethnic cap-
ital per se. The only way that my analysis tries to account for this is with the use of
the additive fixed effects to control for performances of an ethnic group within a specific
municipality. My results are thus to be interpreted within the limits of this methodology.
The concerns around the distinction between labor supply and labor demand are relevant
in line with what my methodology allows me to do in terms of identification.
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2.3 Data
The data that I use in this study is the publicly available 10% sample of the 2011 census
in South Africa.11 The census data contains information that allows inferring both the
employment and migration status of interviewees. The measures of the employment status
include the one-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) code
for occupation. Regarding migration, the census data reports whether the interviewees
have been living at the same place since 2001. I define migrants as individuals who
have moved after 2001 to a new local municipality and were still living there in 2011.
Thus, migrants considered in my study are relatively recent arrivals; they have migrated
less than 10 years ago to their current place of residence. I consider in my main sample
analysis all Black South Africans (or by convention, ”Africans”) internal migrants aged
between 15 and 64 years.
The reason for considering only Africans in the present study is that labor market behav-
ior and migration patterns are race-specific in South Africa (see e.g., Garlick et al., 2016).
Africans represent 80% of the population. Migration among Africans is linked to the po-
litical and economic history of South Africa. As early as Europeans discovered mines in
the country, they installed a structure that constrained access to land for Africans, making
them more likely to turn to labor in the mining sector. Additional measures that con-
strained movement made permanent migration to mining and urban areas impossible.12
These restrictions were later removed, especially with the abolition of apartheid. When
11The dataset has been obtained from the data portal of the University of Cape Town. The link to the
dataset: https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/485.
12Pass books were required outside homelands, where Africans were living, besides when going out to
work, and the length of the stay for work-related reasons was limited.
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those restrictions on people’s movement were in place, a system of circular migration
was observed: people would migrate to the place where they were working, staying there
alone while working, as they were not permitted to move with their families. They had to
go back to their place of origin, the homelands, once the contract was finished. This circu-
lar migration was expected to disappear and lead to more permanent migration following
the end of apartheid. However, Posel and Casale (2003) show that there is evidence that
the circular migration of Africans is still ongoing in South Africa.
These features of Africans’ migration patterns raises questions on how adequate the dif-
ferent datasets on South Africa are to study issues related to migration, and how they
affect the results that are obtained. The census data report information on individuals at a
specific time. Migrants are identified as individuals that are living at a place where they
were not living 10 years ago. This definition includes all the permanent migration that
occurred in the last 10 years and still ongoing, but misses individuals that are in their
place of origin, returning from a spell of temporary or circular migration. Such individu-
als would be classified as non-migrants, under-estimating the true count of the migrants in
the economy. However, as my interest is in the behavior of migrants and not the selection
process, I need, for my results to be unbiased, that individuals that are returning to their
place of origin at the time of the census data collection to be not systematically different
from other migrants. This should not be an issue since the selection here is mostly related
to the time of collection of the data, which does not present any particular feature that
one should worry about in the present context of the interaction between ethnic group and
labor market outcomes.
There is a separate concern, which is the presence at the origin of “permanent return
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migrants” who, at the time of the collection of the census data, do not intend to return
to their previous migration destination. These return migrants do not provide a bias in
the definition of migrants for the purpose of this study but constitute a channel through
which individuals can get information on the place to migrate, and potentially kicks into
how ethnic capital at the place of origin helps explain the choice of the destination. Eth-
nic capital from these return migrants at the place of origin could be correlated to the
ethnic capital from established migrants. This would then be an issue for the estima-
tion in this chapter, as it will contribute to the endogeneity of ethnic capital at the place
of destination. There would be an issue whether these return migrants are positively or
negatively selected. Both successful migrants could share their positive experiences, just
as unsuccessful ones could offer cautionary tales about the migration experience. Ide-
ally, characteristics of these returns would have helped in an equation into the selection
of the destination of migrants. In the end, though, the results of my analysis should be
interpreted within the limitations of how my methodology achieves identification.
2.4 Internal migration in South Africa
Describing internal migrants
The share of internal migrants in the labor force is 11%. Black South Africans represent
the major group in the population, but the second most mobile when it comes to internal
migration. Indeed, only 11% of economically active Black South Africans have migrated,
whereas 20% of White South Africans have also migrated (see Table 2.1 for more details).
Internal migrants tend to be better educated than the general population. Considering the
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Table 2.1: Race and internal migration incidence
Share Internal migration
in the population incidence
Black (African) 76.97 10.73
Coloured 10.03 5.03
Indian or Asian 2.71 9.82
White 10.10 19.83
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census.
whole labor force in the country, the share of individuals holding a post-secondary degree
in the whole population of working age is 14%, whereas 23% of the internal migrants hold
a post-secondary degree. This comparison also holds within racial groups. For Africans
(see Table 2.2), 17% of Black South Africans who migrated have a post-secondary degree,
as compared to 10% only of those who did not migrate. Internal migrants are younger,
more likely to be male and less likely to present physical disabilities (Table 2.2).
Among Africans who are in the labor market, internal migrants are on average 31.6 years
old, while those who did not migrate are 35 years old. They have been living in their
current place for three years on average. The proportion of women among migrants is
45%, whereas women represent 52% of non internal migrants. Internal migrants are less
likely to present disabilities. As an illustration, 9% of internal migrants have vision issues
compared to 11% of those who did not move. Although data on the exact income or
wages are not available, self-reported gross income (including all sources of incomes) of
individuals are reported in brackets. A comparison of the distribution of income shows
that internal migrants tend to earn more, as the distribution of their income is skewed to
the right compared to that of non-migrants (see figure B.1).
One striking aspect while comparing migrants to those who have not moved is that 60%
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Table 2.2: Comparing migrants and non-migrants
Non-migrants Migrants p-value
of difference
No schooling 0.052 0.027 0.000
(0.222) (0.162)
Some primary 0.115 0.072 0.000
(0.320) (0.258)
Completed primary 0.049 0.036 0.000
(0.216) (0.187)
Some secondary 0.388 0.352 0.000
(0.487) (0.478)
Matric 0.312 0.341 0.000
(0.463) (0.474)
Post-secondary 0.084 0.172 0.000
(0.277) (0.378)
Person is male 0.489 0.548 0.000
(0.500) (0.498)
Age in completed years 35.223 31.586 0.000
(11.586) (9.130)
Any difficulty in Seeing 0.113 0.090 0.000
(0.317) (0.286)
Any difficulty in Hearing 0.024 0.021 0.000
(0.154) (0.142)
Any difficulty in Communication 0.007 0.006 0.011
(0.082) (0.076)
Any difficulty in Walking or climbing stairs 0.021 0.014 0.000
(0.142) (0.117)
Any difficulty in Remembering / Concentrating 0.026 0.020 0.000
(0.160) (0.140)
Any difficulty in Self Care 0.008 0.005 0.000
(0.090) (0.070)
N 916,395 123,885
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: Africans aged 15-64, active in the labor force or discour-
aged workers.
of migrants are the head of the household in which they live. This is explained by the
structure of the households, as those headed by internal migrants tend to be smaller:
households headed by internal migrants have, on average, 2.3 persons (compared to 3.5
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for households that are headed by non-migrants). 43% the households with an internal mi-
grant head are a single-member household, and 46% other households have just between
one and three other persons. In addition, internal migrants that are head of households
are 10 years younger than those who are not migrants. This suggests that people moving
within the country are less likely to do so as a household, but more likely to be individ-
ual persons who move alone, and later form their households. This echoes the results
of Garlick et al. (2016) that show that only one third of individuals involved in internal
migration between 2008 and 2016 were in households that moved as a whole.
Migrants’ ethnic group
The two features that define proxies for networks in my study are the province in which
individuals were born and the language that they speak. Table 2.3 presents the 99 dif-
ferent ethnic groups, as defined in section 2.2. These groups vary considerably in their
size. Out of the 99 different groups, the five major ones make up close to 60% of all
internal migrants, whereas the 30 smallest cells provide less than 1% of the internal mi-
grants. Tables B.1 and B.2 provide the rate of migration given the language spoken and
the province of birth. The migrants were primarily born in Eastern Cape (24%), Limpopo
(22%) and Kwazulu-Natal (17%). They primarily speak IsiXhosa (24%), IsiZulu (22%),
and Sepedi (14%). There is a strong correlation between those two characteristics. 86%
of the IsiXhosa were born in Eastern Cape, whereas close to 70% of IsiZulu were born in
Kwazulu-Natal and 80 % of Sepedi in Limpopo.
Regarding the destination that they choose, migrants tend to move mostly to the wealthiest
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Table 2.3: Size of the language and province of origin groups
Language spoken Province of birth
WC EC NC FS KN NW GA MP LI Total Percentage
IsiXhosa 807 25,363 272 613 723 356 1,034 158 111 29,437 23.8
IsiZulu 89 848 96 625 19,033 319 3,307 2,728 593 27,638 22.3
Sepedi 45 129 33 120 110 272 1,251 1,456 14,297 17,713 14.3
Setswana 50 121 1,534 592 185 7,524 2,081 445 697 13,229 10.7
Sesotho 77 1,145 90 6,180 275 596 2,161 510 830 11,864 9.6
Xitsonga 21 224 16 37 51 171 565 1,433 4,337 6,855 5.5
Tshivenda 16 18 7 11 17 34 264 52 4,288 4,707 3.8
English 134 926 79 332 778 391 776 341 707 4,464 3.6
SiSwati 9 44 17 17 83 35 170 2,559 140 3,074 2.5
IsiNdebele 16 92 36 40 232 146 483 1,367 498 2,910 2.3
Afrikaans 185 318 247 297 114 179 386 118 150 1,994 1.6
Total 1,449 29,228 2,427 8,864 21,601 10,023 12,478 11,167 26,648 123,885
Percentage 1.17 23.59 1.96 7.16 17.44 8.09 10.07 9.01 21.51
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: African migrants aged 15-64, active in the labor force
or discouraged workers. The provinces are : WC : Western Cape, EC : Eastern Cape, NC : Northern Cape,
FS : Free State, KN : Kwazulu-Natal NW : North West, GA : Gauteng, MP : Mpumalanga, LI : Limpopo.
and most populated province of the country, Gauteng (see Table B.3). This province
contains Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest city. Gauteng is the destination of 42% of
internal migrants. Kwazulu-Natal, including the main city of Durban, accounts for the
destination of 13% of the internal migrants. The less common destinations are Northern
Cape (2%) and Free State (4%). Migrants primarily choose to go to Gauteng or to a local
municipality that is in the same province. For example, Eastern Cape is the province
where most migrants were born. Of those, 28% choose to go to a geographically close
province, Western Cape, while 27% stay in the same province. 22% choose to go to
Gauteng. In total, 40% of those who migrate have chosen to stay in the same province as
the one they were previously living in.
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Labor market outcomes of internal migrants
The definition of occupational choice builds on the major group of occupations, the one-
digit level of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). One par-
ticularity of South Africa’s labor market is the high unemployment rate and the high share
of discouraged workers. These high numbers have been at the source of questions as to
whether part unemployment is voluntary, and the factors that explain why a large share
of the jobless choose not to actively search for a job. To take into account this feature
of the labor market, instead of studying the choice of occupation conditional on being
employed, or conditional on being active in the labor market, I adopt a definition of oc-
cupation choice that augments the original variable by two categories for unemployed
and discouraged workers. Table 2.4 presents the distribution of this variable. Internal
migrants are less likely to be unemployed or discouraged workers compared to the whole
population. 60% of the whole active population is employed, but this share is 75% within
internal migrants.
This description of migrants characteristics reveals that migrants are selected positively,
as they are better educated, and, in part due to this selection, have better labor outcomes.
However, other factors come into play, as the opportunities available at the destination,
and ethnic capital, which is the factor that my study seeks to highlight. This process can
potentially be used as evidence as that migration is motivated by economic reasons.
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Table 2.4: Occupation choice distribution
Whole population Internal migrants Black internal
migrants
Manager 4.3 7.25 4.21
Professional 3.88 6.7 4.79
Technician 5.83 7.55 6.23
Clerk 7.05 10.06 7.98
Sales and services 9.47 12.22 12.19
Skilled agriculture 0.51 0.65 0.5
Craft and related traders 7.05 8.67 8.85
Plant and machine operators 4.04 4.66 4.86
Elementary workers 10.16 10.68 11.92
Domestic workers 5.97 6.12 7.01
Unemployed 30.75 20.74 25.57
Discouraged workers 11.00 4.71 5.88
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: individuals aged 15-64, active in the labor force or
discouraged workers.
Labor market outcomes and ethnic capital
Descriptive evidence of the importance of the ethnic group for the employment prob-
ability comes from the observation the employment rate of recent internal migrants is
correlated with the employment rate of established migrants of the ethnic group that have
been residing for a longer time in the same local municipality. Table 2.5 presents the av-
erage employment rate of recent internal migrants across language groups, along with the
average employment rate of established internal migrants of the same ethnic group. Re-
cent migrants speaking primarily Afrikaans have the highest employment rate (71%). At
the same time, Afrikaans established migrants also experience the highest employment
rate (81%). Similarly, recent migrants speaking IsiXhosa have the lowest employment
rate (57%) and establisehd migrants speaking IsiXhosa have the lowest employment rate
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among established migrants. The details for all language and origin groups are provided
as a graph (figure B.2). This graph suggests, like the comparison between IsiXhosa and
Afrikaans speakers, that a high employment rate of established migrants is associated
with a high employment rate of migrants of the same ethnic group.




Language groups Mean s.d Mean s.d. N
Afrikaans 0.71 0.17 0.81 0.39 2,002
English 0.68 0.15 0.78 0.42 4,484
IsiNdebel 0.60 0.14 0.72 0.45 2,917
IsiXhosa 0.57 0.12 0.64 0.48 29,511
IsiZulu 0.57 0.12 0.68 0.47 27,712
Sepedi 0.61 0.13 0.68 0.47 17,777
Sesotho 0.62 0.13 0.71 0.45 11,897
Setswana 0.64 0.15 0.74 0.44 13,274
SiSwati 0.62 0.13 0.71 0.45 3,086
Tshivenda 0.69 0.13 0.71 0.46 4,731
Xitsonga 0.62 0.13 0.69 0.46 6,868
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. The averages are computed from the migrants’ point of view. The
average for established migrants is thus the employment rate of established migrants of the same ethnic
group, weighted by the size of the migrants’ group.
I provide similar evidence for the occupational choice. Just as for the employment rate,
I plot the share of each occupation among recent migrants against the same share for
established of the ethnic group (figure B.3). Overall, the share of recent migrants choos-
ing a particular occupation tends to rise as the share of established migrants choosing
this occupation rises. These results provide suggestive evidence that the more employed
or represented in an occupation the ethnic group of a migrant at the destination is, the
more likely the migrant is to get employed and to make similar occupation choices. Such
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correlation could just be due to confounding factors, such as the local labor market con-
ditions that affect both recent migrants and established migrants. In the next section, I
provide evidence that the benefits that migrants get from their ethnic group persist even
after controlling for some of the confounding factors.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Employment and ethnic capital
Table 2.6 presents the results from the estimation of equation 2.3. The equation is in-
tended to produce reduced form estimates of the relationship between a migrant employ-
ment probability and the characteristics of his ethnic group. As expected, individual char-
acteristics matter for the chances of being employed: a higher education level and being
a male are associated with higher chances of employment, as well as being a man. There
is also a positive relationship between age and the chances of being employed. Condi-
tional on individual characteristics, ethnic group characteristics significantly explain the
chances of employment of an internal migrant. The F-test shows that those characteristics
are jointly significant (Table 2.6, specification 2), even after controlling for unobservable
factors at the ethnic group and local municipality of residence level (specification 3).
The effect of the distribution of education at the ethnic group level shows that internal
migrants benefit from both ends of the distribution, i.e. both from the share of their ethnic
group with high education as well as the share with no or little education. These results
are in comparison with the share of the ethnic group that has a secondary education. 13 On
13As the sum of the shares of low education (no education or some primary), secondary and post-
secondary degree holders equal to one, those three variables cannot be added to the model. As such, I
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Table 2.6: Employment and ethnic group characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary -0.016 -0.025 -0.031
(0.007)** (0.006)*** (0.005)***
Post-secondary 0.206 0.206 0.201
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Person is male 0.171 0.168 0.167
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Age 25-44 0.210 0.211 0.212
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Age 45-65 0.279 0.282 0.285
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
Ethnic group average characteristics
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.182 0.072
(0.042)*** (0.021)***
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.197 0.136
(0.035)*** (0.024)***
Ethnic group share of male 0.070 0.069
(0.031)** (0.018)***
Ethnic group share 45-64 -0.067 -0.020
(0.033)** (0.019)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.13
N 123,885 121,797 121,793
Significance of ethnic group characteristics (F-stat) 10.03 11.84
P-value of joint significance test 0.00 0.00
Ethnic group fixed effects No No Y
Local municipality fixed effects No No Y
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all Black
South African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011. Averages for established migrants are computed for
those aged 25 or above. The table presents the marginal effects obtained from a linear probability model
explaining the probability of being employed by individual characteristics and the characteristics of estab-
lished migrants of the same ethnic group. Specification 1 contains only individual characteristics, whereas
2 and 3 introduce ethnic group characteristics and fixed effects for the ethnic group and municipality. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the ethnic group x municipality level. The F-tests presented are for the joint
significance of the characteristics of established migrants.
have chosen to remove the share of the ethnic group that has secondary education. This choice was moti-
vated by the fact potential benefits of ethnic capital from individuals with low and high levels education,
which would translate into a nonlinear relationship between the average level of education of the ethnic
group and the chances of employment. 88
the one hand, an internal migrant’s chances of getting employed increase with the share
of members of his ethnic group that have no level of education or just primary education.
The effect persists even after controlling for local labor market conditions, even though
the estimates are roughly divided by two. From the most conservative estimates, a 10
percentage point increase of the share of primary or no education holders increases the
chances of being employed by .7 percentage points. On the other hand, the share of
members that have a post-secondary degree increases the chances of getting employed, an
effect that is twice as large as the effect of the share of individuals with primary education
or less. Finally, a higher proportion of males among previously established migrants
translates as well into higher chances of employment for new migrants. Although the
age composition of the population seems to matter, suggesting that the older the ethnic
group is, the less migrants benefit from it in terms of employment opportunities, it does
not remain significant once local labor market conditions are accounted for.
One potential issue is the fact that I perform my analysis using individual-level data, while
I am interested in the effects of variables measured at the ethnic group - municipality. An
analysis at the ethnic group - municipality level would address some of the concerns re-
lated to unobservables at that level. Table B.4 presents the results of the estimates at that
aggregate level. Averages of all the variables are computed to obtain employment rates as
the dependent variable, and averages of independent variables. Regressions are weighted
by the size of each cell (ethnic group - municipality level). The results support the idea
that ethnic capital matters when considering the aggregate level for the regressions, even
after accounting for unobserved ethnic group and municipality effects (see columns 2 and
4). However, the results exhibit some abnormalities that potentially qualify this analysis.
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Regarding individual characteristics, a large share of migrants with no education or some
primary education seems to lead to a higher employment rate, when the base is secondary
education. This is counter-intuitive, and also at the odds with the regressions at the in-
dividual level. Given that the conclusion that ethnic group matters holds both with and
without these individual characteristics, the issue with the individual variables is unlikely
to affect this conclusion. Still, this may warrant further investigations.
Ethnic capital or language proficiency?
My analysis assumes that the language a migrant primarily speak helps identify his or
her ethnic group. This assumption excludes the possibility that a migrant learns the lan-
guage that he or she speaks mostly, a situation that may happen when migrants choose
to learn, speak primarily or as a second language a language specific to the place where
they move. Previous literature (Deumert et al., 2005; Deumert and Mabandla, 2009) has
exhibited a change in languages for internal migrants in South Africa, mostly stressing
that the dialect of internal migrants experiences some changes to incorporate elements of
the local language. To see the extent to which my results are sensitive to these concerns,
I perform several analyzes based on language proficiencies, summarized in Table B.5. I
first check whether the results are different with respect to the proficiency of the most
prevalent language in the municipality of residence. Column 5 in Table B.5 presents the
results for migrants who do not speak the most prevalent language, whereas column 6
shows the results for migrants who speak that language. The results are mostly similar
when it comes to the distribution of education; if anything, the effect of the share of indi-
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viduals with a post-secondary degree is slightly larger for migrants proficient in the most
prevalent language in their place of residence. Other variables capturing ethnic capital are
significant only for migrants who speak the most spoken language. These results suggest
that migrants who speak the most prevalent language in the place where they move to
benefit more from their ethnic capital. The fact that those who do not speak the most
prevalent language also benefit from their ethnic capital implies that the results of the im-
portance of ethnic capital are not entirely driven by those who master the language spoken
where they move. In the end, concerns that individuals may learn contribute to the results
presented in this paper, but these concerns are not the sole drivers of my results. I explore
two additional concerns related to language proficiency. I look at internal migrants who
speak English either as their first or second language. Results presented in column 2 show
little difference compared to the results for all migrants. Similarly, I look at migrants who
speak two languages. The results (Table B.5 column 3) are mostly similar. If anything,
they suggest a weaker effect of the share of established migrants with a post-secondary
degree and a stronger effect of the share of primary education holders. I take these results
overall as suggestive evidence that the results indeed reflect ethnic capital and not merely
language proficiency.
Robustness: alternative sample analyses
In the analysis so far, I have defined internal migrants as individuals who have changed the
local municipality where they reside in 2001 or afterward. This definition incorporates in-
dividuals that have just moved inside the same province, and individuals that have moved
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to a neighboring local municipality. Hypothetically, an individual could have changed
the place where he lives while still keeping the same job. This is more likely to happen
when an individual moves to a neighboring local municipality, or moves within the same
province. It will be erroneous to attribute anything to the ethnic group for the success
in the labor market of those migrants. To make sure that those individuals do not drive
my results, I present in Table B.6 the analysis where I excluded them in the sample of
internal migrants. The analysis here thus includes only individuals that have moved to a
non-neighboring local municipality and in a different province. The results show that the
distribution of education and the gender composition of a migrant ethnic group matters
for his own chances of getting employed, even after controlling for local labor market
conditions and unobservable at the migrant ethnic group. This suggests that the results
observed above are unlikely to be driven by people moving while still keeping their jobs.
An additional issue is that I don’t distinguish the reasons why individuals migrate. How-
ever, my main focus is on individuals who are migrating for economic reasons, i.e. in
search of a job. Including people who migrate for other reasons may lower the actual role
of the ethnic group in finding a job. To get a sense of how not identifying the economic
migrants might affect the results, I conduct two separate analyses. In the first analysis, I
considered only migrants that are between 25 and 64 years old, whereas my main sample
contains individuals aged 15 to 64. Arguably, younger individuals may have migrated for
other reasons, such as just accompanying their families, and not necessarily in search of
a job themselves. The results in Table B.7 show that my conclusions for all the migrants
hold in particular when I consider only migrants that are 25 years older or more.
In the second analysis, I focus on the main province of South Africa, Gauteng. Besides
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being the most populous province (24% of the population) and the main destination of
internal migrants (42% of them), Gauteng is the richest province of the country, as it
concentrates 34% of the GDP of the country. 14 According to the Labor Force Survey,
the province receives 71.8% of migrant workers. This suggests that migrants choosing
to settle in Gauteng are more likely to be economic migrants. Therefore, analyzing only
migrants in Gauteng should provide results that are more related to economic migrants.
Table B.8 presents the results of equation 2.3 estimated only for migrants who are living
in Gauteng. The results show that the ethnic groups matter for migrants in Gauteng, with
some specificities. The effects of the lower end of the distribution of education are similar,
whereas the effect of the upper end of the distribution, the share of individuals holding
a post-secondary degree, is stronger (50% higher).15 In all, the previous two analyzes
provide evidence that the results of the role of ethnic capital persists when analysis is
restricted to individuals more likely to migrate for economic reasons.
Robustness check: IV analyses
So far, I have used as independent variables in my regressions the characteristics of es-
tablished internal migrants from the same ethnic group. However, as internal migrants
decide where they move to, this variable is prone to endogeneity. As mentioned in the
methodology section, including local municipality fixed effects contributes to addressing
14See the provincial review 2016. The Real Economy Bulletin:
https://www.tips.org.za/images/The_REB_Provincial_Review_2016_Gauteng.
pdf
15These results could be linked to the fact that migrants to locate in Gauteng are in general better ed-
ucated. The share of migrants that have a post-secondary degree in Gauteng is 20% whereas this share
is 15% in the other provinces. As the specification controls for the migrant own level of education, the
higher effect in Gauteng can be in part attributed to the interaction effect found between one’s own level of
education and the distribution of education.
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that endogeneity issue. However, it does not entirely solve the problem, especially to the
extent that the choice of residence is related to the ethnic group’s presence in the destina-
tion, in ways that the additive fixed effects do not capture. I follow previous research (e.g.,
Borjas, 1992; Patel and Vella, 2013) and use as instrument variables the values of these
characteristics in the past, in my case, 10 years prior (using South Africa’s 2001 census
data). As an illustration, I instrument for the share of established migrants who hold a
post-secondary diploma in 2011 by using the share of established migrants that held a
post-secondary diploma in 2001 in the local municipality of residence. The identification
strategy here assumes that migration decision responds to recent migration experience
in the ethnic group; and that historical migration patterns have an effect on the current
migration patterns, only through the recently established migrants.
Table B.10 shows the results of the instrumental variable estimations. I estimate a linear
probability model equivalent to equation 2.3.The first stage regressions (Table B.10) show
that historical values of the characteristics of established migrants are highly correlated
with their current values, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. The IV estimations
also confirm that ethnic capital is associated with better chances of getting employed for
internal migrants, suggesting that the results observed above are robust to the endogeneity
of migrants choice of their destination. The results also show that if anything, OLS are
biasing the effect of ethnic capital downwards.
Overall, the results suggest that the characteristics of his ethnic group can explain an
internal migrant’s probability of employment. These results thus show that the importance
of social networks that has been highlighted by Burns et al. (2010) holds for internal
94
Table 2.7: Employment and ethnic group characteristics: IV estimations
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary -0.025 -0.031 -0.031 -0.038
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Post-secondary 0.206 0.206 0.201 0.201
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Person is male 0.168 0.173 0.167 0.170
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Age 25-44 0.211 0.206 0.212 0.208
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Age 45-65 0.282 0.272 0.285 0.279
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Ethnic group share (fraction)
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.182 0.284 0.072 0.300
(0.012)*** (0.025)*** (0.017)*** (0.141)**
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.197 0.405 0.136 0.589
(0.018)*** (0.068)*** (0.021)*** (0.213)***
Ethnic group share of male 0.070 0.060 0.069 0.082
(0.011)*** (0.027)** (0.015)*** (0.109)
Ethnic group share 45-64 -0.067 -0.135 -0.020 -0.206
(0.014)*** (0.085) (0.016) (0.244)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13
N 121,797 99,410 121,797 99,410
Significance of ethnic group characteristics: statistic. 77.00 132.36 18.69 22.90
P-value for joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnic group fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Local municipality fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all Black
South African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011. Averages for established migrants are computed for
those aged 25 or above. Instruments for the IV estimates are the values for established migrants, from the
2001 census. The table presents the marginal effects obtained from a linear probability model explaining the
probability of being employed by individual characteristics and the characteristics of established migrants of
the same ethnic group. Results from OLS and IV estimations are compared in the table, with specifications
that include or not fixed effects for the ethnic group and the municipality. Tests for the joint significance of
the characteristics of established migrants are presented. F-tests are used for OLS estimations and χ2 tests
for the IV estimations.
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migrants in particular as well. 16
My results also suggest that migrants’ social capital matters not only for the migration
decision, but also for the employment opportunities of the migrants. The importance of
social networks in the migration decision in South Africa has been suggested by Kok
et al. (2003) and Gelderblom and Adams (2006); it has also been highlighted by Reed
(2009) and Stapleton (2015) who have quantified this importance. Reed (2009) suggested
that social networks play a role only for the choice of destination, but not the probability
of finding a job, but the present analysis shows a link between the characteristics of the
ethnic group and the chances of getting a job.
2.5.2 Occupational choice and ethnic capital
I now present the results on the role of the ethnic capital in the occupation choice. 17 Table
2.8 presents the results of the estimation of equation 2.5, which quantifies the relationship
between the occupation and the ethnic group characteristics. The coefficients are the
marginal effects of the variables on the probability that a migrant chooses a particular
16The results presented in my analysis are not directly comparable to those in Burns et al. (2010), as
their methodology differs from mine. They use a network measure which is the national employment rate
of the ethnic group multiplied by the size (number of members) of the ethnic group in the municipality of
residence. This network measure helps include fixed effects to account for correlated effects. In the end,
the parameter that they obtain (coefficient of the network measure) does not have a direct interpretation,
but helps compute the share of employment that is due to social networks. In my analysis, however, I
present evidence of how ethnic capital affect these employments, with reduced form estimates of the rela-
tionship between individuals’ employment probability and their ethnic capital. That said, results in Burns
et al. (2010)seem to suggest, however, that migrants exhibit smaller benefits from their networks than non-
migrants.
17I choose to include unemployed and discouraged workers as a category for the occupation variable. As
mentioned in section 2.4, this is motivated by the importance of these categories in the labor market. An
alternative would have been to consider two models. The first model would consider the choice between
being discouraged workers, unemployed, and employed. The second model would consider the choice be-
tween the different occupations (in the usual sense) in the labor market. Modeling jointly these choices help
consider the idea that some job seekers or jobless individuals are passed information about job openings, or
are made job offers that they turn down (see, e.g., Levinsohn et al., 2014).
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occupation. The estimation controls for unobservable effects at the ethnic group level as
well as the local municipality level. This implies that the results are identified holding
local labor market conditions constant as well as unobservable factors at the ethnic group
level that might explain differential choices of occupation, for reasons that are not related
to the presence of the ethnic group in the particular local municipality. From the results,
the ethnic group matters for the choice of occupation, although not for all occupations.
The χ2 test for the joint significance of the characteristics of the ethnic group reveals that
they play no significant role in the probability of being employed in skilled agriculture or
in sales and services. 18
Looking specifically at what characteristics matter at the ethnic group level, regarding
the distribution of education, the share of individuals with a post-secondary degree is
the variable most frequently significant. It increases the chances that an internal migrant
works as a manager, a professional, a clerk, or a plant operator. Having a high share
of established ethnic contacts that have low or no education helps for some occupations
as well, namely plant operators, elementary occupations, and domestic workers. The
gender and age distribution also matters for the choice of occupations. A higher share of
men in the networks is associated with higher chances of being employed in craft and in
plants, while there are lower chances of working as a domestic worker. In the case of the
latter occupation, it is worth noting that 76% of domestic workers are women, which may
explain the effect of the gender composition on the choice of this occupation. Similarly,
18The shares for the different categories of the occupation variables are quite different, as low as .5%
for skilled agriculture, which implies smaller variation in these variables. This potentially has implications
in terms of power of the statistical analysis. That said, besides skilled agriculture, the other category for
which ethnic capital does not play a significant role is services an sales, an occupation that 12% of migrants
choose. It is less likely that power issues apply to the results for services, but they could well explain the
lack of results for skilled agriculture.
97
Table 2.8: Occupational choice and ethnic capital (marginal effects)
Occupation (dependent variable) Ethnic group share (independent variables) χ2stat.
Primary Post-secondary Aged 45-65 Male (p-value)
education education
Manager 0.003 0.025 0.009 -0.010 11.48**
(0.008) (0.010)** (0.007) (0.007) (.022)
Professional -0.010 0.025 0.010 0.003 12.11**
(0.008) (0.010)** (0.008) (0.007) (.016)
Technician -0.003 0.016 -0.026 0.006 12.89**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)** (0.008) (.012)
Clerk 0.009 0.045 0.001 0.002 12.64**
(0.010) (0.013)** (0.010) (0.009) (.013)
Sales and service -0.003 -0.011 0.014 -0.007 2.24
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (.691)
Skilled agriculture 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.002 2.45
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (.653)
Craft and related traders -0.013 0.023 0.001 0.043 26.01***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)** (.000)
Plant and machine operators 0.017 0.027 -0.013 0.043 44.70***
(0.008)* (0.011)* (0.008) (0.007)** (.000)
Elementary occupations 0.044 -0.017 -0.011 0.013 19.39***
(0.012)** (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (.000)
Domestic worker 0.027 0.008 -0.005 -0.026 17.28***
(0.009)** (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)** (.001)
Unemployed -0.053 -0.094 0.006 -0.045 38.71***
(0.016)** (0.020)** (0.015) (0.014)** (.000)
N 121,780
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all Black
South African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011. Averages for established migrants are computed
for those aged 25 or above. The table presents the results of the estimation of a SUR model where each
equation represents an occupation. Each row represents an occupation choice. Discouraged workers are the
occupation group that has been chosen as the reference. Each equation controls for ethnic group fixed effect
as well as local municipality fixed effects. The last column presents for each regression the χ2 test for the
joint significance of the characteristics of the ethnic group, with the associated p-values in parentheses.
78% of individuals craft workers and 73% of plant operators are male, which can explain
the effect of the gender composition on those choices. 19
One interesting analysis is to relate the importance of the ethnic capital to the education
19The story here is choice of occupation for which the gender gap is large are associated with the gender
composition of established migrants. This suggests as well that there might be different components of the
ethnic capital for men and women.
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level required for the different occupations. Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) note
that the role of social networks in finding a job may differ with the skills required in
the occupations, depending on how difficult it is to infer the productivity of the incoming
workers based on those skills. Regarding the probability of finding a job, it is often shown
that less skilled workers benefit more from their networks than skilled workers. Table B.9
shows the distribution of education for each occupation, allowing a ranking by the level of
skills required. “Professionals” have the highest share of workers with a post-secondary
degree, followed by the technicians, whereas the domestic workers and the elementary
occupations workers are the least likely to have such a degree. Comparing the results of
the estimations suggest that social networks matter more for occupations that require less
education. Overall, putting together the estimations in Table 2.8 and the distribution in
Table B.9, the results suggest that the ethnic group characteristics especially matter for
occupations that require less education.
These results are, however, small in their magnitude, and the elasticities they imply are
very low. An illustration is the effect of the share of individuals having a post-secondary
diploma on the probability of being employed as a clerk. The estimate implies that a one
percentage point increase in the share of the ethnic group with a post-secondary diploma
leads to an increase by .04 percent the probability of being employed as a clerk, which is
the highest effect induced by the education distribution. While an increase of the share
of individuals holding a post-secondary diploma by 1% (the national share is 10%) is
economically significant, the implied increase in the probability of being employed as
clerk is not, as this represents the occupation that 7% of migrants choose. This result
seems to be in line with the study of occupation enclaves and social networks by Hofmeyr
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(2010), which suggests that internal migrants are less likely to be in occupations where
their social group is over-represented. One caveat to this study and Hofmeyr (2010) is
that actual social contacts are not observed, and to the extent that our definition includes
individuals that are not relevant for migrants’ networks, the present estimates might be
biased downwards when it comes to the role that social networks play in the choice of
occupation.
2.6 Conclusion
Social networks play an important role in different areas of economic decisions, especially
in labor markets and migration. This importance has been highlighted both theoretically
and empirically and is thought to be more prevalent in developing countries (Chauang and
Shecther, 2015). In this paper, I focus on one dimension of social networks, the ethnic
group, and study how the group characteristics affect labor market outcomes for internal
migrants in South Africa. My results show that a migrant’s employment probability is
related to the education distribution and the gender composition of established individu-
als from his ethnic group. The results hold even after I control for unobservables at the
place of residence or the social group considered. I also provide evidence that the choice
of occupation by a migrant is associated with the characteristics of the social group in
the place of residence. Results on the occupational choice show that the ethnic group’s
characteristics in terms of education and gender induce migrants to choose specific occu-
pations. The results in magnitude are however generally small, although IV estimations
for employment probability suggest that they might be larger.
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This article suffers, however, from some limitations that may qualify the results. The main
limitation comes from the choice of data. The main advantage of using the census data is
the size of the sample obtained, especially for the representation of very small groups, like
the groups obtained by crossing the place of residence and the language/province of birth
groups. This gain in representation comes with limitations on the information collected.
One such information not collected is the actual links between individuals. The results
here are to be interpreted as evidence of the importance of networks in labor markets,
while not quantifying the social network effect as defined in the peer effects literature. To
the extent that interaction happens primarily within one’s own language group, the results
presented here represent the effects on migrants of the choices and behavior of potential
contacts that they have in the place where they now reside.
Besides this aspect, the results presented here are reduced form evidence of the relation-
ship between the ethnic group characteristics labor market outcomes for migrants. The
results presented here hold when I control for unobserved common characteristics to the
ethnic group, but at a national level, although the additive local municipality fixed effect
allows for the control of some local ethnic group common effect. This suggests that fur-
ther analyses will help better understand the role that social networks play in the insertion
of internal migrants in the labor market in South Africa in particular, and in developing
countries in general.
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Chapter 3: Cheap Talk and Coordination in the Lab and in the Field: Col-
lective Commercialization in Senegal
This chapter is co-authored with Tanguy Bernard and Angelino Viceisza.
3.1 Introduction
Many activities depend on coordination among a sometimes large number of agents;
for example group projects, the meaning of language, and navigating traffic. From a
game theory standpoint, coordination is required whenever there exist multiple, poten-
tially Pareto ranked, equilibria and theory does not clearly predict behavior. In fact, with-
out prior knowledge about others’ intended actions, strategic uncertainty will likely steer
agents away from activities that require coordination. This in turn leads to coordination
failure; that is, agents choosing risk-dominant strategies over Pareto-dominant ones, thus
leading to suboptimal outcomes (e.g., Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).
Coordination games have featured prominently in the literature.1 Moreover, with coordi-
nation failure at the heart of certain poverty traps (Wydick, 2007), a key policy question
has been how to enhance coordination (Hoff, 2001). For example, Devetag and Ortmann
1Section 3.3 will discuss our work in the context of prior literature. Some overviews are Ochs (1995),
Goeree and Holt (2002), Camerer (2003), Devetag and Ortmann (2007), Van Huyck and Battalio (2008),
and Cooper and Weber (2019).
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(2007) point at several factors that may improve coordination: (1) smaller group sizes
(e.g., Van Huyck et al., 1990); (2) lower attractiveness of the secure relative to the risky ac-
tion (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2006); and (3) certain types of cheap talk/communication
in certain types of games (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Farrell, 1987). Yet, as Avoyan and
Ramos (2017) argue, while communication has been lauded for its potential to enhance
coordination, there are also instances where it has had no effect (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992).
One aspect that has received limited attention is the interaction between the number of
players (i.e., group size) and communication (one exception is Feltovich and Grossman,
2015). In addition, most prior literature on coordination and its drivers (in particular com-
munication) is theoretical and/or based on conventional laboratory experiments. Cooper
and Weber (2019) also conclude that coordination games like ours (i.e., threshold games)
and those that relate to problems in organizations (of which farmer cooperatives are an ex-
ample) require further study. So, to better understand drivers of coordination, it is useful
to complement existing findings with field evidence.
In this paper, we explore the impact of cheap talk on coordination and whether this effect
varies with group size, in a field context where strategic uncertainty has historically led
to coordination failure.2 We study farmer cooperatives that seek to sell members’ agricul-
tural production collectively – a setting that represents much of the developing and devel-
oped world. Farmer groups have received considerable attention in policy and research.
For example, the UN designated 2012 as the year of cooperatives, since 85% of farms
worldwide are small family farms and most of them participate in cooperatives. Barrett
2Throughout, we use the following terms interchangeably: (1) cooperatives, farmer groups, and pro-
ducer organizations; (2) farmers, smallholders, members, players, and subjects; (3) cheap talk, communi-
cation, intentions, plans/planned actions; and (4) coordination and collective commercialization/selling.
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(2008) argues that mechanisms aimed at facilitating smallholder organization (e.g., coop-
eratives) are central to stimulating market participation. At the same time, cooperatives
are not always able to achieve the goal of selling collectively (e.g., Bernard et al., 2008;
Fafchamps and Hill, 2005; Ragasa and Golan, 2014). Our primary goal is not to pro-
mote collective commercialization, as we are agnostic regarding its effective capacity to
increase farmers’ income.3 Instead, we seek to understand why, in groups designed for
the purpose of collective commercialization, farmers are unwilling to do so. In particular,
because those same farmers believe that collective commercialization could lead to higher
incomes.
Based on data from the context in question (Bernard et al., 2014) as well as prior literature
(e.g., Devetag and Ortmann, 2007), we hypothesize that (1) beliefs about others’ sales to
the group are key to one’s decision to sell through the group; (2) larger groups have more
difficulty coordinating; and (3) communicating others’ intentions to sell through the group
(i.e., cheap talk) can increase the likelihood of collective commercialization, particularly
in larger groups.4 In order to test these hypotheses, we work with a sample of 79 Sene-
galese groundnut-producing cooperatives and close to 2800 individual group members.
3Collective commercialization is often promoted in Sub-Saharan Africa on the grounds of imperfect
competition between traders in remote and thin markets, which in turn leads to rent extraction from farm-
ers. By aggregating farmers’ production, collective commercialization offers the possibility to (1) reach
distant but larger markets (e.g., due to lower transaction costs, Key et al., 2000) or (2) negotiate better with
local traders. As reviewed by Dillon and Dambro (2017), the empirical evidence is mixed. For exam-
ple, Bergquist (2017) finds a low pass-through of price premiums from traders to farmers in Kenya, while
Casaburi and Reed (2017) find a high pass-through in Sierra Leone. Bernard et al. (2008) find positive but
limited impacts of cooperatives in Ethiopia and Ashraf et al. (2009) find positive, but unsustained, impacts
in Kenya.
4Bernard et al. (2014) find that among a sample of 27 groundnut-producing cooperatives in Senegal,
67% of group members believe that, if presented with the opportunity, other members would by-pass sales
through the group and sell individually to a trader for a potentially lower, but more certain payoff. There
may of course be other reasons why cooperatives are (un)able to sell collectively; e.g., Casaburi and Mac-
chiavello (2019) and Hill et al. (2014) discuss commitment sanctions and deferred payments respectively.
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First, in a subsample of these cooperatives, randomly selected group members participate
in neutrally framed, high-stakes coordination games (i.e., artefactual field experiments in
the terminology of Harrison and List, 2004, hereafter, lab-in-the-field experiments/LFEs)
where we exogenously vary (1) the experimental group size, (2) the threshold required
for coordination, and (3) information on others’ intentions to coordinate (i.e., cheap talk).
Second, six months later, we implement a comparable naturally-occurring intervention
(i.e., a natural field experiment in the terminology of Harrison and List, 2004, hereafter,
randomized controlled trial/RCT) with the full sample of cooperatives. Shortly after the
harvest period, we collect all group members’ intentions to sell through the cooperative in
the upcoming commercialization season. In a random subset of these cooperatives, mem-
bers’ intentions are revealed in a public meeting right before commercialization starts.5
Since these are existing cooperatives, unlike in the LFEs, it is infeasible to exogenously
manipulate the group size and coordination threshold. Thus, both the LFEs and the RCT
are key for testing our hypotheses. Finally, we supplement these experiments with survey
data and cooperative records (i.e., administrative data).
Our findings are as follows. First, revealing aggregate intentions (i.e., cheap talk) im-
proves coordination in both the LFEs and the RCT, particularly in larger groups. These
results are relatively robust to (1) farmers’ preferences, (2) a series of placebo tests con-
firming that intentions are balanced at baseline, (3) potential social desirability bias, which
we rule out by comparing survey responses to group-administrative data, and (4) correct-
ing for multiple hypothesis testing using the Holm-Bonferroni approach. Second, there
5This form of communication is different from the casual, mostly one-on-one “chit chat” that group
members typically engage in because it enables them to know aggregate group intentions, which is a good
indication of potential success in collective commercialization.
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is suggestive evidence that the intervention positively impacts revenues (welfare) among
farmers who produce smaller quantities. Third, behavior in the “lab” (LFEs) transfers to
behavior in the “field” (RCT). We exploit the random selection of individuals and find
that, in the same cooperative, LFE participants were more likely to engage in day-to-day
collective commercialization than non-LFE participants. Consistent with the literature on
transfer (e.g., Cooper and Van Huyck, 2016), but perhaps contrary to Voors et al. (2012),
participants learn from the LFEs.6 Our study thus also contributes to the literature link-
ing results across the spectrum of experiments; see for example, Levitt and List (2007),
Camerer (2015), Viceisza (2016) and the references within.7 While our findings support
the use of LFEs in combination with RCTs, researchers should take heed that participation
in LFEs may affect subjects’ future behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides evidence of strategic
uncertainty and coordination failure in Senegalese cooperatives. Section 3.3 discusses
our framework and hypotheses in the context of existing literature. Section 3.4 details
our study design and empirical strategy. Section 3.5 covers our main findings. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Strategic uncertainty in Senegal
Groundnut production has long been the backbone of the Senegalese economy. Accord-
ing to Caswell (1984), groundnut processing contributed to 42% of all industrial output
6Similar findings have been documented by Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) and Turiansky (2017). This
is also comparable to a series of papers on classroom experiments in Journal of Economic Perspectives in
the late 1990s.
7E.g., Barr et al. (2010), Finan and Schechter (2012), Stoop et al. (2012), and Hoel et al. (2017).
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and groundnuts represented 80% of all export revenues. For a long time, a dense network
of state-controlled cooperatives was the exclusive interface between farmers and other
actors. Each year, the price of groundnut was fixed at the national level and all marketed
production was collected through cooperatives. Over time, however, revenues from the
groundnut sector steadily declined and in the late 1990s, external and internal shocks
led to privatization of all segments of the value chain. In 2010, the export-monopoly
previously granted to Suneor (the principal end-buyer of groundnuts) was abolished, fa-
cilitating the entry of new potential buyers.
These reforms led to important changes in farmers’ ability to coordinate within coop-
eratives. In this new system, group members became strategic complements since the
cooperative could obtain better per-unit prices by aggregating production and accessing
larger, more distant markets/processing plants, or by negotiating more strongly with lo-
cal traders. However, farmers could also sell directly to local traders. So, this presents
a tradeoff: While aggregation through the cooperative could lead to a higher unit price,
receipt of such funds would usually be delayed relative to local traders who pay cash on
delivery. Moreover, the price premium obtained from collective commercialization would
also depend on the quantity that other members sell through the cooperative, which is un-
certain when a given farmer is visited by the trader.
Bernard et al. (2014) document commercialization among close to 300 members of 27
groundnut cooperatives in Senegal whose main, stated objective is collective commer-
cialization. A great majority of members sells individually to local traders in spot market
transactions. In fact, only 11 of the 27 groups had sold collectively in 2011, and for
those that did, only half of the members participated. This limited involvement contrasts
107
with farmers’ perceived potential for collective commercialization: While 79% of farm-
ers cited problems when attempting to sell individually (e.g., lack of (1) transportation
to reach more lucrative markets, (2) knowledge of current prices, and (3) production to
negotiate better prices), practically all respondents were convinced that group commer-
cialization could alleviate such constraints.
Bernard et al. (2014) also collect members’ aversion to the strategic uncertainty arising
from collective commercialization using a framed version of the instrument by Heine-
mann et al. (2009). Subjects were presented with the choice to sell to a trader at a certain
price or sell through the group at a higher but uncertain price that depends on the number
of other members selling through the group. The price offered by the trader was incre-
mentally raised until subjects switched from selling through the cooperative to selling to
the trader. The results suggest that aversion to strategic uncertainty is negatively corre-
lated with individuals’ effective sales through the cooperative. When asked about other
group members’ likely response to the above strategic uncertainty question, 67% of the
sample believed that those members would by-pass sales through the group and sell indi-
vidually to a trader for a lower payoff than they would. In short, reforms in the groundnut
sector paved the way for issues of strategic uncertainty in Senegalese cooperatives.
3.3 Framework, literature, and hypotheses
3.3.1 Framework
Our framework is a critical-mass/threshold coordination game. There are N ∈ N players,
each of whom j has a positive endowment Vj ∈ N. All players simultaneously choose
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an amount Aj ∈ [0, 1, ..., Vj] to send to the group (the equivalent of commercializing
collectively) and keep the remainder Vj − Aj (the equivalent of selling individually/via
traders). Any quantity Aj sent to the group, earns a high return H if all players jointly
send a quantity A = ΣjAj ≥ T to the group, where T represents some threshold. If
they send a quantity A < T , Aj earns a low return L. Whatever a player chooses to keep
individually, that is Vj − Aj , earns a medium return M , where L < M < H .8
Accordingly, player i’s expected payoff can be expressed as Π(Ai) = pAiH + (1 −
p)AiL+(Vi−Ai)M , where p = P (A ≥ T ).9 It is clear that equilibria in this game will be
driven by player i’s belief, pi, about the likelihood of the threshold being surpassed, p. I.e.,
contributions to the group (how much the farmer chooses to commercialize collectively)
will depend on the player’s sense of strategic uncertainty. If s/he expects A to surpass
T , pi = 1, the player should send all of the endowment to the group, i.e., Ai = Vi. If
s/he expects A not to surpass T , pi = 0, the player should keep the full endowment,
i.e., Ai = 0. If s/he expects a scenario in between these two extremes, the player should
diversify by selling Ai ∈ {1, ..., Vi − 1} through the cooperative.
As discussed in Section 3.2, farmer cooperatives seem to have been unable to commer-
cialize collectively in this setting in recent years. Moreover, most members believe that
other members are more likely to sell individually to traders than collectively through the
cooperative. In short, empirical evidence suggests that p = 0 or close to it. So, a key
question is whether and if so, how p can be increased, given farmers believe it would be
beneficial to do so.
8As discussed in Sections 3.1-3.2, there are several reasons for L < M < H . This condition is also
consistent with farmers’ beliefs about the benefits to collective commercialization.
9Here, we abstract from the more general “utility” function and assume that H,M,L capture players’
true payoffs. In the empirical analysis, we check/control for preferences.
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3.3.2 Related literature and hypotheses
There is a relatively extensive theory and lab literature on coordination (in games) and the
potential determinants thereof (see for example Crawford, 1998; Farrell, 1987; Goeree
and Holt, 2002; Ochs, 1995; Van Huyck and Battalio, 2008, for some overviews). The
literature that relates most closely to our setting is on (1) coordination games with Pareto-
ranked equilibria, which cover both order-statistic games (e.g., Van Huyck and Battalio,
2008; Van Huyck et al., 1990) and stag-hunt games (e.g. Battalio et al., 2001; Charness
and Grosskopf, 2004; Cooper et al., 1992) and (2) preplay communication/cheap talk
(e.g., Avoyan and Ramos, 2017; Blume and Ortmann, 2007, and some of the previous
references).10
Devetag and Ortmann (2007) and Cooper and Weber (2019) survey some of this literature
and both point at a range of common factors that may enhance coordination. Among those
are (1) smaller group sizes; (2) certain types of cheap talk/communication in certain types
of games; and (3) lower attractiveness of the secure action relative to the risky one. As
Feltovich and Grossman (2015) note, there has been little work jointly investigating the
effect of group size and cheap talk. In fact, their study is one of the few exceptions.11 It is
also closest to ours, but there are a few key differences. First, their setting is a threshold
public-good game with a dichotomous choice (“contribute” or “not”). Second, their com-
munication takes the form of one subject/player sending a message that “Everyone should
10Kets and Sandroni (2017) address strategic uncertainty and cultural diversity.
11Balliet (2010) conducts a meta-analysis of 45 social-dilemma experiments and finds a positive inter-
action between group size and the effect of communication. However, this interaction is not robust to
controlling for other relevant variables and removal of two outliers (see Feltovich and Grossman, 2015, for
a more detailed discussion/analysis).
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choose [action]”. Third, their group sizes are smaller. Finally, we examine this interac-
tion both in the “lab” and “field”. Particularly in the latter case, there may be pre-existing
experiences that impact the interaction between group size and cheap talk.
In order to state the main hypotheses that form the basis of the experimental design in
Section 3.4, we further extend the framework discussed in Section 3.3.1. Suppose there
is a pre-stage to the game in which all players simultaneously reveal an intended action
towards the group A′j (i.e., N -way communication) prior to taking the “true” action Aj .
Player iwill use intentionsA′j to inform her/his belief pi about p only if s/he believes those
intentions. In particular, player i will substitute A′−i for A−i in order to more precisely
assess the likelihood of surpassing the threshold T . Accordingly, we state the following
hypotheses.12
Hypothesis 1. As the group size N increases, player i decreases her/his contribution to
the group Ai, since coordination failure is more likely. In other words, due to strategic
uncertainty, smaller groups are more conducive to coordination.
Hypothesis 2. Player i will set pi = p = 1 and thus Ai = Vi if revealed intentions are
such that ΣjA′j = A
′ ≥ T . In other words, cheap talk can reduce coordination failure if
aggregate intentions surpass the threshold.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of cheap talk (i.e., ΣjA′j relative to T ) will increase with the
group size N . In other words, due to strategic uncertainty, cheap talk is more effective in
12While some of the literature on communication has suggested that players may seek to deceive others,
particularly when sending non-costly and non-binding messages, there is no such incentive in this game.
Unlike Prisoner’s dilemma/public-good type games, a player cannot “free-ride” by sending a high intention
A′j and then taking a low action Aj . If a player truly believes that a high signal will cause others to increase
their contributions to the group, this player should align her/his actual contribution with such intentions.
This is the same argument that has been made by for example Crawford (1998) – recall the “reassurance”
role of cheap talk in stag-hunt games.
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larger groups. However, the direction of the effect will depend on whether or not aggre-
gate intentions surpass the threshold. This hypothesis basically combines hypotheses 1
and 2.
3.4 Study design
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we are unable to exogenously manipulate two key param-
eters – the group size N and the threshold T – in the naturally-occurring environment.
As such, group-size effects in the day-to-day setting could be capturing other (potentially
unobserved) characteristics. For example, larger groups may (1) offer better services
to farmers to begin with (e.g., input, credit, or negotiated prices); (2) be more likely to
achieve a given threshold level, ceteris paribus; and (3) be associated with greater strate-
gic uncertainty due to a greater number of “moving parts” (i.e., number of players). Ac-
cordingly, our design is based on a two-stage empirical strategy. First, we fully test our
predictions through controlled, neutrally framed LFEs in which we are able to observe
and manipulate N and T as well as other aspects such as external uncertainty and the
premium for coordination (H). Then, we test our results in a naturally-occurring RCT
where we do not manipulate the above parameters. The timing was as follows (Table C.1
summarizes the relationship between the LFE and RCT samples):
1. LFEs: From May to June 2013, randomly selected farmers from 28 cooperatives
participated in variants of neutrally-framed, high-stakes, threshold coordination
games (Section 3.4.1). A presurvey collecting basic (behavioral) characteristics
was also administered at this time.
112
2. RCT: From November 2013 to February 2014, 79 farmer groups (including 26 of
the 28 that were in the LFEs) participated in variants of intention-revelation treat-
ments (Section 3.4.2). Intentions were revealed 2-4 weeks prior to the start of the
commercialization period.
3. Post-survey and administrative data: In June 2014, a follow-up survey was admin-
istered to 10-12 randomly selected members of each cooperative (median size is 24,
ranging from 4-91). Administrative data on all individual members’ commercial-
ization through the cooperative during the 2014 season were also collected from the
group’s books/records.
3.4.1 LFEs
The LFEs were based on two main treatments (see online appendix for detailed instruc-
tions): (1) a baseline coordination game (BCG) and (2) the same coordination game
but with intentions revealed (i.e., communication/cheap talk) prior to play (CCG). These
treatments were randomly assigned across experimental groups of subjects, which were
created by randomly drawing members from existing cooperatives to form sets of players
of size N equal to 10 or 20. All players in a given experimental group were members of
the same cooperative. Table C.2 gives the sample distribution across the BCG and CCG.
In the BCG, each player j had an endowment Vj of six chips. Each chip was worth
2000 West African francs/CFA (the equivalent of approximately 4 US dollars) if held
individually. This was M . So, players were explained at the beginning of the game
that they held an endowment of 12000 CFA. To mitigate windfall/house money effects,
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this endowment was framed as payment for the presurvey. The payoff for each chip
sent to the experimental group was dependent on whether or not the threshold (T ) was
reached/surpassed. If A ≥ T , each chip was worth 3000 CFA (the equivalent of H); if
not, each chip was worth 500 CFA (the equivalent of L). So, each player had to decide
how many of the six chips to send to the group (Aj) and how many to keep individually
(6− Aj), as shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: LFEs – visual aid
The CCG was identical to the BCG with one exception: prior to choosing and committing
to Aj , each player was asked to reveal their intended action A′j to the experimenter; that
is, how much the player planned to send to the experimental group. This intention, which
was confidentially revealed to all other players −j alongside the aggregate intention on a
board at the front of the room, indicated a given player’s likely action. However, it was
not a binding commitment and as such, other players did not know with full certainty that
Aj would be the same as A′j . It is in this sense that it was cheap talk.
Apart from the BCG and the CCG, we randomly varied N, T,H , and the presence of
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external uncertainty as separate treatments. We varied H and the presence of external
uncertainty because prior literature has shown that attractiveness of the secure versus the
risky action may impact coordination (recall Section 3.3.2). We also varied T because
in a day-to-day context (in particular, the RCT) group size N is likely to be correlated
with other characteristics such as the perceived likelihood of achieving the threshold. So,
experimental variation in T enables us to better understand what mechanism is at play.
To see this, consider the following: If the level of T is fixed, it should be easier to co-
ordinate in large groups than in small groups, since the former are more likely to reach
the threshold. So, communication should be less informative in large (relative to small)
groups for a fixed level of T . On the other hand, if communication is more informative in
large groups, despite the level of T being fixed, this must be because of greater strategic
uncertainty surrounding other players’ actions. Similarly, if the average (i.e., per-player)
number of chips needed to surpass the threshold is fixed across small and large groups,
but communication matters differentially acrossN , this also suggests that strategic uncer-
tainty is the main mechanism at play. Since we are unable to (1) experimentally control
T in the RCT and (2) fully isolate these mechanisms in the day-to-day environment, we
thus rely on the LFEs as a crucial part of our design in order to argue mechanisms.
Two primary aids were used when explaining the game. First, monetary payoffs were
explained by displaying actual CFA bills on a board at the front of the room, also making
“real stakes” more salient. Second, many hypothetical examples were used. For example,
the experimenter and his assistant as well as pairs of subjects role-played through different
scenarios. We also tested subject understanding by asking specific players to calculate
such payoffs. A substantial part of the LFE sessions was dedicated to the instruction
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phase.
In the CCG, the exact same procedure as in the BCG was followed, except that prior to
subjects making their actual decisions (Aj), the experimenter went around the room and
asked players in private to reveal their intended actions (A′j). Subjects were explained that
this information would be collected by the experimenter and confidentially displayed in
random order on a separate board at the front of the room. It was made clear that this was
an intended, but non-binding action. Figure 3.1 also shows the logic behind the CCG.
It was identical to the BCG, except for an additional board (right panel of Figure 3.1),
which contained randomly ordered intentions A′j and the aggregate A
′.
The BCG and the CCG were implemented between sessions (and thus subjects), since
introducing intentions mid-session would have complicated the protocol. The (experi-
mental) group size, N , was fixed at either 10 or 20 during a session. So, N was varied
across sessions (and subjects). The threshold, T , was 40 or 50 in 10-person groups and
40, 50, 80, or 100 in 20-person groups. T was varied randomly across rounds. H was
either 3000 or 2500 CFA per chip and was varied randomly across rounds. Whether or
not there was external uncertainty was implemented as follows. Subjects were explained
that there was a 50 percent chance that due to bad luck H would be 1500 CFA per chip
(instead of 2500 or 3000). This was varied across rounds by flipping a coin.13
13Each session comprised: (1) a presurvey collecting basic information (available upon request); (2)
an introduction covering the purpose of the session and the fact that participants would be paid for de-
cisions made during the session; (3) four rounds of decisions with no feedback, followed by debriefing;
(4) a postsurvey collecting other information (available upon request); and (5) payment in private based
on one randomly selected round. The sessions lasted 2.5-3 hours and average earnings were 9,500 CFA
(approximately 20 US dollars), relative to a daily wage equivalent in this region of 5,000 CFA.
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3.4.2 RCT
We worked with 79 groundnut-producing cooperatives – including 26 of the 28 with
which we implemented the LFEs – comprising close to 2800 individuals. These coop-
eratives are part of two umbrella federations (i.e., conglomerates of cooperatives) in the
main groundnut production zone of Senegal. From November to December 2013, two
leaders of each farmer group attended a two-day training conducted by two development
specialists. The training focused on the potential, pitfalls, and conduct of collective com-
mercialization; in particular, strategies for identifying distant buyers, negotiating prices,
and organizing transportation. Participants were instructed to conduct a meeting with all
cooperative members upon returning to their village, to report the gist of what was cov-
ered during the training. Trainees were also provided with standardized booklets to keep
records of each member’s contribution to the group’s sales in the upcoming commercial-
ization season. A reward of 10,000 CFA was promised for filling in the booklets with all
the requested information. All groups eventually received such reward.
After the training, during January 2014, enumerators went to the villages in order to elicit
commercialization intentions from all cooperative members. Prior to doing so, they made
sure that the leaders who had taken part in the training had held the briefing meeting. For
each farmer group, all members who produced groundnuts for the 2014 commercializa-
tion season were asked how they intended to use their production. They had to split their
anticipated harvest into (1) individual commercialization, (2) collective commercializa-
tion (via the cooperative), (3) inventories, and (4) other uses. They were told that the
purpose of this survey was to better understand their decisions with regard to groundnut
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production. They were also informed that a subsequent group meeting would be held,
where a message would be delivered to them. They were invited to attend that meeting.
The 79 groups were allocated to one of four conditions, depending on the information
that would be disclosed in the subsequent meeting (Table C.3):14
• In Condition A (the control group), members’ intentions were not revealed. Enu-
merators said that a survey would be conducted after the end of commercialization.
This was also announced in Conditions B-D.
• In Condition B, members’ aggregate intentions were revealed.
• In Condition C, members’ aggregate intentions as well as the distribution of inten-
tions among members were revealed. I.e., how many members intended to con-
tribute 100kg; how many intended to contribute 200kg, and so on. This was most
comparable to the CCG in the LFEs.
• In Condition D, the same information as in C was revealed, but the distribution
of intentions was disaggregated by ordinary members versus cooperative leaders
(i.e., members who are part of the management committee). This treatment was
inspired by the literature on leadership (e.g., Hermalin, 1998; Jack and Recalde,
2015; Potters et al., 2007).
14As discussed in some of the papers referenced in Section 3.3.2, messages have differential impacts
depending on the “statistics”/content they convey. Hence, the logic for a variant of information treatments.
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3.4.3 Sample description
An average of 10-12 randomly selected farmers per cooperative were surveyed before
(time of eliciting intentions) and after commercialization. Table C.4 describes the charac-
teristics of such individuals and compares means across groups that received no informa-
tion about others’ intentions and groups that did. Consistent with the context described
in Section 3.2, our sample essentially comprises small farmers, with a total farm size of
less then five hectares on average. The full sample cultivates groundnuts, but 58% also
produce other crops. Groundnut production is also relatively small in magnitude, with the
previous and current year’s average expected harvest below 1.7 tons. 84% of the farm-
ers indicate that they intend to sell some of their groundnut harvest through the group in
the upcoming commercialization season. On average, intended sales through the group
amounted to 60% of farmers’ production.
Overall, Table C.4 does not show clear differences on pre-intervention characteristics
across the two samples. There are, however, indications that generosity (as measured by
a hypothetical dictator game) is higher on average for groups where no information was
revealed. For a comparable groundnut-producing sample, Bernard et al. (2014) find that
altruism is negatively related to group sales. So, in this case that might translate into an
upward bias of the information effect. They find, however, that the associated coefficient
is quite small in magnitude, in particular compared to the one associated with individuals’
aversion to strategic uncertainty. Table C.4 also indicates that a greater number of farmers
whose group was selected to participate in the LFEs were in the control group. All RCT-
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related estimations include these and other variables among the controls.15
3.4.4 Empirical strategy
With the LFE and RCT protocols being comparable, we rely on a common estimation
strategy to assess the impact of others’ intentions on the decision to contribute to the
group. Individuals are indexed by subscript i and groups by subscript g – where “groups”
refers to experimental sessions in the LFEs and day-to-day cooperatives in the RCT. Our
basic estimation is as follows:
Aig = α + βTg + εig (3.1)
where being exposed to others’ intentions, which varies at the group level, is captured by
a binary variable Tg (our proxy for A′ in Section 3.3.1), and the associated parameter β
measures its effect on the dependent variable of interest (more below). εig is a composite
error term defined as:16 εig = µg + ξig where µg is a group-specific error and ξig is
the remaining idiosyncratic one. With group members’ decisions to contribute to the
group being strategic complements, we allow for within-group, individual errors to be
correlated. Thus, all our standard errors are clustered at the group-level.17
While the same estimator is used for both the LFEs and the RCT, interpretation of the
coefficients differs across the two. In LFE-related estimates, the β parameter is the treat-
15Table C.5 reports the same tests across Conditions A-D. The results are similar.
16In the estimating equations that follow, εig will vary depending on the specification. But, for simplicity
we keep the same notation.
17We rely on the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method to compute cluster-robust
standard errors. While our design includes a reasonably large number of clusters, we also computed stan-
dard errors based on more conservative randomized inference tests. Results are available upon request, and
similar to those reported here.
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ment effect on the treated. In fact, all individuals selected to participate in the game did
participate and no one left before all rounds were completed (although that was allowed if
they wanted to). In the RCT however, only 59% of group members attended the meeting
in which aggregate intentions were revealed (last row of Table C.4). Without exogenous
variation in attendance to the meeting, we estimate equation 3.1 on the full sample of
farmers, regardless of whether or not they attended. The estimated β parameter therefore
captures our “intent” to reveal or not aggregate intentions; i.e., an intent-to-treat effect.
Although we do not find evidence of major imbalances across conditions, we augment
equation 3.1 with a vector of individual characteristics collected pre-intervention, Xig, to
both account for existing imbalances and enhance the precision of our estimates through
reduced unexplained variance in our outcome variable. In LFE-related estimates, this
vector of covariates includes age, sex, land size, education (dummy for going to a French
school versus a Koranic or no schooling), and measures for risk, time (patience), and
social preferences (generosity/altruism).18 In RCT-related estimates, this includes age,
sex, a dummy for whether the individual holds a leadership position in the group, the
groundnut harvest (in kg), a dummy for whether the farmer produced other crops, land
size, measures for risk, time, and social preferences, and participation in the LFEs. This
leads to the following estimating equation:
Aig = α + βTig +X
′
igρ+ εig (3.2)
18Generosity/social preference was elicited through a hypothetical dictator game (with a greater number
indicating a more generous/altruistic individual). Risk preferences were elicited through a hypothetical
Binswanger (1980)-style lottery (with a lower number indicating a more risk averse individual. Finally,
patience was elicited through typical, hypothetical preference-over-time questions (with a one-day front-
end delay and a higher number indicating a less patient individual).
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Finally, in line with our framework, we test for heterogenous treatment effects with re-
spect to group size by estimating equation 3.3, where Sg is a dummy for large groups
(N = 20) in the LFE estimations and actual group size in the RCT estimations; β is the
average effect of being exposed to aggregate intentions among all individuals in the sam-
ple; and δ captures the additional effect of this exposure for individuals in larger groups.
Aig = α + βTg + γSg + δTg × Sg +X
′
igρ+ εig (3.3)
For our main specifications, we estimate the effect of revealing aggregate intentions on
both the extensive margin – with the dependent variable Aig being a dummy for whether
the individual contributed any amount to the group – and the intensive margin – where
the dependent variable Aig is the total amount that one contributed to the group. Both are
consistent with the framework (and notation) discussed in Section 3.3.
In the RCT-related estimates, we also run several robustness checks. First, we test for
significance of β and δ when the dependent variable is members’ intentions. Because
intentions were collected prior to any information revelation, we expect these parameters
to be equal to 0. Second, one may be concerned about social desirability bias in individ-
uals’ reporting of collective groundnut sales. For both the intensive and extensive margin
estimates, we thus also use effective individual sales from all group members, based on
the group’s own administrative data (recall the booklets/cooperative records discussed in
Section 3.4.2); although such data do not include individual characteristics. Third, we
also run some Tobit (to account for null reports) and inverse hyperbolic sine transforma-
tions specifications. Finally, we correct for multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) using the
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Holm-Bonferroni method (see Tables 3.1 and 3.3).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Cheap talk and coordination
Tables C.6 and 3.1 present our main results based on specifications 3.2 and 3.3. The first
two columns are for the LFEs while the remaining ones are for the RCT. Our falsification
test is presented in columns 3 and 4 where the dependent variable is one’s intentions
to contribute to the group, collected ahead of the intervention. In columns 5 and 6, we
present the main results using data from individual surveys, while the last two columns
rely on administrative data collected from the groups’ books/records (there are no controls
in this case).
In Table C.6 we assess the extensive margin – i.e., the effect of revealing others’ intentions
on an individual’s decision to contribute part of one’s resources (i.e., number of chips in
the LFEs, kilograms/kgs of groundnuts in the RCT) or not to the group. We find no direct
effect of revealing aggregate intentions, be it in the LFEs or in the RCT (columns 1 and 5);
however, interacting with group size yields support for Hypothesis 3. In the LFEs, cheap
talk (intentions) led to an 11 percentage point increase in the probability that one invests
chips collectively, albeit limited to those sessions with groups of size 20 (as opposed to
10). The same is true in column 6, where revealing intentions increases the likelihood that
one sold part of one’s production through the cooperative by one percentage point for each
additional group member. While insignificant, the direct effect of intentions is negative
(−0.04 for LFEs and −0.08 for RCT), suggesting that the cheap-talk effect on increased
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coordination is limited to larger groups. In comparison, no such results are found in
the falsification test (column 4). Further, we can fairly confidently rule out concerns of
social desirability bias in the responses, since the results are very similar when using
administrative data (column 8).
Results on the intensive margin are presented in Table 3.1 and show a similar pattern.
While we do find a direct effect of cheap talk on the quantity of chips (column 1) and
groundnuts (column 5) contributed to the group, this effect is only present in larger groups
for both the LFEs (column 2) and the RCT (column 6). No such relationships are found in
our placebo tests (columns 3 and 4) and the administrative data yield results comparable
to those based on the individual survey data (columns 7 and 8).19 We also correct for MHT
(see adjusted p-values in square [..] brackets). The effects in the LFEs (columns 1 and
2) are no longer significant; however, the effects in the RCT persist (columns 5-8). The
only exception is the direct effect of cheap talk when using administrative data, but recall
that there are fewer (no) control variables in this specification, which also explains the
lower R2. Following Maniadis et al. (2014), we also calculate the post-study probability
(PSP) associated with the main cheap-talk effect, i.e., the first and fifth columns of Table
3.1 for the LFEs and RCT respectively. Tables C.7 and C.8 illustrate that for low initial
priors (i.e., below 0.2) the accuracy of the cheap-talk effect can be questioned. However,
for moderate to high priors (i.e., above 0.2) we can be relatively confident that the main
cheap-talk effect is accurate. 20
19Results are robust to Tobit (Table C.9) and inverse hyperbolic sine (Table C.10).
20A separate issue is the presence of multiple observations per farmer for the LFEs, which may induce
correlation among the residuals in Equation 3.2 and 3.3. We account for this by the use of standard errors
clustered at the cooperative level. The fact that our main treatment is at the experimental group level, and
thus does not vary over rounds for a farmer precludes the use of farmer fixed effects. We have, however,
estimated the equations of interest using farmer random effects (see Table C.11), and the results are similar
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Overall, Tables C.6 and 3.1 provide support for our predictions (in particular hypothesis
3): Cheap talk (intentions) can enhance coordination in situations of strategic uncertainty
and this mainly seems to occur in larger groups, where coordination is more difficult to
start with.21 While consistent with our framework and prior work on the direct effect of
cheap talk on coordination (recall theoretical and lab findings referenced in Sections 3.1
and 3.3.2), these results do not line up with Feltovich and Grossman (2015) who find
that the beneficial effect of cheap talk decreases as the group size increases. However,
as discussed previously, their findings are based on a threshold public-good game with
messages that are different from ours. In addition, their group sizes are significantly
smaller than ours.
As previously discussed, we are unable to exogenously vary group size in the RCT. There-
fore, the effect in larger groups (particularly in the RCT) may be associated with other
characteristics and thus, we should be cautious in interpreting the interaction effect. We
address this concern in two main ways. First, we exploit the experimental design in order
to separate the effect of group size from the potentially confounding threshold effect by
using data from the LFEs. Table C.12 compares the group-size effect across three main
specifications. Columns 1-2 use data from all LFE sessions, regardless of the threshold
level required to achieve coordination. These are columns 1-2 from Table 3.1. Columns
3-4 use data from LFE sessions where the average (i.e., per-player) number of chips re-
quired to achieve the threshold is constant across group size. Finally, columns 5-6 use
data from LFE sessions where the overall threshold is constant across group size. As
to not including these random effects.
21In the upper panel of Table C.13, we show that these results cannot be attributed to changes in individ-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mentioned in Section 3.4.1, if communication is more informative in large groups, de-
spite the average number of chips needed to surpass the threshold or the overall threshold
being fixed across group size, strategic uncertainty is likely to be the main mechanism
at play. Indeed, column 6 provides evidence that it is primarily about group size and its
relation to strategic uncertainty. We also note that while the point estimate in column 4
is not statistically significant, it is positive and relatively large (in the order of 20 percent
relative to the control group/CCG mean).
Second, Table C.14 compares group characteristics across above- and below-median day-
to-day group size. We find limited evidence that these groups systematically differ from
one another across size, except for being part of different umbrella federations, which
we control for in all specifications. In short, we are reasonably confident that the group
size effect is mainly associated with strategic uncertainty and less so with the threshold
required to achieve coordination (which can be thought of as the amount required to fulfill
contracts, e.g., when selling to large buyers in the day-to-day environment).
3.5.2 Collective commercialization and farmers’ income
With the increased level of collective commercialization induced by the RCT intervention,
we turn to its potential welfare effect. Specifically, we assess its impact on farmers’ total
income from the sale of groundnuts. This includes individual sales as well as those con-
ducted through the cooperative. Since the intervention started shortly before the harvest,
it did not affect farmers’ production choices. Therefore, any effect of the intervention is
mediated by a combination of (1) changes in the way farmers allocate their marketable
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surplus across individual versus collective sales and (2) changes in the price that may be
obtained from collective sales due to greater aggregation.
The results are presented in Table 3.2. The dependent variable is the total revenue from
selling groundnuts in thousands of CFA (1000 CFA was approximately equivalent to
US$2 at the time of the study).22 In column 1, we find no evidence of a direct effect of the
intervention on farmers’ income from groundnuts. In column 2 we extend the model to
investigate whether the intervention differentially affected smaller versus larger farmers.
We interact the treatment variable with the farmer’s reported area of land that is dedicated
to the production of groundnuts. While the direct effect of the intervention is large and
positive, the coefficient associated with the interaction term is negative. In other words,
larger farmers gain less from collective commercialization, in line with the existence of
economies of scale in commercialization albeit with decreasing marginal returns. Finally,
column 4 assesses the robustness of these findings by controlling for various individual
and group characteristics. While the sign of the coefficients remain, they are no longer
statistically significant. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the direct effect of the interven-
tion does indicate that providing information on aggregate intentions led to a meaningful
increase in groundnut revenues for farmers in the treatment group.
These results, combined with those in Section 3.5.1, point to the potential for a “coordination-
based poverty trap” that is characterized by three key aspects. First, smaller (poorer)
farmers have more to gain from collective commercialization. Second, collective com-
mercialization requires a larger group of small farmers to surpass the threshold. Third, it
22Field work revealed that (1) quantities collected from farmers were quite noisy due to the lack of
weighting scales for transactions that occur at the farm gate/local markets and (2) farmers tend to negotiate
prices on the total quantity/amount. As such, we are unable to recover a per-unit price for those transactions
conducted outside the group.
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Table 3.2: Effect on revenues from groundnut sales
Dependent variable Revenues from groundnut sales (CFA)
Source RCT - survey data
Treatment 15.57 185.11 7.91 61.05
(73.25) (56.22) (51.46) (39.07)
Size of land (ha) 3.48 45.62 0.85 14.28
(3.55) (20.68) (1.16) (16.38)
Treatment X Land size (ha) -43.33 -13.70
(20.83) (16.47)
Control group mean 233.66
R2 0.01 0.06 0.34 0.34
N 868 868 868 868
Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the
total revenue from selling groundnuts in thousands of CFA (1000 CFA was approximately equivalent to
US$2 at the time of the study). The last column adds as control variables age, sex, land size, generosity,
risk aversion and time preference (see Table C.4), cooperative size, dummies for the federation, whether
the farmer is a leader, and whether the farmer produced crops other than groundnuts, all measured pre-
intervention, as well as a dummy for whether the farmer indicated positive intentions to sell through the
group.
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is more difficult to achieve coordination in larger groups. In short, it is precisely in larger
groups consisting of more small farmers that coordination may be necessary but more
difficult.
3.5.3 What information matters?
In order to assess whether the content of the information had an impact, we interact the
aggregate intended actions (A′) revealed by study participants with the main treatment;
i.e., whether or not this information was conveyed to the group (Table C.15). Higher
aggregate intentions lead to higher quantities sold to the group, but only in cooperatives
where such information was revealed (column 2). First, this confirms that it is not just
about “collecting intentions”, but also “revealing them”. Second, this finding supports
the view that cheap talk helps farmers overcome coordination failure by shifting their
beliefs.23 One caveat to the analysis is that individual intentions and thus the aggregate,
are endogenous, potentially reflecting other characteristics of the groups in question. The
results are robust, however, to the inclusion of various individual and group characteristics
(columns 3 and 4).
The RCT design also included variations on the type of information that was provided,
which in turn allows us to explore which feature of aggregate intentions primarily en-
hances coordination (recall Table C.3). Table 3.3 presents the disaggregated impact of
providing information on groundnut contributions to the cooperative, by informational
treatment arm. Similarly to Table 3.1, we correct for MHT. The adjusted p-values in
23We did not explicitly elicit individual-level beliefs as that would have significantly complicated the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































square [..] brackets suggests that the main results discussed below are robust, except for
the direct effects estimated using administrative data (column 5). As before, our falsi-
fication tests in columns 1 and 2 show no relationship between one’s intentions and the
later provision of information. Results in column 3 indicate that provision of information
increased group contributions in all three Conditions (B–D), although with significant dif-
ferences in magnitude. In particular, while knowing others’ aggregate intention leads to
higher contributions (Condition B), the effect is more than two times larger in magnitude
if one is also provided with the distribution of others’ intentions (Condition C).
Two potential mechanisms may be at play here. First, one may trust a given aggregate
more when it originates from a large number of individuals. For example, if farmers
were to find out that most of the aggregate came from one individual’s intended contri-
bution, it would be reasonable to expect that this individual would be better off selling
alone. So, revealing the distribution of intentions may help individuals refine their expec-
tations. Second, individuals in the group may exhibit interdependent preferences, with
group members’ payoffs entering each others’ utility functions, thus giving rise to social
norms of equity and fairness (e.g., Manski, 2000; Sobel, 2005). While these effects may
exist even in the absence of communication, they may be particularly salient when inten-
tions and their distributions are revealed since they can be interpreted as signaling what
other players consider “the right thing to do” (e.g., Bernheim, 1994). Examples of this
type of norm and information signaling are Vesterlund (2003), Gächter et al. (2010), and
Hill et al. (2012).
We find a smaller effect of revealing the distribution of intentions separately for leaders
versus ordinary members (Condition D) in comparison to the overall distribution (Con-
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dition C). Leaders may be perceived as having superior information relative to ordinary
members. In this case, that could mean that the leader for example has better knowledge
of current market conditions.24 So, it may be surprising that leaders’ intentions lead to
positive, but lower contributions to the group than the overall distribution (Condition C).
To further unpack this finding, we conduct an analysis comparable to that in Table C.15,
but now by informational treatment arm (see Table C.16). First, we assess whether the av-
erage amount that leaders or group ordinary members intend to sell matters. Second, we
check whether leaders’ intentions being greater than those of ordinary members matters.
I.e., one reason why the impact of Condition D may be smaller than that of Condition C is
because ordinary members expect leaders to contribute significantly high amounts to the
group and upon learning that leaders’ intentions do not match up with this, they reduce
their contributions. Table C.16 suggests that the results are inconsistent with the above:
Aggregate intentions, the overall distribution, and the distribution by leaders versus ordi-
nary members all matter; however, the actual quantities revealed do not seem to matter.
In other words, the findings do not support the idea that members in Condition D may
have been deceived by the intentions provided/revealed by leaders.
3.5.4 Participation in games and day-to-day behavior
Our design further enables us to assess how participation in the LFE coordination games
affects later behavior in the naturally-occurring RCT. After the LFEs, all participants were
asked to provide feedback regarding the game they had played. The game was neutrally
24Bernard et al. (2014) find that 75% of members believed that leaders had better information about
traders and/or prices in the region.
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framed and there was no reference to collective marketing. Yet, many participants in-
dicated that the coordination setting they had been faced with closely aligned with the
situation they faced when deciding whether or not to sell their groundnut harvest through
the cooperative. Recall that players were randomly selected from the full list of mem-
bers for their group, but that each session only gathered players who were members of
the same cooperative.25 Considering the above as well as a related literature on transfer
in coordination games (e.g., Cooper and Van Huyck, 2016), we hypothesize that experi-
encing coordination games with members of one’s group may affect one’s expectations
vis-à-vis group members in subsequent, naturally-occurring, collaborative contexts.
We test for this in Table 3.4 where, in addition to the RCT treatment, we assess the impact
of one’s participation in the LFEs. We find no such effect in columns 1 and 2, where the
dependent variable is one’s intentions to commercialize collectively. In columns 3 and 4,
however, we find a positive effect of participating in the LFEs, on top of the treatment
effects that were previously identified. Importantly, there is no effect at the group level
(i.e., whether the cooperative was selected for the LFEs), but there is a clear effect for
whether the individual was (randomly) selected for participation in the LFEs. In fact,
the results hold even when restricting our sample to only those cooperatives that were
selected for the LFEs. Furthermore, this effect is independent of the treatment: In column
7, we restrict our sample to those cooperatives selected for the LFEs, but that belonged to
the control group in the RCT (where no intentions were revealed). The effects are large in
25This was mainly driven by the fact that cooperatives are typically defined at the village level. With
villages sometimes being far apart, we chose to (1) organize each session in the village school and (2) avoid
further complications such as communicating decisions by phone (e.g., Hill et al., 2012). In Table C.17
we report tests for equality of characteristics between LFE participants and non-participants within groups
that were selected for the LFEs. Similarly, we provide in Table C.18 tests for equality between the LFE
cooperatives and those that were only in the RCTs.
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magnitude, with participation in the LFEs leading to an additional 74 kgs of groundnuts
being contributed to the cooperative during the (naturally-occurring) commercialization
season. 26
In summary, while the LFEs are a useful diagnostic tool to test our hypotheses in a highly
controlled environment, they seem to improve farmers’ understanding of the strategic
complementarities that exist, which in turn impacts collective commercialization.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper tests selected drivers of coordination among members of farmer cooperatives
(groundnut producers) in rural Senegal. Consistent with our framework and prior liter-
ature, we find the following. First, cheap talk increases coordination (specifically, sales
through the cooperative), but primarily in larger groups. Second, there is suggestive ev-
idence that revelation of intentions leads to higher revenues from groundnut sales for
smaller farmers. Third, participation in the “lab” impacts subsequent behavior in the
“field”.
Given the simplicity of this intervention, one might wonder why these cooperatives, and
26Tables and C.17 and C.18 show that some of the characteristics differ across cooperatives in the LFEs
and those that were in the RCTs only, and similarly between those who attended the games and those who
did not, within LFE cooperatives. More importantly, the omnibus test performed in table C.18 failed to
reject that those characteristics jointly are significantly associated with being in an LFE cooperative. Such
characteristics, if they were collected prior to the RCT, are controlled for in the specifications in the main
tables, e.g., Table 3.4. One additional characteristic that differs across these groups is the attendance at
the intention revelation meeting. This is potentially problematic, as participation in the meeting is the
main mechanism through which the intervention affects behavior, although there is nothing that prevents
cooperatives to reflect on, and share thoughts on what was discussed at the meeting. In that way, information
could reach those who were not in the meeting as well. However, this variable was only collected long
after the meeting, i.e.in the post-commercialization survey. For this reason, the variable on the meeting
attendance is not included in the regressions of which the results are presented in this article. Regressions
that include this variable show, however, little difference with respect to the effect of participation in the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































arguably others, have not already attempted this potential solution to the coordination
problem. One possible explanation is that the study was carried out by “others” in an
environment that is characterized by important interpersonal ties. So, participants may
have been more willing to reveal and believe intended actions than had the process been
implemented by familiar peers who could have had “hidden agendas”. Future research
can explore related issues further.
137
Chapter A: Appendix for chapter 1
Figure A.1: Evolution of outcomes over time
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Figure A.2: Distribution of the proxy before the policy
Proxy for experience in 2013Q3, just before the policy
Eligible cohorts Ineligible cohorts
Proxy for experience in 2011-2013Q3, just before the policy
Eligible cohorts Ineligible cohorts
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Figure A.3: Evolution of outcomes over time for women
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Figure A.4: Evolution of outcomes over time for men
Table A.1: Cohorts and eligibility
Young cohort Old cohort
Age in 2013 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
Year of birth 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79
Year
2013Q1-2013Q3
2013Q3-2014 X X X X S
Notes: S denotes that some of the individuals are eligible. X denotes that all the individuals are eligible.
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Table A.2: Detail summary statistics of outcomes of interest and control variables
Periods Before policy After policy
Cohort Ineligible Eligible Diff Ineligible Eligible Diff DID
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Private formal employment 32.22 27.20 -5.02 33.10 29.40 -3.21 0.67
(-7.94) (-3.48) (0.67)
Private employment 43.32 35.79 -7.53 43.94 38.94 -4.62 1.16
(-12.21) (-4.50) (1.11)
Employment 55.19 43.90 -11.29 57.59 48.95 -7.76 1.84
(-18.17) (-8.22) (1.91)
Participation 63.34 54.50 -8.85 65.15 58.14 -6.39 0.70
(-14.78) (-7.02) (0.74)
Gender is female 48.86 49.97 1.11 48.76 48.84 0.14 -1.14
(1.96) (0.14) (-1.26)
African 82.27 82.55 0.28 82.15 82.67 0.31 -0.36
(0.52) (0.41) (-0.43)
No schooling 1.57 0.88 -0.69 1.63 1.26 -0.34 0.39
(-4.82) (-1.86) (1.87)
Primary or less 9.57 7.87 -1.70 9.04 7.13 -1.90 -0.22
(-4.81) (-4.03) (-0.40)
Secondary 42.10 42.56 0.46 41.20 41.27 -0.19 -0.48
(0.68) (-0.21) (-0.45)
Matric 31.36 35.57 4.21 31.49 35.10 3.81 -0.33
(6.86) (4.11) (-0.32)
Post-secondary 14.46 12.42 -2.04 15.79 14.39 -1.41 0.36
(-2.99) (-1.73) (0.45)
Gauteng 28.62 26.38 -2.24 29.07 26.55 -2.06 -0.36
(-2.92) (-2.04) (-0.37)
Single 57.37 74.67 17.30 53.92 70.25 15.29 -0.91
(26.64) (14.20) (-0.90)
Living with a partner 14.44 11.87 -2.57 14.93 12.60 -2.48 -0.51
(-5.26) (-3.23) (-0.63)
Married 26.61 12.93 -13.68 29.37 16.49 -11.77 1.49
(-21.39) (-13.46) (1.74)
HH has an employed member 54.04 59.51 5.47 53.33 58.65 4.92 -0.40
(9.27) (5.26) (-0.38)
HH has a pensioner 19.92 21.48 1.57 20.10 20.60 0.26 -0.69
(3.21) (0.37) (-0.84)
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Table A.3: Effects on unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ1 -2.490 -1.887 -0.075 0.234
(0.885)*** (0.838)** (0.923) (0.847)
Experience proxy -13.737 -6.247
(1.255)*** (0.668)***
Experience proxy square 0.824 0.567
(0.093)*** (0.056)***
R2 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.16
N 32,861 32,861 32,861 32,861
Controls N Y N Y
Average young before policy 19.4
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals born in 1979-1988 from the incoming
rotation group. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets
are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample weights from the QLFS and
estimated using a linear probability model. Controls are race (Blacks, Colored, Asian/Indians and Whites),
gender, education (no education, some primary, primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed,
post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another
individual who is working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.
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Table A.4: Robustness checks
Main Young workers Interacting education Different
results eligible for with experience
2 years time cohort functions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Employment
δ1 -0.735 -1.248 -0.835 -0.735 -0.694
(0.893) (1.067) (0.896) (0.893) (0.908)
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
B: Private employment
δ1 -0.765 -0.172 -0.868 -0.777 -0.633
(0.979) (1.224) (0.978) (0.978) (0.981)
R2 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
C: Private formal employment
δ1 -0.782 -0.501 -0.862 -0.785 -0.530
(0.927) (1.119) (0.928) (0.926) (0.956)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
N 56,453 40,596 56,453 56,453 56,453
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals born in 1979-1988, from the incoming
rotation group. Column 1 presents the main results, as obtained in table 1.2, column 4. Column 2 restricts
the analysis on workers born between 1986-1988 and between 1981-1983, allowing to test the effects on
young workers eligible for two years of subsidies. Column 3 presents results of specifications that include
interaction terms between education and year dummies, and column 4 includes interaction terms between
education and a dummy for eligible cohorts. Column 5 allows for different effects of experience for eligible
and ineligible cohorts. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see Equation 1.1). Standard errors in
brackets are clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample weights from the
QLFS and estimated using a linear probability model. Controls include race (Blacks, Colored, Indians,
Whites), gender, marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another
individual who is working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.
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Table A.5: Testing the sensitivity of the results to the functional form of experience proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Overall employment
δ1 1.350 1.847 -0.637 -0.846 -0.472
(0.887) (0.892)** (0.913) (0.905) (0.916)
Experience proxy 2.923 8.439 10.750
(0.356)*** (0.871)*** (1.523)***
Experience proxy square -0.602 -1.193
(0.076)*** (0.358)***
Experience proxy cubic 0.042
(0.026)
R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
B: Private employment
δ1 0.743 1.168 -0.520 -0.657 -0.552
(0.970) (0.972) (0.994) (0.979) (0.977)
Experience proxy 2.503 6.253 7.765
(0.322)*** (0.791)*** (1.427)***
Experience proxy square -0.409 -0.796
(0.070)*** (0.342)**
Experience proxy cubic 0.028
(0.025)
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
C: Private formal employment
δ1 0.387 0.884 -0.762 -0.826 -0.885
(0.921) (0.925) (0.939) (0.941) (0.940)
Experience proxy 2.927 6.582 7.294
(0.301)*** (0.705)*** (1.252)***
Experience proxy square -0.399 -0.581
(0.065)*** (0.307)*
Experience proxy cubic 0.013
(0.023)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, born in
1979-1988. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see Equation 1.1). This table tests for the sensitivity
for the functional form of the experience proxy. In column 5, deciles of the distribution of the experience
proxy are used, to account for a non-parametric functional form.
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Table A.6: Heterogeneous effects by gender
Overall Private Private formal
employment employment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Men
δ1 0.838 0.425 1.382 1.025 1.795 1.729
(1.403) (1.292) (1.378) (1.300) (1.352) (1.311)
Experience proxy 11.615 7.852 8.872 4.944 9.664 3.548
(1.341)*** (1.015)*** (1.332)*** (1.070)*** (1.280)*** (1.067)***
Experience proxy square -0.684 -0.595 -0.451 -0.363 -0.456 -0.265
(0.113)*** (0.094)*** (0.116)*** (0.096)*** (0.119)*** (0.100)***
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
N 26,836 26,836 26,836 26,836 26,836 26,836
B: Women
δ1 -1.509 -1.857 -1.960 -2.516 -3.031 -3.379
(1.455) (1.326) (1.509) (1.385)* (1.429)** (1.267)***
Experience proxy 12.398 9.015 9.886 6.565 9.855 5.119
(1.232)*** (0.979)*** (1.062)*** (0.855)*** (1.036)*** (0.769)***
Experience proxy square -0.724 -0.659 -0.532 -0.529 -0.508 -0.437
(0.105)*** (0.097)*** (0.095)*** (0.083)*** (0.094)*** (0.074)***
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.14
N 29,617 29,617 29,617 29,617 29,617 29,617
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals in the incoming rotation group, born in
1979-1988. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see Equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets are
clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample weights attached to the QLFS and
estimated using a linear probability model. Controls include race, education, marital status, the presence
of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another individual who is working, all included in the
regression equation as dummy variables.
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Table A.7: Heterogeneous effects by race
Overall Private Private formal
employment employment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Blacks
δ1 -0.490 -0.925 -0.483 -1.004 -0.891 -1.133
(1.099) (1.023) (1.193) (1.123) (1.117) (1.046)
Experience proxy 10.093 7.966 7.288 5.241 7.614 3.798
(1.212)*** (0.892)*** (1.028)*** (0.778)*** (0.887)*** (0.681)***
Experience proxy square -0.580 -0.535 -0.384 -0.374 -0.374 -0.297
(0.110)*** (0.097)*** (0.096)*** (0.083)*** (0.086)*** (0.073)***
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10
N 45,957 45,957 45,957 45,957 45,957 45,957
B: Whites
δ1 0.393 -0.200 -0.061 -0.672 2.293 1.565
(4.180) (3.811) (4.062) (4.101) (4.083) (4.006)
Experience proxy 9.848 9.835 9.134 9.409 6.598 6.739
(2.210)*** (2.372)*** (2.531)*** (2.666)*** (2.528)** (2.771)**
Experience proxy square -0.765 -0.760 -0.654 -0.682 -0.426 -0.436
(0.205)*** (0.203)*** (0.220)*** (0.220)*** (0.221)* (0.231)*
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07
N 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,221
Notes: Data from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals born in 1979-1988, from the incoming rota-
tion group. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets are
clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample from the QLFS and estimated
using a linear probability model. Controls include gender, education (no education, some primary, primary
completed, some secondary, secondary completed, post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an indi-
vidual older than 65 and the presence of another individual who is working, all included in the regression
equation as dummy variables.
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Table A.8: Heterogeneous effects by level of education
Overall Private Private formal
employment employment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Individuals with less than a matric
δ1 -0.209 -0.769 -0.018 -0.812 -0.515 -0.954
(1.454) (1.359) (1.425) (1.300) (1.194) (1.118)
Experience proxy 7.957 6.409 5.987 4.203 6.076 2.421
(1.260)*** (0.988)*** (1.125)*** (0.893)*** (0.827)*** (0.736)***
Experience proxy square -0.403 -0.420 -0.242 -0.282 -0.236 -0.180
(0.109)*** (0.096)*** (0.101)** (0.086)*** (0.083)*** (0.075)**
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.10
N 30,020 30,020 30,020 30,020 30,020 30,020
B: Individuals with a matric or more
δ1 -0.454 -0.852 -0.451 -0.905 -0.531 -0.850
(1.450) (1.321) (1.597) (1.490) (1.563) (1.456)
Experience proxy 14.879 10.790 12.002 7.478 12.098 6.397
(1.242)*** (0.984)*** (1.291)*** (1.003)*** (1.325)*** (1.028)***
Experience proxy square -1.000 -0.839 -0.726 -0.582 -0.697 -0.512
(0.108)*** (0.091)*** (0.117)*** (0.096)*** (0.121)*** (0.098)***
Controls N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.11
N 25,997 25,997 25,997 25,997 25,997 25,997
Notes: Data from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals born in 1979-1988, from the incoming rota-
tion group. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see equation 1.1). Standard errors in brackets are
clustered at the stratum level. Regressions are weighted using the sample from the QLFS and estimated
using a linear probability model. Controls include race (Blacks, Colored, Asians/Indians, Whites), gender,
marital status, the presence of an individual older than 65 and the presence of another individual who is
working, all included in the regression equation as dummy variables.
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Table A.9: Heterogeneous effects by industry
Main industry Trade Community Financial Manufac- Construction
and social turing
δ1 -0.593 0.705 0.337 -0.619 -0.688
(0.668) (0.628) (0.531) (0.489) (0.447)
R2 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.04
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Eligible cohorts, before policy 11.5 7.4 6.5 5.5 3.8
Private Transport Agriculture Mining
households
δ1 -0.021 0.095 0.307 -0.031
(0.352) (0.370) (0.307) (0.249)
R2 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Eligible cohorts, before policy 2.3 2.5 2.0 1.0
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, born in
1979-1988. δ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator (see Equation 1.1). For each column, the dependent
variable is a dummy variable which is 1 if when an individual is employed in the mentioned industry,
and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated using a linear probability model weighted using the sample
from the QLFS. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the stratum level. Controls are race (Blacks,
Colored, Asians/Indians and Whites), gender, education (no education, some primary, primary completed,
some secondary, secondary completed and post-secondary), marital status, the presence of an individual
older than 65 and the presence of another individual who is working, all included in the regression equation
as dummy variables.
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Table A.10: Effects and local labor market conditions
Employment Private Priv. formal Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Main effects
Young cohorts * post -0.735 -0.765 -0.782 -0.952
(0.893) (0.979) (0.927) (0.926)
R2 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09
B: Adding unemployment rate
Young cohorts * post -0.756 -0.783 -0.811 -0.918
(0.894) (0.980) (0.927) (0.928)
Unemp. rate (35+) -0.229 -0.203 -0.321 0.370
(0.230) (0.226) (0.190)* (0.253)
R2 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
C: Interacting with unemployment rate
Young cohorts * post -1.054 -2.291 0.034 -1.421
(1.835) (2.051) (2.050) (1.820)
Unemp. rate (35+) -0.442 -0.364 -0.445 0.213
(0.266)* (0.246) (0.208)** (0.294)
Young cohorts * post * Unemp. rate (35+) 0.037 0.128 -0.120 0.015
(0.178) (0.190) (0.179) (0.184)
R2 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09
N 56,453 56,453 56,453 56,453
Notes: Data are from the QLFS 2011-2014. Sample: individuals from the incoming rotation group, born
in 1979-1988. This table tests for heterogeneous effects by local market conditions, proxied by the unem-
ployment rate of individuals aged 35 and above. Panel A presents the main results (as in Table 1.2). Panel
B presents the results when the unemployment rate of individuals aged 35 and above is added. Panel C
presents the results when the variable of interest, the interaction of young cohorts and the dummy variable
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter B: Appendix for chapter 2
Figure B.1: Income distribution among migrants and non-migrants
All Africans
Employed Africans only
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011.
Averages for established migrants are computed for those aged 25 or above. Income is self-reported from
all sources.
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Figure B.2: Employment rates of migrants and non-migrants of same origin and language
group
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011.
Averages for established migrants are computed for those aged 25 or above.
Table B.1: Province of birth and internal migration incidence
Whole population Africans
Western cape 5.74 6.05
Eastern cape 13.33 13.87
Northern cape 12.89 12.53
Free state 11.49 9.87
Kwazulu-natal 9.78 9.13




Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: individuals aged 15 to 64 in 2011. Averages for established
migrants are computed for those aged 25 or above.
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Figure B.3: Occupational choices of migrants and non-migrants of same origin and lan-
guage group
Notes: Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011.
Averages for established migrants are computed for those aged 25 or above.
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Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: individuals aged 15 to 64 in 2011. Averages for established
migrants are computed for those aged 25 or above.
Table B.3: Province of birth and current province of residence
Province of birth Current province of residence
WC EC NC FS KN NW GA MP LI
Western cape 43.05 12.86 1.65 1.65 4.75 2.82 28.4 2.89 1.93
Eastern cape 28.28 26.55 0.55 2.25 10.99 6.08 21.73 2.08 1.5
Northern cape 5.72 2.1 48.46 6.17 2.1 12.13 19.29 2.63 1.4
Free state 2.5 1.41 2.35 37.89 2.35 9.4 38.18 4.41 1.51
Kwazulu-natal 1.44 1.56 0.21 1.06 53.98 1.45 34.7 4.76 0.84
North west 0.9 0.28 7.56 2.13 0.56 44.92 38.06 1.77 3.83
Gauteng 3.54 1.8 0.6 2.72 2.51 7.76 70.39 6.32 4.35
Mpumalanga 0.96 0.6 0.37 0.95 1.61 4.43 44.13 40.75 6.2
Limpopo 0.6 0.42 0.28 0.72 0.42 4.89 61.16 6.84 24.67
Total 8.36 7.17 2.07 4.25 12.8 8.5 41.93 7.65 7.27
Notes: The provinces are : WC : Western cape, EC : Eastern cape, NC : Northern cape, FS : Free state, KN
: Kwazulu-natal NW : North west, GA : Gauteng, MP : Mpumalanga, LI : Limpopo.
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Table B.4: Employment and ethnic capital, results at the ethnic group - municipality level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary 0.185 0.156 0.059
(0.042)*** (0.035)*** (0.023)**
Post-secondary 0.351 0.366 0.306
(0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.020)***
Migrant is male 0.270 0.255 0.224
(0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.016)***
Age 25-44 0.188 0.186 0.212
(0.031)*** (0.033)*** (0.020)***
Age 45-65 0.197 0.189 0.269
(0.045)*** (0.046)*** (0.029)***
Ethnic group average characteristics (share)
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.153 0.125 0.067 0.060
(0.041)*** (0.032)*** (0.024)*** (0.021)***
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.344 0.117 0.215 0.106
(0.046)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.024)***
Ethnic group share of male 0.118 0.043 0.104 0.051
(0.033)*** (0.027) (0.020)*** (0.018)***
Ethnic group share 45-64 0.018 -0.059 0.004 -0.020
(0.034) (0.026)** (0.020) (0.019)
R2 0.20 0.06 0.22 0.42 0.52
N 5,542 4,140 4,140 4,135 4,135
Significance of ethnic group characteristics 16.56 6.27 19.43 7.13
P-value of joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnic group fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Local municipality fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Data: South Africa 2011 census. Sample: all Black South
African internal migrants aged 15 to 64 in 2011, aggregated values at the ethnic group - municipality level.
Averages for established migrants are computed for those aged 25 or above. The table presents the OLS
estimates of the regression of the share of employment in each group on individual characteristics and the
characteristics of established migrants of the same ethnic group. Specification 4 and 5 include and fixed
effects for the ethnic group and municipality. The F-tests presented are for the joint significance of the
characteristics of established migrants.
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Table B.5: Employment and ethnic capital, by specific and multiple language proficiency
All No Two Main local language
English languages No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary -0.031 -0.018 -0.031 -0.022 -0.036
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
Post-secondary 0.201 0.198 0.209 0.175 0.218
(0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)***
Person is male 0.167 0.206 0.209 0.179 0.157
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)***
Age 25-44 0.212 0.202 0.195 0.225 0.204
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Age 45-65 0.285 0.282 0.267 0.308 0.271
(0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)***
Ethnic group average characteristics
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.072 0.082 0.114 0.051 0.056
(0.021)*** (0.025)*** (0.039)*** (0.022)** (0.032)*
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.136 0.146 0.101 0.073 0.113
(0.024)*** (0.033)*** (0.049)** (0.026)*** (0.044)**
Ethnic group share of male 0.069 0.089 0.090 0.006 0.072
(0.018)*** (0.023)*** (0.032)*** (0.019) (0.028)***
Ethnic group share 45-64 -0.020 -0.028 -0.022 0.005 -0.060
(0.019) (0.023) (0.036) (0.019) (0.031)*
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12
N 121,793 63,425 35,575 49,052 72,725
Significance of ethnic group characteristics 11.84 8.80 3.86 2.87 3.93
P-value of joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Ethnic group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The table presents the estimates from a linear probability
model explaining the probability of being employed by individual characteristics and the characteristics of
established migrants of the same ethnic group. The sample used is all African internal migrants aged 15 to
64 that moved to another province and to a non-neighboring municipality. The established migrants are all
aged 25 or above. Column 1 presents the main results, as in Table 2.6. Column 2 restricts the sample on
migrants who speak English as first or second language. Column 3 restricts the sample on individuals who
report that they speak two migrants. Column 4 restricts the sample to migrants who do not speak the most
spoken language in their municipality of residence, while column 5 restricts the sample to migrants who
speak the language in their municipality of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnic group x
municipality level. The F-tests presented are for the joint significance of the characteristics of established
migrants.
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Table B.6: Employment and ethnic capital, excluding migrants moving to neighboring
local municipalities or within same province
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary -0.009 -0.018 -0.026
(0.010) (0.008)** (0.008)***
Post-secondary 0.198 0.196 0.188
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Migrant is male 0.187 0.184 0.183
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Age 25-44 0.209 0.209 0.210
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Age 45-65 0.278 0.280 0.284
(0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)***
Ethnic group share (fraction)
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.178 0.044
(0.055)*** (0.023)*
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.218 0.119
(0.038)*** (0.025)***
Ethnic group share of male 0.059 0.036
(0.034)* (0.019)*
Ethnic group share 45-64 -0.064 -0.007
(0.041) (0.020)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.14
N 74,812 73,092 73,089
Significance of ethnic group characteristics (F-stat) 9.28 6.68
P-value of joint significance test 0.00 0.00
Ethnic group fixed effects No No Y
Local municipality fixed effects No No Y
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The table presents the estimates from a linear probability
model explaining the probability of being employed by individual characteristics and the characteristics of
established migrants of the same ethnic group. The sample used is all African internal migrants aged 15
to 64 that moved to another province and to a non-neighboring municipality. The established migrants are
all aged 25 or above. Specification 1 contains only individual characteristics, whereas 2 and 3 introduce
ethnic group characteristics and fixed effects for the ethnic group and the municipality. Standard errors are
clustered at the ethnic group x municipality level. The F-tests presented are for the joint significance of the
characteristics of established migrants.
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Table B.7: Employment and ethnic capital: results for migrants aged 25-64
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary -0.026 -0.030 -0.035
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Post-secondary 0.210 0.209 0.204
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Age 45-65 0.072 0.073 0.074
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Person is male 0.166 0.163 0.161
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Ethnic group share (fraction)
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.115 0.046
(0.032)*** (0.020)**
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.194 0.132
(0.034)*** (0.022)***
Ethnic group share of male 0.081 0.063
(0.027)*** (0.017)***
Ethnic group share 45-64 -0.026 -0.018
(0.026) (0.018)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.09
N 94,966 93,247 93,244
Significance of ethnic group characteristics (F-stat) 10.75 12.66
P-value of joint significance test 0.00 0.00
Ethnic group fixed effects No No Y
Local municipality fixed effects No No Y
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The table presents the estimates from a linear probability
model explaining the probability of being employed by individual characteristics and the characteristics
of established migrants of the same ethnic group characteristics. The sample used is all African internal
migrants aged 25 to 64. The established migrants are all aged 25 or above. Specification 1 contains only
individual characteristics, whereas 2 and 3 introduce ethnic group characteristics and fixed effects for the
ethnic group and the municipality. The F-tests presented are for the joint significance of the characteristics
of established migrants.
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Table B.8: Employment and ethnic capital: results for the province of Gauteng
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant own characteristics (dummy variables)
No education or some primary -0.025 -0.026 -0.027
(0.010)** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
Post-secondary 0.203 0.194 0.194
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Person is male 0.153 0.156 0.157
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Age 25-44 0.242 0.240 0.239
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Age 45-65 0.348 0.340 0.338
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Ethnic group share (fraction)
Ethnic group share with primary or no education 0.141 0.078
(0.052)*** (0.072)
Ethnic group share with post-secondary education 0.340 0.197
(0.084)*** (0.082)**
Ethnic group share of male -0.055 0.035
(0.050) (0.052)
Ethnic group share 45-64 0.193 0.063
(0.057)*** (0.053)
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13
N 51,957 51,867 51,867
Significance of ethnic group characteristics 10.57 1.87
P-value of joint significance test 0.00 0.11
Ethnic group fixed effects No No Y
Local municipality fixed effects No No Y
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The table presents the estimates from a linear probability
model explaining the probability of being employed by individual characteristics and the characteristics
of established migrants of the same ethnic group characteristics. The sample used is all African internal
migrants aged 15 to 64 that moved to Gauteng. Specification 1 contains only individual characteristics,
whereas 2 and 3 introduce ethnic group characteristics and fixed effects for the ethnic group and the munic-
ipality. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnic group x municipality level. The F-tests presented are for
the joint significance of the characteristics of established migrants.
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Table B.9: Level of education and occupational choice
Grouped occupation No school Some primary Completed Some seco Grade 12 Higher
Manager 2.23 5.53 2.35 22.38 37.4 29.45
Professional 1.41 3.69 1.48 14.09 24.11 54.5
Technician 2.03 4.57 2.02 20.77 37.88 31.86
Clerk 1.87 4.64 2.28 24.34 48.56 17.86
Sales and services 3.2 7.7 3.67 34.33 39.83 10.91
Skilled agriculture 8.11 12.93 5.25 31.51 28.94 12.96
Craft and related traders 4.6 11.06 5.5 39.58 29.58 9.34
Plant and machine operators 4.71 11.96 5.19 37.86 31.01 8.9
Elementary occupations 7.36 14.5 6.38 39.9 25.45 6.16
Domestic workers 7.81 16.82 6.97 40.3 22.27 5.56
Table B.10: First-stage of IV-estimates
Ethnic group share with (2011) Primary Post-secondary Male 45-65
Ethnic group share with (in 2001)
Primary or no education 0.178 -0.050 0.039 -0.003
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)
Post-secondary education 0.005 0.168 0.018 0.087
(0.004) (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Gender: male 0.045 0.027 0.202 -0.010
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Age 45-65 -0.020 0.013 -0.024 0.082
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
R2 0.66 0.47 0.54 0.36
N 99,410 99,410 99,410 99,410
F-statistic for excluded instruments 1658.98 1422.31 1774.41 364.65
Language X origin fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Residence fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The table presents the first stage results for the IV estimates
presented in Table . The dependent variables are the 2011 average characteristics of established migrants of
the same ethnic group at the place of residence. The instruments are the value of these averages for 2001.
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Chapter C: Appendix for chapter 3
Table C.1: Sample distribution across RCT and LFEs
# of Cooperatives # of farmers in survey # farmers in admin data
Was in LFEs? No Yes No Yes No Yes
RCT Condition A 10 7 114 80 320 207
RCT Condition B 15 6 173 68 640 201
RCT Condition C 14 6 160 59 360 276
RCT Condition D 14 7 156 72 418 331
Total 53 26 603 279 1738 1015
Condition A is the control group in the RCT
Conditions B, C, and D are treatment variations (see Section 3.4.2 or Table C.3)
Table C.2: Distribution of Baseline and Communication Coordination Games
Variable BCG CCG Total
# Sessions 28 28 56
# Rounds 112 110 222
# Players 429 410 839
# Observations 1716 1600 3316
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Table C.3: RCT treatments
RCT Condition What is revealed?
A – – –
B Aggregate intentions – –
C Aggregate intentions Distribution –
D Aggregate intentions Distribution Leader vs. Member




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.7: PSP estimates: LFE cheap-talk effect in Table 3.1 - column 1 (β = 0.66)
k = 1 k = 2 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15
π
0.01 0.118 0.084 0.043 0.025 0.018
0.02 0.212 0.156 0.082 0.048 0.037
0.05 0.410 0.323 0.188 0.116 0.089
0.1 0.595 0.502 0.328 0.217 0.172
0.2 0.767 0.694 0.524 0.384 0.318
0.3 0.850 0.795 0.653 0.516 0.444
0.35 0.877 0.830 0.703 0.573 0.501
0.55 0.942 0.917 0.843 0.753 0.695
Note: PSP = (1−β
k)π
(1−βk)π+[1−(1−α)k](1−π) , where:
typical power = 1− β, α = 0.05, π = a prior
k represents the number of independent researchers
working on specific associations in a field
(i.e., competition)
Table C.8: PSP estimates: RCT cheap-talk effect in Table 3.1 - column 5 (β = 0.99)
k = 1 k = 2 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15
π
0.01 0.167 0.094 0.043 0.025 0.018
0.02 0.288 0.173 0.083 0.048 0.037
0.05 0.510 0.351 0.189 0.116 0.089
0.1 0.688 0.533 0.329 0.217 0.172
0.2 0.832 0.719 0.525 0.384 0.318
0.3 0.895 0.815 0.655 0.516 0.444
0.35 0.914 0.847 0.704 0.573 0.501
0.55 0.960 0.926 0.844 0.753 0.695
Note: See Table C.7 for definition of PSP .
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Table C.9: Effect on collective commercialization - Tobit model
Dependent variable Contributed to group
Source RCT - survey data
Treatment 278.60 -622.40 460.23 -88.53
(295.31) (550.79) (258.33) (512.10)
Size of Group 27.50 -2.87 25.79 7.97
(6.20) (15.59) (6.50) (15.38)
Treatment X Size 31.70 18.94
(16.94) (16.57)
Control group mean 39.58
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
N 882 873 873 873
Control No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the estimations of the main equation of interest (collective commercialization on
treatment) using a Tobit model for the null quantities reported. The dependent variable is the quantity of
groundnuts sold through the group. Controls include age, sex, land size, generosity, risk aversion mea-
sures and time preferences elicited through hypothetical questions (see Table C.4), and dummies for the
federation, whether the farmer is a leader, and whether the farmer produced crops other than groundnuts,
all measured pre-intervention. A dummy for whether the individual indicated positive intentions to sell
through the group is also added.
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Table C.10: Effect on collective commercialization - inverse hyperbolic sine transforma-
tion
Dependent variable Contributed to group
Source RCT - survey data
Treatment 0.42 -1.13 0.64 -0.52
(0.39) (0.68) (0.34) (0.63)
Size of Group 0.05 -0.00 0.05 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Treatment X Size 0.06 0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
Control group mean 39.58
R2 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.17
N 882 873 873 873
Control No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. The dependent variable is the quantity of
groundnuts sold through the group, transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine. Controls include age, sex,
land size, generosity, risk aversion measures and time preferences elicited through hypothetical questions
(see Table C.4), and dummies for the federation, whether the farmer is a leader, and whether the farmer
produced crops other than groundnuts, all measured pre-intervention. A dummy for whether the individual
indicated positive intentions to sell through the group is also added.
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Table C.11: Intensive margin results for LFEs: testing sensitivity to farmer random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.40 -0.03 0.40 -0.03
(0.19) (0.31) (0.19) (0.31)
Size of PO 0.03 -0.31 0.03 -0.30
(0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.27)
Treatment X Size 0.65 0.64
(0.38) (0.38)
R2 0.09 0.10
N 3,316 3,316 3,316 3,316
Farmer random effects No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. The table reproduces the results in Table 3.1 and
explores the sensitivity to the inclusion of farmer random effects. All estimations use data from the LFEs.
The dependent variable is the number of chips. The size in the specifications is a dummy variable that is
1 if the experimental session was run with 20 farmers and 0 if it was run with 10 farmers. Columns 3 and
4 include a farmer random effect. Controls in the LFE regressions include age, sex, land size, education
(dummy for going to a French school versus a Koranic or no schooling), generosity, risk aversion measures
and time preferences elicited through hypothetical questions (see Table C.4), and dummies for the federation
and whether the farmer is a leader.
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Table C.12: Isolating the effect of group size from that of the threshold (LFEs)
Dependent variable # Chips contributed
Source (recall Section 3.4.1) LFE
Treatment 0.40 -0.03 0.22 -0.03 0.36 -0.02
(0.19) (0.31) (0.21) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29)
Size of Group 0.03 -0.31 -0.27 -0.53 -0.00 -0.38
(0.24) (0.27) (0.21) (0.35) (0.23) (0.25)
Treatment X Size 0.65 0.53 0.77
(0.38) (0.41) (0.44)
Control group mean 3.03 3.09 3.09
R2 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12
N 3,316 3,316 2,116 2,116 2,320 2,320
Fixed threshold? No Yes - Average Yes - Overall
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. All columns use data from the LFEs. The dependent
variable is the number of chips. The size in all specifications is a dummy variable that is 1 if the experimental
session was run with 20 farmers and 0 if it was run with 10 farmers. Columns 1 and 2 use data from all
LFEs regardless of the threshold required for coordination. Columns 3 and 4 only use data from the LFEs
where the average (per-player) number of chips required to reach the threshold was the same across large
and small groups. Columns 5 and 6 only use data from the LFEs where the overall threshold was fixed
across small and large groups. Controls in the regressions include age, sex, land size, education (dummy
for going to a French school versus a Koranic or no schooling), generosity, risk aversion measures and time
preferences elicited through hypothetical questions (see Table C.4), and dummies for the federation and
whether the farmer is a leader.
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Table C.13: Robustness check: effect of the treatment on patience, generosity and risk
Dependent variable Patience Generosity Risk
Source RCT - survey
Binary treatment
Treatment -0.15 -0.14 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.40
(0.11) (0.28) (0.10) (0.20) (0.11) (0.33)
Size of Group -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Treatment X Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04
N 873 873 873 873 873 873
Treatment arms
B -0.12 -0.04 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.44
(0.13) (0.32) (0.12) (0.26) (0.13) (0.35)
C -0.29 -0.22 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.30
(0.14) (0.32) (0.12) (0.25) (0.16) (0.37)
D -0.04 -0.15 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.48
(0.14) (0.32) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.38)
Size of Group -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
B X Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
C X Size -0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D X Size 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Control group mean 1.84 1.84 3.10 3.10 2.15 2.15
R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04
N 873 873 873 873 873 873
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. See Table C.4 for definitions of generosity/social
preferences, risk preferences, and patience/time preferences. All dependent variables were measured af-
ter the intervention and in the same way they were measured before the intervention. Their values pre-
intervention are used as controls in the regressions. Additional controls include age, sex, land size, and
dummies for the federation, whether the farmer is a leader, and whether the farmer produced crops other








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.15: Collective commercialization and aggregate intentions
Dependent variable Contributed to group
Source RCT - survey data
Treatment 91.90 -16.87 121.66 50.55
(37.79) (36.80) (34.92) (35.13)
Aggregate intentions (tonnes) 3.41 -0.49 0.58 -1.83
(1.08) (0.51) (1.46) (1.29)
Treatment X Aggregate intentions 4.59 2.96
(1.42) (1.44)
Control group mean 39.58
R2 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.18
N 873 873 873 873
Controls? No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. The dependent variable is the quantity of groundnuts
sold through the group. Aggregate intentions (in tonnes) are obtained as the sum of the individual intentions
reported by farmers. Controls include age, sex, land size, generosity, risk aversion measures and time
preferences elicited through hypothetical questions (see Table C.4), cooperative size, and dummies for the
federation, whether the farmer is a leader, and whether the farmer produced crops other than groundnuts,
all measured pre-intervention. A dummy for whether the individual indicated positive intentions to sell
through the group is also added.
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Table C.16: Collective commercialization and leader’s intentions
Dependent variable Contributed to group
Source RCT - survey data
B 73.39 108.56 57.59 88.06
(48.97) (43.60) (44.72) (40.47)
C 133.66 169.72 148.73 181.64
(56.57) (54.83) (60.85) (58.72)
D 125.63 144.68 70.84 117.12
(63.79) (59.99) (43.04) (45.77)
Average intentions leader 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Average intentions member -0.04 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03)
D X Average intentions leader 0.06 0.03
(0.07) (0.08)
D X Average intentions member -0.10 -0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Leader’s intentions -/- member’s ≥ 0 46.66 49.67
(49.42) (45.38)
D X difference ≥ 0 43.34 6.62
(72.45) (71.19)
Size of Group 7.14 6.97 7.52 7.19
(2.03) (2.18) (1.96) (1.92)
Control group mean 39.58
R2 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.18
N 868 868 868 868
Control No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. The dependent variable is the quantity of groundnuts
sold through the group. Average intentions are used as an explanatory variable. This information was only
revealed in the RCT Group D. Controls include age, sex, land size, generosity, risk aversion measures and
time preferences elicited through hypothetical questions (see Table C.4), and dummies for the federation,
whether the farmer is a leader, and whether the farmer produced crops other than groundnuts, all measured

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.18: Comparing farmers in LFE cooperatives to farmers in non-LFE cooperatives
LFE cooperatives
N All No Yes P-value of diff. Omnibus test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 882 46.27 46.84 45.05 0.16 -0.00
(0.00)
Sex (1=male; 0=female) 873 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.63 -0.03
(0.07)
Leader (1=yes, 0=no) 873 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.52 -0.04
(0.03)
Size of land (ha) 873 4.25 4.39 3.96 0.60 0.00
(0.00)
Risk (1 to 5) 873 2.80 2.73 2.96 0.09 0.02
(0.01)
Generosity (1 to 7) 873 2.92 2.80 3.16 0.04 0.04
(0.02)
Patience (1 to 5) [pre-intervention] 873 2.52 2.56 2.44 0.45 -0.02
(0.01)
Federation (1=CCPA, 0=FEGPAB) 873 0.52 0.58 0.40 0.13 -0.14
(0.10)
2013 harvest (kg) 873 1,680.85 1,621.40 1,807.42 0.58 0.02
(0.01)
Expected 2014 harvest (kg) 873 1,628.10 1,719.93 1,432.58 0.45 -0.02
(0.01)
Intended to coll. com. : 1=yes, 0=no 873 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.33 0.06
(0.04)
Intentions coll. com. (kg) 873 966.43 989.81 916.64 0.78 0.01
(0.02)
Intentions indiv. com. (kg) 873 148.05 183.93 71.65 0.05 -0.02
(0.02)
Farmed other crops : 1=yes, 0=no 873 0.57 0.53 0.66 0.02 0.10
(0.05)
Attended int. revelation meeting: 1=yes; 0=no 882 0.59 0.52 0.72 0.00 0.17
(0.04)
Omnibus test F-stat 4.04
Omnibus test P-value 0.00
Notes: The p-values in the last column are reported from two-tailed t-tests, and the standard errors for
the tests are clustered at group level. Column 6 presents the results of an omnibus test, which regresses
the dummy for being in a games cooperative against all the variables on which balance is tested. The
table here compares farmers in the LFE cooperative sample to those who later took part only in the RCT.
All the variables, except for the attendance at the intention revelation meeting, were measured before the
intervention, i.e., before revealing intentions. See Table C.4 for definitions of generosity/social preferences,
risk preferences, and patience/time preferences.
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